The Long and Short of Financial Development

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Abstract

By improving the pledgeability of returns to financiers, financial development enhances a producer's ability to raise capital to fund long term complex investments. Consequently, it should increase output and welfare. However, a general equilibrium analysis suggests this is not always so. We consider an economy where producers and consuming/financing households are distinct agents, where producers lack sufficient capital, and where households care about both pledgeable returns and liquidity. In this economy, the greater pledgeability of long-term project earnings can reduce long term production and overall welfare, even though it makes financing more accessible. Our results have implications for why economies face impediments to financial development and overall growth, especially when producer capital is scarce.

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1 Introduction

A fundamental challenge in development is transitioning from simple, quick economic production processes with low returns to more complex, longer-term processes that generate higher returns. Financing such production is a complicating factor. To access household savings, producers must offer attractive financial claims with good returns. However, conflicts of interest, moral hazard, and low transparency can limit producers' ability to pledge future output from productive investments to claim-holding households, especially for longer-run production processes. Financial development, for instance, through improved corporate governance, should increase the financeability of long-term complex projects by enhancing the pledgeability of output. This, in turn, should increase high-return production and foster economic growth. Yet the impediments to financial development seem more than simply a lack of awareness of its benefits. What might they be?

We consider economic situations with three characteristics. First, producers have a choice between simple short production and complex long production. Because they have limited capital, production can be enhanced if they raise external funds by issuing financial claims to households. Second, the pledgeability of producer output to financing households is typically low, especially for long-duration, complex production. This immediately implies that producers must co-invest their own capital to make up the difference between required investment and available external funds. Consequently, production is limited by producers' capital. Low producer capital and low relative pledgeability of long production also mean that producers can only offer low rates of return to households on their claims, with the remaining return accruing as rents to producers. These "rents from financing" accrue despite producers being competitive, and are critical in the analysis. Third, financing households are also consumers (which is what we will call them from now on) with potentially different and uncertain preferences for consumption over time. Their possible desire for early consumption, and hence liquidity, will affect their allocations to and pricing of financial claims. These three elements are crucial to our results.

Let us be more specific. Competitive and homogeneous producers can undertake either short-term lower-return investments making tradeable goods using simple, transparent methods (such as planting seeds for fresh vegetables, mining for silver or gold, or holding inventories of commodities to trade them) or higher-return complex investment with an extended duration between input and final output (such as building a factory to produce canned tomato paste or bicycles). Producers value consumption equally at any time, caring only about their overall returns.

Each of these investments has an associated pledgeability — defined as the share of output that can be committed to be paid to outside investors. Short pledgeability is the share of output from the short term investment that can be paid out. For inventory investment, think of more effective and easily monitored warehousing technology that ensures the pledged inventory is available to support any lender's efforts to collect promised payment. Long pledgeability is similarly defined as the share of output from the long term investment that can be paid out, reflecting for instance the quality of corporate governance, which ensures the long term investment is managed in the interests of investors. With quick turnaround from input to output on short investment, producers can more easily commit to repaying outside financiers, while the longer timeline and more complex processes for long investments make it harder for producers to commit to repayments. We term increases in long pledgeability *financial development* and increases in short pledgeability *credit development*.

Producers are endowed with some capital but can also secure funding for a portion of their real investments by issuing financial claims to consumers. The amount of funding they can obtain is limited to the present value of the pledgeable portion of their production output.

Consumers also have some capital but cannot produce on their own. They can finance producers but cannot save elsewhere, though access to low return storage is easily accommodated. They are also uncertain about when they need to consume. Therefore, they will value the liquidity of financial claims, defined as the return they can obtain at an early date, in addition to valuing long-term returns.

We assume a competitive financial market on each date. This market allows competing producers to issue financial claims to consumers initially and later allows consumers to trade financial claims with each other. Importantly, limited producer capital coupled with limited pledgeability of output to consumers gives producers rents from financing that cannot be competed away. These rents may differ for short and long assets.

Competition among producers (all with access to the same technologies) requires them to pass through to consumers as much of the output produced as is pledgeable. Because producers can undertake either short or long term investment and can raise funding in a competitive market, producer returns on either investment, including the rents from financing, must be equal if both investments are undertaken; else, only the investment with the higher return to producers will be undertaken. The rates of return available to consumers on short term and long term financial claims depend on the degree of pledgeability of output from each maturity as well as on the market price for those claims when issued or resold. Long-term claims are illiquid if they resell at interim dates for low prices. Those holding short claims can then buy the cheap long claim to obtain higher long term returns.

The core of our analysis focuses on a key conflict of interest: when an investment becomes more pledgeable, producers can commit to pay out more of that asset's output to consumers, and competition forces them to do so. Whereas this increases financeability, it could reduce the producer's rents from producing that asset, and consequently the attractiveness of producing more of it. Consumer returns from buying financial claims on the asset move in the opposite direction to producer returns, which also affects consumer allocations to claims. This implies that an increase in the pledgeability of the long asset, that is, *financial development*, does not always increase producer production or consumer financing of it, unlike what a partial-equilibrium analysis might suggest.

Some examples may help fix ideas. Start with the case when assets are fully pledgeable. In that case, competitive producers will pledge all the returns from externally-financed projects to consumers (so producers get no rents from financing), and the producers do not need to make up financing shortfalls in any asset with their own capital. They will invest their own capital in higher return long production for their own consumption. Consumers allocate their capital by trading off the higher return from long-term claims and the liquidity offered by short-term claims.

Now consider lower levels of asset pledgeability. Start first with the case where producers have large amounts of capital relative to consumers, and so can co-invest as needed. Producers pay out up to the pledgeable portion of output, but they have to raise only a small fraction of the investment needed in each project from consumers, co-investing the rest. Producer competition will ensure that the rents from financing the long asset are driven to zero, and consumers are paid the return on their small holdings of long claims they would get if the long asset were fully pledgeable. Consumers will get higher returns from the long claim, with the liquidity benefits from the short financial claim motivating them to hold both claims in equilibrium.

By way of contrast, consider the case where producers have no capital. In that case, the output that will accrue to consumers is only what is pledgeable. Since the consumer has to put up all the funds for investment, he might allocate them to financing only the short asset if the pledgeable returns from the short asset exceed the pledgeable returns on the long asset. In this case, pledgeability determines what is produced, and the lower pledgeability of the long asset may cause it to be dominated. However, the producers make substantial "rents from financing" since they pay out only the pledgeable part of any output, retaining the rest of the output for themselves despite not investing a cent, and despite markets being competitive. The rents stem from the producers' monopoly over production, with the lack of pledgeability (and of producer capital) effectively limiting competition.

The main body of the paper focuses on what happens when neither long pledgeability nor producer capital are at extremes. We will see that the level of long pledgeability affects how increases in it (financial development) play out. A critical level is when the pledgeable return of the high return long term project just equals the pledgeable return on the more pledgeable low return short term project. *Ceteris paribus*, above this level of long pledgeability, project pledgeability and project returns are *aligned*, that is, higher return projects generate more pledgeable output, while they are *misaligned* at levels below, in that the lower return project generates more pledgeable output.

At very low levels of long pledgeability, returns and pledgeability are grossly misaligned, and only the short term project will be undertaken. Financial development over a range has no effect on project choice or output. The outcomes here are reminiscent of primitive economies where the accent is on simple subsistence production and commodity trade.

At higher levels of long pledgeability, while returns and pledgeability are still misaligned, we will see financial development helps increase producer and consumer allocations to the long asset. However, producers get a disproportionate share of the additional returns, so much so that consumers are worse off. So in this region, consumers would not support financial development.

