Abstract: This paper studies how homeowners insurance markets respond to growing climate losses and how this impacts mortgage market dynamics. Using Florida as a case study, we show that traditional insurers are exiting high risk areas, and new lower quality insurers are entering and filling the gap. These new insurers service the riskiest areas, are less diversified, hold less capital, and 20 percent of them become insolvent. We trace their growth to a lax insurance regulatory environment. Yet, despite their low quality, these insurers secure high financial stability ratings, not from traditional rating agencies, but from emerging rating agencies. Importantly, these ratings are high enough to meet the minimum rating requirements set by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). We find that these new insurers would not meet GSE eligibility thresholds if subjected to traditional rating agencies’ methodologies. We then examine the implications of these dynamics for mortgage markets. We show that lenders respond to the decline in insurance quality by selling a large portion of exposed loans to the GSEs. We quantify the counterparty risk by examining the surge in serious delinquencies and foreclosure around the landfall of Hurricane Irma. Our results show that the GSEs bear a large share of insurance counterparty risk, which is driven by their mis-calibrated insurer eligibility requirements and lax insurance regulation.
Abstract: Many young employees work on a temporary basis, which entails significantly greater income risk than “permanent” work, even for jobs in the same occupation and at a similar wage. We find that this income uncertainty leads lenders to ration credit to temporary workers, precisely at the stage of life when permanent workers rely on mortgages to invest in housing and loans to smooth consumption and purchase durable goods. Labor laws that improve job security for permanent workers create a dual credit market alongside the dual labor market, making it harder for young adults to establish financial independence and new families.
Discussant: Michaela Pagel, Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract: Are households with low financial skills disadvantaged in the mortgage market? Using stochastic record linking, we construct a unique U.S. dataset encompassing a rich set of mortgage details and borrowers’ characteristics, including their objective financial literacy measure. We find that households with low financial literacy are up to 4% more likely to search less and lock in at 15-20 b.p. higher rates. Upon origination, unskilled borrowers face a 35-45% higher mortgage delinquency and end up with a 30% lower likelihood of refinancing. Overall, for a $100,000 loan, the potential losses from low financial literacy are more than $9,329 over the mortgage duration. To understand how financial education, more accessible mortgages, or mortgage rate changes affect households with low financial literacy, we formulate and calibrate a mortgage search model with heterogeneous search frictions and endogenous financial skills. Our model estimates show that search intensity and financial skill variations contribute to 55% and 10% of mortgage rate variations, respectively. We find that i) more accessible mortgages lead to a higher delinquency risk among low-skilled households, ii) financial education mitigates the adverse effects of increased accessibility, and iii) low mortgage rates favor high-skilled homeowners and, by reinforcing refinancing activity, deepen consumption differences across different financial skill levels.
Discussant: Sheisha Kulkarni, University of Virginia
Abstract: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) publicly disclosed consumer complaint narratives in 2015. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that, following disclosure, CFPB-supervised banks whose complaint narratives are disclosed are less prone to discriminate against minority borrowers in the mortgage lending market. This reduces racial disparities in interest rates, default rates, and rejection rates. The disclosure saves minority borrowers $102 million in interest payments and aids over 14,000 minority households in securing loans annually, thereby narrowing the racial gap in homeownership. Stakeholders including consumers, peer banks, and stock market investors facilitate the disclosure’s effects on reducing discrimination.
Discussant: Feng Liu, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
