The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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DISCUSSION
Published: 05/01/1975 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01815.x
John S. Bilbersee, Jacob Bichaelsen
Matching Capital and Labor
Published: 06/22/2017 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12542
JONATHAN B. BERK, JULES H. BINSBERGEN, BINYING LIU
We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm's decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm's funds.
CRITERIA FOR GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: COMMENT
Published: 12/01/1951 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04485.x
J. M. Buchanan
VALUATION OF INVENTORIES FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES*
Published: 12/01/1958 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04223.x
J. F. Barron
Regulation of Charlatans in High‐Skill Professions
Published: 02/06/2022 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13112
JONATHAN B. BERK, JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN
We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.
DISCUSSION
Published: 07/01/1984 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03664.x
JAMES L. BICKSLER
Nontransferable Interest‐Bearing National Debt
Published: 09/01/1980 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03518.x
JOHN BRYANT
Good‐Specific Habit Formation and the Cross‐Section of Expected Returns
Published: 02/22/2016 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12397
JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN
I study asset prices in a general equilibrium framework in which agents form habits over individual varieties of goods rather than over an aggregate consumption bundle. Goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms whose elasticities of demand depend on consumers' habit formation. Firms that produce goods with a high habit level relative to consumption have low demand elasticities, set high prices for their product, have low expected returns on their stock, and have low asset pricing betas and stock return volatilities. I find supportive evidence for these predictions in the data.
THE STATE OF THE FINANCE FIELD: A FURTHER COMMENT
Published: 09/01/1972 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01322.x
J. L. Bicksler
Trade Credit and Industry Dynamics: Evidence from Trucking Firms
Published: 10/13/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12371
JEAN‐NOËL BARROT
Long payment terms are a strong impediment to the entry and survival of liquidity‐constrained firms. To test this idea and its implications, I consider the effect of a reform restricting the trade credit supply of French trucking firms. In a difference‐in‐differences setting, I find that trucking firms' corporate default probability decreases by 25% following the restriction. The effect is persistent, concentrated among liquidity‐constrained firms, and not offset by a decrease in profits. The restriction also triggers an increase in the entry of small trucking firms.
Rumors
Published: 07/15/2003 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00575
Jos Van Bommel
A Kyle (1985) model with private information diffusion is used to examine the motivation to spread stock tips. An informed investor with limited investment capacity spreads imprecise rumors to an audience of followers. Followers trade on the advice and move the price. Due to the imprecision of the rumor, the price overshoots with positive probability. This gives the rumormonger the opportunity to trade twice: First when she receives information, then when she knows the price to be overshooting. In equilibrium, rumors are informative and both rumormongers and followers increase their profits at the expense of uninformed liquidity traders.