Matters change considerably when long pledgeability increases further, aligning returns with pledgeability, so that higher return projects also have more pledgeable output. Intriguingly, at these levels of financial development, consumers' liquidity concerns ensure their capital allocations to different financial claims are fixed. So financial development results in a higher consumer return on long financial claims, and thus lower rents from financing to the producer. Producers will have incentives to tilt towards production that is less pledgeable, that is, the short term lower return asset, which contradicts the partial-equilibrium intuition that an increase in pledgeability of an asset, and thus an increase in the financing available for it, should increase its production. Over a range, financial development reduces the share of aggregate capital that is devoted to long projects, and reduces producer welfare, as well as overall output, while enhancing consumer returns. Consequently, producers have an incentive to oppose financial development in this region, akin to a middle-development trap.

Finally, at very high levels of long pledgeability, the elimination of rents from financing longs will make producers abandon opposition to financial development. Conflicts of interest over greater pledgeability dissipate.

The important message is that no single constituency (that is, producers or consumers) has an incentive to favor financial development at every level of long pledgeability. Regardless of the government in place at an early level of long pledgeability (for example, pro-producer oligarchy or pro-consumer democracy), it will turn against financial development eventually. The sobering message is that conflicts of interest over further development dissipate only when long pledgeability is at a high level or when producers are wealthy. This suggests a version of what is termed the Matthew effect ("to everyone who has will more be given,...") may apply to financial development also. It also suggests why in a developing economy, an initial increase in inequality, with producers having relatively more capital, may be associated with more growth, as Simon Kuznets observed.

We also examine the effects of increases in short asset pledgeability, that is, *credit development*. We find that it makes the consumer better off, and makes the producer (weakly) worse off. The effects on overall welfare are, once again, more ambiguous.

Our work is not just relevant to developing countries. One reason behind misaligned returns is the informativeness of data on future outcomes. As shown by Dessaint et al. (2024) and Dessaint et al. (2023), big data (such as social media) is mainly informative about short-term future outcomes, and this can have real effects on investments. In addition, the rising importance of intangibles, especially in intellectual-property-intensive sectors, can cause returns and pledgeability to become misaligned even in developed countries. Similarly, risk-bearing producer capital can shrink relative to consumer capital in times of economic adversity, while expanding in booms. We draw out implications for business cycles later in the paper.

The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the model, and analyze equilibria for various parameters in section 3. In section 4, we examine incentives for financial development given the comparative statics of various equilibria if decision making is in different hands, and relate our work to the literature in section 5. In section 6, we discuss the model's robustness with respect to risk aversion and limited participation and also study the social planner's problem under different constraints. We conclude in section 7.

2 Model

2.1 Agents and Preferences

Consider an economy with three dates $t = 0, 1, 2$ and total capital endowment normalized to one. There are two categories of agents: consumers and producers.

Let $\eta \in [0, 1]$ be the total capital owned by consumers at $t = 0$, with each consumer owning 1 unit. With *i.i.d.* probability $1-q$, a consumer turns out to be early; with probability q, he turns out to be late. An early consumer only cares about consumption at $t = 1$, so his utility function is C_1, whereas a late consumer's utility function is $C_1 + C_2$. Consumer type (early or late) is private information of each consumer. For now, we assume consumers' preferences are linear and thus risk-neutral. Other than this linearity, these preferences are identical to those in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The linearity is for simplicity and most of our results, such as resource allocation and equilibrium prices, remain unchanged if consumers are risk averse. Producers are endowed with total capital $1 - \eta$ at $t = 0$, with each owning 1 unit.[1] They can consume at both $t = 1$ and $t = 2$, and their payoff is $\Pi_1 + \Pi_2$ where Π_t is their payoff at date t.

2.2 Asset and Pledgeability

Producers can invest in two types of real assets (using their capital and the funding raised by issuing financial claims to consumers) at date 0. Both assets are constant returns to scale investments available to all producers, but only to them. One is a short-term asset (henceforth short asset) with a return per unit invested of $R \geq 1$ at $t = 1$. The output of this investment should be thought of as a tradeable consumption good. The second asset is a long-term one (henceforth long asset) with a return of $X > R$ at $t = 2$ but zero return if liquidated early at $t = 1$. This asset could be thought of as a sophisticated asset, that is, a project or firm that pays off in the long run.

Producer investments are made with the producers' own capital as well as the resources they raise from consumers. Not all of an asset's return can be paid out to consumers. In the case of the short asset, the producer may need to retain some "skin in the game" upfront to assure buyers of claims that they will get their share of output. This is especially the case if the production process requires effort. An alternative interpretation is that there are defects in the production process, implying that only a fraction of the short asset's output is consumable or exchangeable by consumers, while the rest can only be consumed by the producer (think of the producer producing misshapen or unattractive vegetables that are intrinsically edible but are unacceptable to consumers because they are uncertain about quality). We do not differentiate between these different microfoundations and assume that only a positive fraction γ_S of the short-term asset's output is payable to consumers. We refer to γ_S as *short pledgeability*, and increases in it *credit development*. Better banks, more reliable warehouses where inventory can be stored and monitored, better enforcement of collateral pledges, etc., would all contribute to higher short pledgeability.

Similarly, we assume only a positive fraction γ_L of the long-term asset's output at $t = 2$ is pledgeable, where γ_L *is long pledgeability*. The reasons only a portion is pledgeable could be similar to those for the short asset. In addition, though, long assets require greater probity

[1] Given the total capital owned by either consumers or producers, their individual size is not critical. One interpretation is that consumers have a total measure of η, with each owning one unit of capital. Alternatively, consumers have a total measure of one, with each owning η amount of capital. The results remain the same in both scenarios.

of, and incentives for, the producer since she has more time and cover (because of the more complex nature of the asset) to steal output, or shirk. In that sense, long pledgeability proxies for the governance exerted over the long term asset. Improvements in accounting standards, corporate disclosure, and transparency, corporate governance, etc., would all contribute to higher long pledgeability, that is, *financial development*.

For now, we assume both production technologies are only available at $t = 0$. In other words, there is no other means for consumers to save from $t = 1$ to $t = 2$. However, our assumption that late consumers value consumption on both date 1 and 2 ($=C_1 + C_2$) is equivalent to having them value only date 2 consumption, while being able to store pledgeable consumption goods between those dates at a zero rate of return.

2.3 Financial Market and Rates of Return

Markets open at $t = 0$ and $t = 1$. In the $t = 0$ financial market, the producer can sell financial claims against the pledgeable output produced by the real assets. Let consumers investing at t receive promised gross rates of return, $r^a_{t\tau}$, between dates t and τ for claim $a \in \{S, L\}$,where S denotes the claim against the short asset and L the claim on the long asset.

Let p_a be the quantity of date-0 capital consumers contribute to buy a financial claim written against one unit of investment in asset a. So the long claim delivers cash flows $\gamma_L X$ at $t = 2$ to the consume, and p_L is its date-0 price. Similarly, p_S is the price of a short claim delivering cash flows $\gamma_S R$ at $t = 1$. So $r^L_{02} = \dfrac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ and $r^S_{01} = \dfrac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ are the returns when the respective claims are held to their maturity.

If $p_a < 1$, an asset is produced with a fraction p_a of consumer capital and $1 - p_a$ of producer capital. If the producer has sufficient capital, she may also self-fund some assets entirely. For the rest of this paper, we also refer to p_S and p_L as the *financeability* of the short- and long-term asset, respectively.

