The Journal of Finance

Circuit Breakers and Market Volatility: A Theoretical Perspective

Published: 03/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04427.x

AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM

This paper examines ex ante effects of circuit breakers (mandated trading halts). We show that circuit breakers, by causing agents to suboptimally advance trades in time, may have the perverse effect of increasing price variability and exacerbating price movements. We next consider a situation in which a circuit breaker causes trading to be halted in both a dominant (more liquid) and a satellite market. As agents switch from the dominant market to the satellite market, price variability and market liquidity decline on the dominant market and increase on the satellite market.

Feedback from Stock Prices to Cash Flows

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00409

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Sheridan Titman

Feedback from financial market prices to cash flows arises when a firm's nonfinancial stakeholders, for example, its customers, employees, and suppliers, make decisions that are contingent on the information revealed by the price. Complementarities across stakeholders result in cascades, wherein relatively small stock price moves trigger substantial changes in asset values. This paper analyzes the relation between such feedback effects and parameters such as the information cost, the volatility of existing projects, the risk aversion of liquidity suppliers, and the precision of managerial information.

On Intraday Risk Premia

Published: 03/01/1995   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05176.x

MATTHEW SPIEGEL, AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM

This article presents a framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of anticipated large demand pressures on asset risk premia. We show that large institutions who can time their entry into the market will trade either at the open, or during periods of unusual demand pressures. We show that if these institutions do enter later in the day, they trade in the same direction as institutions which provide liquidity continuously; institutions therefore appear to exhibit “herding” behavior. We also explore how changing the uncertainty of demand pressures late in the day affects trading costs throughout the day.

The Going‐Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00136

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Sheridan Titman

This paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency, the choice between private and public financing, and the development of capital markets in emerging economies. Generally, the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire, and if investors receive valuable information without cost. The value of public firms generally depends on public market size, which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public, so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public. The model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development.

Investor Psychology and Security Market Under‐ and Overreactions

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00077

Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

We propose a theory of securities market under‐ and overreactions based on two well‐known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self‐attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long‐lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public‐event‐based return predictability. Biased self‐attribution adds positive short‐lag autocorrelations (“momentum”), short‐run earnings “drift,” but negative correlation between future returns and long‐term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate financial policy.

Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition

Published: 03/01/1992   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03985.x

CRAIG W. HOLDEN, AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM

We develop a multi‐period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long‐lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.

Market Liquidity and Trading Activity

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00335

Tarun Chordia, Richard Roll, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

Previous studies of liquidity span short time periods and focus on the individual security. In contrast, we study aggregate market spreads, depths, and trading activity for U.S. equities over an extended time sample. Daily changes in market averages of liquidity and trading activity are highly volatile and negatively serially dependent. Liquidity plummets significantly in down markets. Recent market volatility induces a decrease in trading activity and spreads. There are strong day‐of‐the‐week effects; Fridays accompany a significant decrease in trading activity and liquidity, while Tuesdays display the opposite pattern. Long‐ and short‐term interest rates influence liquidity. Depth and trading activity increase just prior to major macroeconomic announcements.

Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others

Published: 12/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04777.x

DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM, SHERIDAN TITMAN

In existing models of information acquisition, all informed investors receive their information at the same time. This article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others. The model implies that, under some conditions, investors will focus only on a subset of securities (“herding”), while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics. In addition, the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft‐cited trading strategies such as profit taking (short‐term position reversal) and following the leader (mimicking earlier trades).

Liquidity and the Law of One Price: The Case of the Futures‐Cash Basis

Published: 09/04/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01273.x

RICHARD ROLL, EDUARDO SCHWARTZ, AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM

Deviations from no‐arbitrage relations should be related to market liquidity, because liquidity facilitates arbitrage. At the same time, a wide futures‐cash basis may trigger arbitrage trades and, in turn, affect liquidity. We test these ideas by studying the dynamic relation between stock market liquidity and the index futures basis. There is evidence of two‐way Granger causality between the short‐term absolute basis and liquidity, and liquidity Granger‐causes longer‐term absolute bases. Shocks to the absolute basis predict future stock market liquidity. The evidence suggests that liquidity enhances the efficiency of the futures‐cash pricing system.

Overconfidence, Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pricing

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00350

Kent D. Daniel, David Hirshleifer, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

This paper offers a model in which asset prices reflect both covariance risk and misperceptions of firms' prospects, and in which arbitrageurs trade against mispricing. In equilibrium, expected returns are linearly related to both risk and mispricing measures (e.g., fundamental/price ratios). With many securities, mispricing of idiosyncratic value components diminishes but systematic mispricing does not. The theory offers untested empirical implications about volume, volatility, fundamental/price ratios, and mean returns, and is consistent with several empirical findings. These include the ability of fundamental/price ratios and market value to forecast returns, and the domination of beta by these variables in some studies.

Leverage Is a Double‐Edged Sword

Published: 02/15/2024   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13316

AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM, KE TANG, JINGYUAN WANG, XUEWEI YANG

We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out‐of‐sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.