Once the uncertainty about when they will consume is resolved, some consumers will gain from trading in the $t = 1$ financial market, where only consumers can trade. Let b_F be the endogenous date-1 price per unit of a long financial claim (that is, a claim on $\gamma_L X$). Buying the long claim at this price on date 1 provides a rate of return between dates 1 and 2 of $r^L_{12} = \frac{\gamma_L X}{b_F}$. Clearly, only late consumers want to buy the claim. If so, b_F cannot be so high that the late consumer prefers consuming b_F immediately at date 1 rather than waiting till date 2 and consuming $\gamma_L X$. Therefore, $b_F \leq \gamma_L X$, otherwise, late consumers will not buy at $t = 1$. Put differently, the second period gross return on the long financial claim, r^L_{12}, cannot go below 1.

The role of a short-term financial claim is two-fold. First, it offers cash flows for consumption when consumers are early types. Second, when they are late, it offers cash flows for them to buy long-term financial claims or to use for immediate consumption. The ability to buy is particularly valuable when long-term claims are illiquid, selling at discounted interim date prices (that is, $b_F < \gamma_L X$) which allow the date-1 buyers to enjoy higher returns $r^L_{12} > 1$. The more consumers are induced to invest in the long claim relative to the short claim at date 0, the greater the interim-date discount, which imposes a natural constraint on the attractiveness of the long claim, offsetting the pledgeable return on the underlying asset, X. Naturally, consumers will demand the long-term claim only if it offers a sufficiently high return, taking into account the potential need to trade it at a discounted price.

Because long asset purchases (or sales) must offer a rate of return to the buyer of $r^L_{12} \geq 1$, short claims used to buy longs offer a two period return of at least r^S_{01}, and long claims offer a one period return of at most r^L_{02}.[2] As a result, longs are dominated for consumers unless $r^L_{02} \geq r^S_{01}$. For the rest of this paper, we refer to this condition or equivalently

$$\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} \geq \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} \tag{1}$$

as the *undominated long claims* constraint.

2.4 Equilibrium Definition and Preliminary Analysis

Let the representative consumer invest share θ and $1-\theta$ of their capital at date 0 in long claims and short claims, respectively. A representative producer allocates y_L to the production of the partly externally financed long asset (backing the long claim), y_S to producing the short asset (backing the short claim), and $1-y_L-y_S$ to long asset production that she self-finances entirely and whose payoffs she consumes entirely. Consumers will buy all of the financial claims issued. Note that the producer never entirely self-finances any short production, because long investments are more productive, $X > R$, and she values cash flows equally at both $t=1$ and $t=2$. Then the economy is characterized by six unknowns $\{\theta, y_L, y_S, p_S, p_L, b_F\}$.

A producer's payoff then is

$$\Pi = \max_{y_L, y_S} \; y_S \underbrace{\frac{(1-\gamma_S)\,R}{1-p_S}}_{\text{non-pledgeable short return}} + y_L \underbrace{\frac{(1-\gamma_L)\,X}{1-p_L}}_{\text{non-pledgeable long return}} + (1-y_L-y_S)X.$$

[2] The expected return for a long claim is $q r^L_{02} + (1-q)\frac{r^L_{02}}{r^L_{12}} \leq q r^L_{02} + (1-q) r^L_{02} = r^L_{02}$, while the expected return from the short claim is $q r^S_{01} r^L_{12} + (1-q) r^S_{01} \geq q r^S_{01} + (1-q) r^S_{01} = r^S_{01}$.

Note that due to producer competition neither p_L nor p_S can be greater than 1 for that would mean the consumer entirely finances investment and more, so every producer would compete the relevant price down to 1, given they have no personal cost of production. It is clear that the producer does not self finance long production for own consumption (the last term) when $\frac{(1-\gamma_L)}{(1-p_L)} > 1$ or equivalently $p_L > \gamma_L$.

We begin by describing what happens when both short and long claims are produced and financed. Producers must earn the same rate of return by investing their capital in either asset. This leads to the following, which is also their first order condition (FOC).

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)\,R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)\,X}{1-p_L}. \tag{2}$$

Also, note that the rent the producer obtains from financing the long asset is

$$\frac{y_L\,(1-\gamma_L)\,X}{1-p_L} - y_L X = \frac{y_L X\,(p_L-\gamma_L)}{1-p_L}.$$

So the rent from financing comes from the producer's ability to sell γ_L of financial claims on the long asset for $p_L > \gamma_L$, and similarly for the short asset. Note the producer does not self finance long assets when she earns rents on them.

The consumer demand for financial claims depends on the return they can achieve. The expected payoff of the consumer is

$$U = \max_{\theta}\ (1-q)\left(\underbrace{\frac{\theta}{p_L} b_F}_{\text{sell long-financial}} + \underbrace{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}_{\text{consume short-financial}} \right) + q\left(\underbrace{\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X}_{\text{consume long-financial}} + \underbrace{\frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X}_{\text{buy long-financial using payoff from short-financial}} \right)$$

The first term in large parentheses is the payoff conditional on turning out to be an early consumer. In it, the first term is the value from selling holdings of the long financial claim and consuming the proceeds, the second is the value of consuming the payoff from holdings of the short financial claim. The terms within the second set of large parentheses is the payoff conditional on turning out to be a late consumer. In it, the first term is the value of consuming the payoff from the long financial claim, the second is the value from buying more of the long financial claim using the payoffs from the short financial claim. When consumers hold both assets, the FOC w.r.t. θ implies that the consumer's expected returns (given the distribution of their liquidity shocks) are equalized across both long and short financial claims.

$$(1-q)\frac{b_F}{p_L} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S b_F}\gamma_L X. \tag{3}$$

Market clearing at $t=0$ requires

$$\underbrace{\eta\frac{\theta}{p_L}}_{\text{demand for long financial}} = \underbrace{(1-\eta)\frac{y_L}{1-p_L}}_{\text{supply of long financial}} \Rightarrow p_L = \frac{\theta\eta}{\theta\eta + (1-\eta)y_L} \tag{4}$$

$$\underbrace{\eta\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}}_{\text{demand for short financial}} = \underbrace{(1-\eta)\frac{y_S}{1-p_S}}_{\text{supply of short financial}} \Rightarrow p_S = \frac{(1-\theta)\eta}{(1-\theta)\eta + (1-\eta)y_s} \tag{5}$$

These expressions are intuitive. If each producer puts y_L of capital into long production and each consumer puts in θ, the date 2 pledgeable payment to consumers is $(\theta\eta + (1-\eta)y_L)\,\gamma_L X$ and the consumer rate of return on longs can be as high as $\frac{(\theta\eta+(1-\eta)y_L)\gamma_L X}{\theta\eta}$. Competition among producers pushes the consumer's rates of return on financial claims to their upper bounds. At this upper bound, this must equal $\dfrac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$, so the date-0 price of pledgeable payoffs of $\gamma_L X$ is then $p_L = \frac{\theta\eta}{\theta\eta+(1-\eta)y_L}$. Following similar logic, $p_S = \frac{\eta(1-\theta)}{\eta(1-\theta)+(1-\eta)y_s}$. Note that higher the producer allocation to an asset relative to consumer allocation, lower the claim's price, and higher the consumer return. Hence, much of the comparative statics analysis will involve tracing how the allocations move.

At the $t=1$ financial market, late consumers (fraction q) want to buy the long asset; early consumers (fraction $1-q$) want to sell. Market clearing implies

$$b_F = \min\left\{\frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}, \gamma_L X\right\}, \tag{6}$$

where the price is capped when the quantum of long assets coming on the market at date 1 relative to the purchasing power of all potential buyers is low.

Equations (2)-(6) solve the model. We also define overall welfare as the simple sum of the payoff to the consumers and producers, i.e., $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$.

Before proceeding with the full solution, let us discuss some preliminary results.

Lemma 1. *When $b_F = \frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}$, then $\theta = q$.*

A proof is straightforward by plugging $b_F = \frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}$ into (3). This result says if the date 1 price of the long asset is set to clear the market where early consumers sell all of their long assets to late consumers for all of their short assets, and the consumer's FOC holds with equality, it must be that they allocate exactly a fraction q of their capital to the long asset at date 0. The demand for a financial claim must account for both the return from consuming its payoff and either using short claims to buy other longs or selling long claims for payoffs from shorts in the future. This is a no arbitrage condition for consumer investment, where aggregate date-0 allocations to claims match the known distribution of consumer types, and is similar to that in Jacklin (1987).

Lemma 2. *In equilibrium,* $r_{01}^S = r_{01}^L$ *if* $\theta \in (0,1)$*, where* $r_{01}^S = \dfrac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ *and* $r_{01}^L = \frac{b_F}{p_L}$*. If* $b_F = \gamma_L X$*, then* $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ *so* $r_{02}^L = r_{01}^S$*.*

A proof is straightforward from Equation (3) by simply rewriting the equation as

$$(1-q)\left(\frac{b_F}{p_L} - \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\right) = q\left(\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} - \frac{b_F}{p_L}\right)\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}\frac{p_L}{b_F},$$

which can be rewritten in terms of returns

$$(1-q)\left(r_{01}^L - r_{01}^S\right) = q\left(r_{01}^S - r_{01}^L\right) r_{12}^L.$$

This implies that as long as consumers' allocation is interior, i.e., $\theta \in (0,1)$, the returns between $t=0$ and $t=1$ offered by the short and long financial claims are identical. As a result, the early consumer can trade out of the long claims he has at date 1 and receive a value of the short claim as if he had invested in the short claim all along. Similarly, the late consumer can sell the short claims he has and buy long claims so he receives the value he would have if he had invested up front in the long claim. Put differently, the interim price is set at precisely the level that long payoffs are converted to short payoffs and vice versa so that the consumer's holding does not matter, given prices. The ability to trade once again eliminates the risk to the consumer from holding the wrong asset, given his type. Furthermore, in the particular case where $b_F = \gamma_L X$, not only do the short and long asset deliver the exact same return on date 1, the date 1 to 2 return on the long asset is $\frac{\gamma_L X}{b_F} = 1$, that is, the long financial claim is liquid. There are then no essential differences in return between the two assets.

Lemma 3. *In any equilibrium, it cannot be that long dominates short for consumers, i.e.,* $\theta = 1$ *is not possible.*

We can show this result by contradiction. If $\theta = 1$, $b_F \to 0$ since there is no purchasing power to pick up the longs that early consumers want to sell, giving an astronomical return to any late consumer holding short claims. So, with any positive γ_S, short claims would become very attractive to issue, and it cannot be that none are issued at date 0.

3 Decentralized Market Equilibrium Outcome

3.1 Simple Benchmarks

Let us start with some simple benchmark cases.

Full pledgeability, $\gamma_L = \gamma_S = 1$

Full pledgeability combined with competitive producers with constant returns to scale investments immediately implies that all of the output from capital invested by consumers must accrue to consumers. That is, the zero excess profit condition for producers immediately implies that $r_{01}^S = R$ and $r_{02}^L = X$ and $p_L = p_S = 1$. Since the producer does not have to make up any capital shortfall after issuing financial claims, she will invest her own capital in long assets and consume the output. Consumers provide all of the capital for production of financial claims when there is full pledgeability.

The only endogenous choice is the consumer allocation of initial capital given $r_{01}^S = R$ and $r_{02}^L = X$. The first order condition for an interior optimum when both assets are held is:

$$(1-q)\, b_F + qX = (1-q)\, R + q\frac{R}{b_F}X,$$

which has a unique solution $b_F = R$. Any other solution would lead one asset to be dominated for the consumer. If both assets are held, the initial consumer allocation is $\theta = q$.[3]

Producers have all the capital (implying $\eta \to 0$**).**

In the case where producers have essentially all the capital, they can co-invest with consumers as needed. Producer competition will ensure that the rents from producing financial claims are driven to zero, and consumers are paid the return on their small holdings of long claims they would get if the long asset were fully pledgeable. In other words, the returns offered to consumers on long claims is $r_{02}^L = X$. Consumers will get higher returns from the

[3] It is easily derived that given $X > R$, the solution to the first-order condition for consumers cannot be at a corner: if all invest in long, then $\theta = 1$, $b_F = 0$, inducing consumers to allocate to short; if all invest in short, then $\theta = 0$ and $b_F = X$, inducing consumers to allocate to long.

long claim, with the liquidity benefits from the short financial claim motivating them to hold both claims in equilibrium.

Note that the result for short claims differs from the full-pledgeability benchmark. In the full-pledgeability benchmark competition across producers leads to a full pass-through of short and long asset returns to consumers. With limited pledgeability, some producer capital must back financial claims. Because producer's opportunity cost of production is X, they must earn at least this from producing short or long claims. With plentiful producer capital eliminating rents, producers earn a return of X from investing in short assets, but because the return on short assets is only $R < X$, a more than proportional share of the output from the short asset must go to producers relative to their capital investment. Equivalently, short financial claims will yield less than R to consumers. Consumers do not provide all of the capital for short investment when pledgeability is limited, so to induce producers to invest in them, they accept a lower return on them.[4]

Producers have no capital (implying $\eta \to 1$).

Turn next to the case where producers have no capital of their own and there is incomplete pledgeability. It must be that consumers provide all the capital for investments, and thus $p_S = p_L = 1$. The returns offered to consumers would need to be $r_{01}^S = \gamma_S R$ and $r_{02}^L = \gamma_L X$, leaving unavoidable rents to producers. The first-order condition for both assets being held become

$$(1-q)\, b_F + q\gamma_L X = (1-q)\,\gamma_S R + q\frac{\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X$$

It is possible also that the pledgeable return on shorts exceeds that on longs, or $\gamma_S R > \gamma_L X$ so that long claims are not attractive to consumers and the long claim is not produced in equilibrium.

As in the case of full pledgeability, the rates of return offered to consumers are set directly by technology and competition. In both cases, producer capital is not in play in determining prices and returns.

3.2 Limited Pledgeability and Equilibrium Regimes

When there is limited pledgeability and producers have some capital, they would want to compete for consumer funding by investing some of their own capital to offer consumers a higher return for a given investment. In this case, the incentives of consumers and producers

[4] We will see in 3.3.4 that consumers earn less than R on short claims even when producers earn no rents.

interact to determine the returns available on financial assets.

Higher pledgeability of an asset has two important effects. First, it increases the rate of return that claims offer consumers for a given allocation of capital, as higher pledgeability directly affects the output share financial claims get. So greater pledgeability increases the *financeability* of an investment. Second, greater pledgeability usually (but importantly, not always) reduces the rate of return for producers, because they retain the shrunken non-pledgeable portion of output and compete down financing rents when selling claims on the now-expanded pledgeable portion to consumers. Thus changes in pledgeability also affect the *incentive* of producers to produce that asset. The relative scarcity of producer capital, represented by the ratio of consumer to producer capital, also makes a difference.

We have argued that short pledgeability is naturally likely to be higher than long pledgeability, that is, $\gamma_S > \gamma_L$. In institutionally underdeveloped economies, it is possible that long pledgeability is so low that $\gamma_S R > \gamma_L X$. In such a situation, pledgeable returns are *misaligned* with underlying asset returns because less productive assets are more pledgeable. Of course, at high levels of long pledgeability, *ceteris paribus* , $\gamma_S R \leq \gamma_L X$, and pledgeable returns and underlying returns will be *aligned*.

Figure 1 anticipates our general results on pledgeability, where we plot the equilibrium regions as a function of γ_L and γ_S.

3.3 Variation in the long pledgeability

In describing the equilibrium regions, we first hold the pledgeability of the short asset constant at $\gamma_s \in (0, 1)$ and vary the pledgeability of the long asset. The regions are

1. *Short dominance (yellow) :* At very low levels of γ_L, producers will find inadequate financing for the long asset, and its returns dominated by investing solely in the short asset. This resembles a primitive economy where short production dominates.

2. *Short glut (green):* When γ_L increases sufficiently, producers will see their return on the production of long assets rise to their return on the production of short assets and a small number of long assets and financial claims will start getting produced. At date 1, there will consequently be a glut of short claims sold relative to long, ensuring the scarce long financial claim will be liquid in that it sells for full face value at date 1. This resembles a developing economy with the beginnings of complex long production.

3. *Illiquid long (dark blue)*: When γ_L increases further, and sufficient producer and consumer capital shifts to long production, the equilibrium moves from short glut to illiquid long, long financial claims offer higher returns to maturity than short and have

Figure 1: Equilibrium Regimes as a function of γ_L and γ_S



This figure plots equilibrium regimes when γ_L and γ_S vary. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$ and $\eta = 0.75$.

an interim price b_F less than $\gamma_L X$, and hence are illiquid. This region is more likely in an emerging economy.

4. *No long rent (light blue)*: When γ_L is higher still, the date-0 price of the long financial claim is driven down to the point that producers offer consumers the full rate of return available from long production and there are no rents associated with externally financed production. The conditions here are consistent with a developed economy, with long production not distorted by financing rents.

Let us now be more specific about the regions.

3.3.1 Short dominance

If $\gamma_L \leq \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}$, given the shadow prices it is unprofitable for the producer to produce the long asset or the consumer to invest in the associated financial claim.[5] In such an equilibrium, $y_L = 0$, and $\theta = 0$. All of consumer capital goes into short claims. We will show the producer will not retain long assets so all her resources are devoted to producing the short asset and $y_S = 1$. If so, $p_S = \eta$. The producer must prefer producing short assets to producing and retaining long so $\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} \geq X \Rightarrow (1-\gamma_S)R \geq (1-\eta)X$.

When all assets are short, any early consumer who deviated and had a long to sell would obtain the full date 2 value $b_F = \gamma_L X$ from a late buyer with plenty of purchasing power. That is, the shadow $b_F = \min\left\{\frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}, \gamma_L X\right\} = \gamma_L X$.[6] Short claims will weakly dominate longs if p_L satisfies:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(1-q)\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} &\leq (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} &\leq \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} \Rightarrow p_L \geq \underline{p}_L \equiv \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}p_S = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}\eta
\end{aligned}
$$

In words, for consumers to shun long claims which pay $\gamma_L X$, the fraction of their own capital that needs to go into each unit of long must be so high as to depress the returns below what they can get from investing in shorts.

Finally, it must be that the producer finds it less profitable to produce the long asset rather than the short, so

$$
\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L} \leq \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} \Rightarrow 1-p_L \geq \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}(1-p_S) \Rightarrow p_L \leq \bar{p}_L \equiv 1-\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}(1-\eta).
$$

Put differently, the rent from financing available from producing longs per unit of producer capital that must be deployed is swamped by the rent available on shorts.

The set of p_L satisfying both constraints for no long claims to be held or long assets

[5] This condition requires that $(1-\eta)X \leq (1-\gamma_S)R$; otherwise, the short dominance region does not exist.

[6] The reason is if so, it must be that $\frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}$ is finite. Since $\theta = 0$,this implies $p_L \to 0$. However, consumer FOC implies

$$
\begin{aligned}
q\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} &\leq (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + (1-q)\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} \\
\underbrace{q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}\left[1-\frac{1-q}{q}\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\right]}_{+\infty} + \underbrace{q\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}}_{\to+\infty} &\leq (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}
\end{aligned}
$$

which is impossible. Therefore, it cannot be that $p_L \to 0$ and it must be that $b_F = \gamma_L X$.

produced, is non-empty if

$$\underline{p}_L \leq \bar{p}_L \Rightarrow \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}\eta \leq 1 - \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}(1-\eta). \tag{7}$$

In this equilibrium, consumer welfare is $U = \frac{\gamma_S R}{\eta}$, and producer profits are $\Pi = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-\eta}$. The short asset dominates because, given low long pledgeability, far too much producer capital is required to be allocated to long assets for them to offer producers the same return as short assets. Conversely, the implied shadow price of the long financial claim is too high for consumers to prefer them to the short claim. With limited producer capital relative to consumer capital ($\frac{\eta}{(1-\eta)}$ is large), producers find it more profitable to produce short assets exclusively.

3.3.2 Short glut ($b_F = \gamma_L X$)

As γ_L rises further and $\gamma_L \in [\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}, \underline{\gamma}_L]$,[7]some long externally financed assets will be produced.

An increase in γ_L increases the share of long output that can be pledged to households and thus the fraction of each unit of long investment that can come from households, p_L, while remaining competitive with shorts. With lower investment $(1-p_L)$ per unit required from producers, producer returns from longs will match returns on shorts, so that $\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L} = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S}$ and both assets will start getting produced. Nevertheless, in this region, given how much producer capital each long asset needs, the producer can produce only a relatively small amount of the long asset. Since consumers mainly hold short claims, not all of those will be needed to buy the longs sold at date 1, so the interim price of the long asset is capped at $b_F = \gamma_L X$, its date-2 payoff. The date 1 to 2 gross interest rate is then 1.

Compared to the short dominance region, the allocation of some producer capital to longs in this region increases the consumer return on long claims. When coupled with the increase in long pledgeability, long returns can now match that on short claims and $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ (the shadow long return was below short returns in the dominance region) while at the same time making producers indifferent because $\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}$.

Substituting $\frac{p_L}{p_S} = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}$ into the producer's indifference condition and rearranging, we get the prices where producers are indifferent about assets produced and consumers are

[7] $\underline{\gamma}_L$ solves $X\left(\eta(1-q)-\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2 + \gamma_S\left(R(\eta q - 1 + \gamma_S) + (1-\eta+\eta q)X\right)\gamma_L - qR\eta\gamma_S^2 = 0$. This equation is derived from three conditions: the long asset is liquid, i.e., $b_F = \gamma_L X$; consumers put exactly a fraction $\theta = q$ of their endowments to long financial assets; and there is no glut of short financial asset.

indifferent about claims held as:

$$p_S = \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))}{(\gamma_S - \gamma_L)}$$
$$p_L = \frac{\gamma_L}{R}\frac{(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))}{(\gamma_S - \gamma_L)}.$$

In this short glut region, the *undominated long claims* constraint (1) holds with equality. Under (4) and (5) , it becomes

$$\frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R} = \frac{1 + \dfrac{(1-\eta)(1-y_S)}{\eta(1-\theta)}}{1 + \frac{(1-\eta)y_L}{\eta\theta}} \tag{8}$$

This constrains the ratios of producer to consumer capital so that both financial claims are attractive to consumers.

Comparative Statics with respect to γ_L

Lemma 4. *In the short glut equilibrium, as γ_L increases: y_L increases, θ increases, $\frac{y_L}{\theta}$ decreases, $\frac{1-y_L}{1-\theta}$ increases, p_S increases, p_L increases, $\frac{\gamma_L}{p_L}$ decreases, consumer welfare U decreases, producer profits Π increases, and total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ increases.*

Before discussing the intuition for these comparative statics, recognize that if $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$ (which we will see is true in this region in Proposition 1), it must be that $(1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X$ so from producer indifference $\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}$ it must be that $1-p_S < 1-p_L$. So producers put more capital per unit of long in this region because of the higher non-pledgeable payout it offers them. As γ_L rises in this region, more of the return from long assets can be paid out to financial claims. With more financing available per unit of long (that is, p_L rises), and with the producer payoff per unit of capital invested in long claim still exceeding that on short claims so that $(1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X$, the producer would want to shift capital to producing longs, which means she produces more units of them. From condition (8), the ratio of producer to consumer capital in longs falls relative to shorts. This can only happen if the consumer also shifts his allocation towards longs, which is required to fund additional long production. Since the capital-constrained producer can produce less than one unit of long asset for every unit reduction of short asset (since $1-p_L > 1-p_S$), and because long assets are less pledgeable (that is, $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$), the overall future amounts that can be pledged to consumers fall. Given fixed consumer capital up front, and equal returns across financial claims, it must be that consumer returns fall and consumers are worse off as they shift capital to longs. By contrast, producers benefit from this change because they produce more long assets and receive higher prices for their issued financial claims, increasing their profitability. From an aggregate perspective, since more long assets are produced from the available resources, total welfare increases.

Essentially, in this region, greater long pledgeability enhances long financeability without diminishing producer incentives to produce long – because consumers shift allocations to longs, thereby increasing producer returns. Financial development improves overall output and welfare. We will see this is no longer the case as we move into the illiquid long region.

3.3.3 Illiquid Long

With an increase in γ_L in the short glut region, more units of long assets are produced relative to short assets. Eventually, sufficient long financial claims are produced relative to short so the payout from short holdings at date 1 to late consumers (the buyers) is less than the future value of long claims sold by early consumers. As a result, $b_F = \frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}} < \gamma_L X$. Now the date-1 price on the long is less than face value, which means longs are illiquid. Recall that the first period return on longs and short claims are always equal when both are held. In addition, longs return more than one over the second period because they are illiquid. So held to maturity, longs return more than shorts. Also, the consumer's asset allocations are now set anticipating their date 1 trades, which implies it is only when $\theta = q$ that the ex-ante returns on the claims are equalized, as we have explained in subsection 2.5. Consumer allocations to each asset do not vary with γ_L in this region. Given so, $p_L = \frac{q\eta}{q\eta+(1-\eta)y_L}$ and $p_S = \frac{\eta(1-q)}{\eta(1-q)+(1-\eta)y_s}$, prices are fully determined by producer allocations. [8]

Comparative Statics with respect to γ_L

Lemma 5. *In the illiquid long with rent equilibrium, as γ_L* increases*: y_L decreases, p_S decreases, p_L increases, and $\frac{\gamma_L}{p_L}$ increases. Consumer welfare U increases, producer profits Π decreases, and total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ decreases with γ_L.*

The key difference here from the short glut region is that consumer allocations to claims do not change with γ_L. Producer allocations are therefore dispositive here. So when γ_L goes up, non-pledgeable long producer returns fall and producer investment in the long asset, y_L, must go down. Intuitively, to restore producer incentives to invest in the long asset, it must be that $p_L (= \frac{q\eta}{q\eta+(1-\eta)y_L})$ increases, which can only be if the producer invests less in the long asset, that is, y_L falls.

[8] Further substituting these prices into (2), the producer's FOC, we get a quadratic in y_L, $\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}(1-y_L) = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q+y_L}y_L$.

Consequently, $p_S = \frac{\eta(1-q)}{\eta(1-q)+(1-\eta)y_s}$ falls (since the producer invests more in the short), so that consumer returns from shorts, $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$, increases with γ_L. So in the new equilibrium, the producer's return from producing shorts, $\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S}$, falls, so too must the producer's return from producing longs, $\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$(despite the increase in p_L). This must imply that the consumer's return from holding long $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ increases (because p_L increases by less than γ_L).

Note that different from the short glut region, consumer returns from both claims increase – the long claim because it becomes more pledgeable so larger payoffs offering higher returns are available for sale, reducing producer rents from financing and increasing consumer returns, and the short claim because the producer shifts to producing more of it, reducing prices per pledgeable payoff (given the consumer does not shift allocations). Overall output and welfare are fully determined by producer allocations, and welfare falls since long production falls. Since consumer returns increase on both claims and the consumer's allocations do not change, consumer welfare increases.

Importantly, an increase in the pledgeability of any asset in this region tends to reduce producer returns, and pushes the producer to produce more of the asset whose pledgeability has not increased in order to limit the fall in producer returns. This seemingly counter-intuitive effect of higher pledgeability on an asset's production is because the possibility of interim trade means that consumer allocations are based on the known (and constant) distribution of types to prevent arbitrage. Financial claims compete with each other by offering the same equilibrium initial period return. Consequently, since consumer allocations do not shift towards the more pledgeable asset to enhance its price, higher pledgeability for an asset directly reduces the producer's return from producing the asset.

3.3.4 No Long Rent ($p_L = \gamma_L$)

As γ_L rises further in the illiquid long with rent region, p_L rises but at a slower rate and eventually meets γ_L from above. At this point, the rent from financing the long asset falls to zero because the price at which the long claim is sold to consumers is exactly equal to its long pledgeability – so all returns are passed through to the consumer. The return to consumers from investing in the long claim tops out at X, the same return as when the producer invests in the long asset entirely with own funds (retention), or with external financing:

$$p_L = \gamma_L \Rightarrow \frac{(1-\gamma_L)\,X}{1-p_L} = X.$$

Since the producer's return on the long asset is X, the producer's FOC requires this to be the return on producing the short asset whenever $\gamma_S < 1$, which implies

$$p_S = 1 - (1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}.$$

It is easily checked that the return to the consumer satisfies $r_{01}^S < R$ from investing in the short financial claim, while the return on the long financial claim is $r_{02}^L = X$. Yet the consumer's expected utility from either claim is equal because the long claim is illiquid. In this region, only changes in short pledgeability can change the rate of return available to consumers. Note that $y_S + y_L \leq 1$ and the producer invests $1 - y_S - y_L$ in self-financed and retained longs. The consumer again invests $\theta = q$ to avoid arbitrage profits from trade at date 1. Market clearing implies that

$$y_L = \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{q(1-\gamma_L)}{\gamma_L}, \qquad y_S = \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{(1-q)}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}, \qquad b_F = \frac{\gamma_L\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}.$$

Comparative Statics with respect to γ_L

Lemma 6. *In the no long rent region, y_L decreases with γ_L, y_S is unchanged with γ_L so producer retention goes up with γ_L. θ and p_S are independent of γ_L, p_L increases with γ_L, and $\frac{\gamma_L}{p_L}$ is unchanged with γ_L. Consumer welfare U, producer profits Π, and total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ are all unchanged with γ_L.*

In the no long rent region, the limited pledgeability of the long asset does not constrain the pricing or production of long financial claims. Furthermore, the rate of return on producer capital invested in the short asset is also fixed to equal that of producing the long asset, X. That is, the producer earns no rent on producing short claims and short claims have consumer returns below R only because consumers will pay for liquidity benefits, while producers will find that the added return on shorts allows it to match their opportunity cost on longs. Since an increase in the pledgeability of the long asset only reduces producer allocation to externally financed production but not overall production of the long asset, it has no effect on producer welfare. The consumer's allocations are also fixed, and her return on the long claim is fixed. So overall welfare does not change with long pledgeability.

3.3.5 Discussion

The first two regions, short dominance and short glut, where short assets predominate, seem more consistent with economic underdevelopment, where complex long production is scarce. Indeed we have

Proposition 1. *If returns and pledgeability are aligned so that $\gamma_S R \leq \gamma_L X$, then short dominance and short glut are impossible.*

Conversely, all four cases are possible when returns are misaligned ($\gamma_S R > \gamma_L X$). The related literature (see, for example, Ebrahimy (2022) and Matsuyama (2007)) has focused on the case of misaligned returns, with assets of equal maturity. In their work, the more productive asset always dominates when returns are aligned with pledgeability. However, when assets are of different maturities as in this paper, with the longer term asset more productive, both assets will be produced even when returns are aligned because of the short asset's liquidity benefits.

We conclude this subsection by validating the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The proof is in Appendix A.1.

Proposition 2. *There exists a unique equilibrium.*

3.4 Credit development

An increase in short pledgeability will increase the *financeability* of the short asset relative to the long asset. Ordinarily (though not always), this should increase consumer allocations to the short claim issued, increasing the producer's incentive to produce more of it. At the same time, an increase in short pledgeability will reduce a producer's financing *rents* associated with the short asset relative to the long asset. Ordinarily (though not always), this should reduce the producer's incentive to produce more of it. Outcomes depend on how financeability trades off against rents.

We will see that increased short pledgeability always makes the consumer better off, and makes the producer (weakly) worse off. The effects on overall welfare are, once again, more ambiguous. An example may be useful to set ideas.

We focus on scenarios where returns may be misaligned, i.e., γ_L is relatively low. As illustrated in Figure 1, as γ_S increases, the equilibrium progresses through several stages: it moves from an illiquid long regime to a short glut, then to short dominance, and finally returns to the short glut regime. Figure 2 describes the amount of long and short assets, as well as the total output being produced.

In this example, the decentralized equilibrium is in the *illiquid long* region when γ_S is below 0.14. Since consumers do not reallocate in this region (consumer's allocation stays unchanged at $\theta = q$), the producer shifts allocations toward the long asset following an increase in short pledgeability γ_S. This is because producers' incentives to produce short diminish as it becomes more pledgeable. As γ_S rises above 0.14, the equilibrium shifts to *short glut*. Both producer and consumer allocations to long assets fall with γ_S until they reach zero, in which case the equilibrium enters the short dominance region.[9] Finally, as γ_S

[9]In the short glut region, producer and consumer allocations to long assets are in general non-monotonic

Figure 2: Production and Output under different γ_S



This figure plots equilibrium production and output when γ_S varies. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$, $\eta = 0.75$, and $\gamma_L = 0.06$.

increases further, the equilibrium returns to the short glut region. Now, as short pledgeability increases, increased financeability (allowing more finance from consumers who value early payoffs instead of from producers who do not) dominates producers' reduced incentives to produce short. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that total output can change non-monotonically with γ_S: it first increases, then drops abruptly with the shift to only short production, and then increases again as γ_S gets sufficiently high and almost all short claims are financed by consumer capital.

We present the formal results on comparative statics with respect to γ_S in Appendix A.3 Interestingly, in the short glut region, long production can be non-monotonic with increases in γ_S, in contrast with its monotonic increase with increases in γ_L. The difference is because short production requires less producer capital and therefore incurs higher opportunity cost in this region.

in γ_S.

3.5 Initial Capital Distribution

Let us turn finally to changes in the amount of consumer capital relative to producers. Figure 3 plots the equilibrium region for our example as η varies from 0 to 1. The light blue region is the illiquid long no rent, dark blue is illiquid long with rent, green is short glut, and yellow region is the dominant short asset region. Clearly, as η increases so that the producers have relatively less and less capital, the equilibrium moves from the no long rents region to illiquid long, short glut and eventually to the short dominance region.

Figure 3: Equilibrium Cases as a function of η



This figure plots equilibrium regimes when η varies. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$, $\gamma_L = 0.06$ and $\gamma_S = 0.5$.

Figure 4 shows that as η increases, the amount of long production goes down, short production goes up, and the total output goes down. We supplement the formal results on comparative statics with respect to η in Appendix A.4.

Discussion:

An increase in η could represent a business cycle downturn, a financial crisis, or a trade shock where producer capital, which is relatively more risk exposed, falls in comparison to consumer capital. This immediately means that if returns are misaligned with pledgeability, we get relatively less production of the high return long asset, and more of the short asset (also see Matsuyama (2007)). Thus productivity falls in downturns, as noted by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008). Furthermore, consumer returns fall, not just because of the adverse economic outcome, but because the producer's rents to financing go up. Interestingly, these "business cycle" effects would be more muted in a primitive economy with short dominance, so long as changes in producer capital do not take us out of the region – for instance, a hit to producer capital would not alter the productivity of investment, since it continues to be entirely invested in shorts.

Figure 4: Production and Output as a function of η



This figure plots equilibrium production and output when η varies. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$, $\gamma_L = 0.06$ and $\gamma_S = 0.5$.

4 Implications for financial and credit development

Institutional developments, including improvements in pledgeability, are often seen as universally beneficial, providing society with more tools, contractability, and commitment ability, thus enhancing economic growth and well-being. Our model introduces two often overlooked elements: specialized producers enjoying rents from financial claims, and varying returns and pledgeability across different production maturities. In this context, institutional development may not benefit everyone or even society as a whole. The interesting question becomes who gains and who loses from development, and under what circumstances.[10] Importantly, different governmental systems might foster or hinder development at various stages, suggesting no smooth path to financial development.

Table 1: Effects of Long- and Short-term Pledgeability

(a) Long-term Pledgeability

$\gamma_L \uparrow$	Consumer	Producer	Long Production	Overall Welfare
Short Dominance	0	0	0	0
Short Glut	−	+	+	+
Illiquid Long	+	−	−	−
No rents	0	0	0	0

(b) Short-term Pledgeability

$\gamma_S \uparrow$	Consumer	Producer	Long Production	Overall Welfare
Short Dominance	+	−	0	0
Short Glut	+	−	depends	depends
Illiquid Long	+	−	+	increases
No rents	+	0	+	increases

4.1 Technologies: short term vs long term

Table 1 compares the various cases. When short-term pledgeability (credit development) improves, it always increases consumer welfare while decreasing or leaving unchanged producer welfare. Outside the short glut region, this typically leads to an increase in total output (and therefore overall welfare). The main effect is that producers can allocate more capital to higher-return long assets, economizing on capital for the lower-return short assets.

In contrast, improved long pledgeability often reduces producers' incentive to create long, welfare-enhancing assets. It also decreases the amount of producer capital needed per unit of long asset. This creates a tradeoff between rents and financeability, which typically reduces or leaves unchanged producer welfare. However, there's an exception in the short glut region. Here, increasing long pledgeability from low levels can benefit producers by allowing larger consumer allocations to long claims and making long asset production more attractive to producers.

While we will discuss movement within a regime in what follows, it's important to note that substantial changes in pledgeability can shift the economy to different regimes, altering the incentives for further development.

[10] There is a literature on the political economy of financial development (see, for example, Haber (1997); La Porta et al. (1998); Roe (1996); Rajan and Zingales (2003); Rajan (2009)).

4.1.1 Short dominance: Primitive economy and the possibility of development traps

In underdeveloped or primitive societies, short-term pledgeability typically greatly exceeds long-term pledgeability. This misalignment often leads to an economy dominated by short-term production, focusing on low-return primary sector goods. The appropriable returns from long-term investment appear relatively low for both consumers and producers. This situation is more pronounced when producers have little capital compared to consumers. The low returns from short-term production make it difficult for producers to accumulate capital, even in a dynamic setting. Moreover, the absence of long-term production provides little incentive to improve corporate governance and long-term pledgeability.

The path of institutional development in this scenario depends on who holds power. In an oligarchy controlled by producers, development may stagnate. In a consumer-led democracy, development might focus solely on enhancing short-term credit, potentially creating a skewed system.

These implications align with historical observations (see, for example, Braudel (1980)). Early Western capitalism, for instance, saw entrepreneurs concentrating on trading short-term production rather than investing in capital-intensive, long-term projects. Similarly, in underdeveloped economies, entrepreneurs often gravitate towards lower-return commerce instead of complex manufacturing, reflecting an environment of low producer capital and minimal long-term pledgeability.[11] Apart from technological development, our model suggests the shift from commerce toward manufacturing required (1) producers to become relatively richer (for instance, as a result of the steady accumulation of business profits or as a result of windfalls that benefited the adventurous producer class) (2) the relative pledgeability of long versus short assets to increase, say as a result of institutional development.

4.1.2 Short glut region: Developing country and oligarchic development

In developing economies with higher potential returns from long-term investment but low long pledgeability and moderate short-term pledgeability, both forms of production coexist in a "short glut" region. Increasing long pledgeability here improves overall welfare by boosting long-term production. This occurs because more consumer capital is drawn to long-term financing, enhancing producer rents from both long and short production.

However, producers and consumers have opposing views on increasing long-term pledgeability. Producers favor it as they can sell more financial claims at higher prices, while

[11] Of course, institutions can also be weak on the real side. Long, high return production may suffer from a lack of property rights enforcement – complex fixed assets may need more security – which may reduce their returns relative to short duration production.

consumers dislike it due to lower returns. The opposite is true for increases in short-term pledgeability.

The type of government significantly influences development in this region. An oligarchy, controlled by producers, is likely to enhance long pledgeability, increasing long-term production and producer rents at the expense of consumers. In contrast, a consumer-oriented democracy tends to boost short pledgeability, potentially reducing overall output but benefiting consumers.

4.1.3 Illiquid long region with producer rents: The Middle Income Trap

As long pledgeability increases, moving the economy into the "illiquid long with rent" region, producers lose interest in further pledgeability improvements of either type. Consumer allocations become fixed due to trade arbitrage possibilities, eliminating the financing benefits of enhanced pledgeability for producers while still reducing their financing rents. This situation can lead to a "middle income trap" if producers control the government, halting further financial and credit development.

Consumers, however, would still benefit from greater pledgeability. In a democracy, they might implement such changes, but this could reduce overall welfare if producers shift away from long-term production. This scenario suggests that financing rents, in addition to other monopoly rents, contribute to producer opposition towards reforms in middle-income economies.

A transition from oligarchy to democracy in this economic state would likely boost financial and credit development, benefiting consumers at the expense of producers. The impact on overall output would depend on which type of pledgeability is enhanced: negative for long pledgeability increases, but positive for short pledgeability improvements.

4.1.4 Illiquid long no rent region: The absence of conflicts

When both long-term and short pledgeability reach high levels, pushing the economy into the "no long rent" region, the dynamics of financial and credit development change significantly. In this state, further increases in long pledgeability have no effect on consumer, producer, or overall welfare. However, improvements in short pledgeability continue to enhance both consumer and total welfare.

The key feature of this region is the reduction of conflicts of interest over financial development. No group opposes higher pledgeability, regardless of its type. This harmony occurs because the distortionary financing rents, which previously influenced allocations and rent-sharing, are eliminated in the "illiquid long no rent" region.

4.1.5 Finally...

When producer capital significantly outweighs consumer capital, producers invest enough in each asset to reduce financing rents. Their production choices then primarily reflect intrinsic returns and consumer preferences, even with modest financial development. In this scenario, all economic agents become more supportive of increased pledgeability.

This analysis suggests that financial development becomes easier for more developed countries for two main reasons. First, wealthier producers are less influenced by financing rents. Second, beyond a certain threshold, financial development itself reduces financing rents and associated conflicts of interest, moving the system into a "no rent" equilibrium.

However, transitioning to this state from other equilibria is challenging. Our model highlights the complex interplay between economic development, wealth distribution, and financial structures, underscoring the difficulties countries face in achieving sustainable financial progress.

5 Related Literature

There is a large literature on limited pledgeability and the role of the net worth of producers in facilitating investment. Important studies include Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Hart and Moore (1994) and Holmström and Tirole (1998). A bit closer to our model is the literature on financial intermediary capital, where some assets are best held by financial intermediaries and their net worth determines if they are able to hold the asset which helps determine the asset's price. Key work in this area include He and Krishnamurthy (2013); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); Rampini and Viswanathan (2019). These models focus on how low intermediary capital prevents an institution from providing its important service (monitoring or superior collateralization). Our focus, instead, is on the impact of low intermediary capital (our producers are best thought of as a fusion of producer and financial intermediary) on the relative profitability of assets with different horizons, which could be thought of as the vehicles to provide the services.

In prior work, we allow pledgeability to be an endogenous choice of corporations, and study how industry liquidity can affect it (Diamond et al., 2020a,b, 2022) . Our focus here is on how economy wide changes in pledgeability affect outcomes, and hence the incentives to change it.

Most closely related are previous studies that examine investment in assets which vary in their pledgeability but have identical maturity. Our model has similarities to Matsuyama (2007), who examines an economy where indivisible projects have misaligned returns – higher productivity projects have lower pledgeability. Producer capital really matters now, since projects need more own-financing to be undertaken. When producer capital is low, more pledgeable but low return projects are undertaken because they require less producer capital, but this ensures producer capital does not grow, suggestive of a poverty trap. Conversely, a producer with more capital can undertake more productive projects, funding the shortfall given their low pledgeability with own capital, generating higher future capital. Higher producer capital therefore implies higher productivity and growth. In Matsuyama (2007), the most attractive project, taking into account both productivity and pledgeability, attracts all the funding. So undoubtedly, an improvement in the pledgeability of the most productive project must improve its chances of being undertaken, and hence overall productivity. However, an improvement in the pledgeability of less productive projects can also improve their chances of being undertaken, in this case reducing productivity. So financial development is not always good.

Unlike Matsuyama (2007), we allow for both types of projects to be undertaken simultaneously, and for project maturity to also matter. We show that high productivity long term projects with higher-than-short pledgeability may still coexist with short projects, with the latter valued for liquidity. Unlike Matsuyama (2007), we also show that an increase in the pledgeability of the high productivity long project can reduce welfare because producers produce less of it given their diminished rents from financing. Conversely, an increase in the pledgeability of the lower productivity short project can improve welfare because the economy can generate the needed liquidity with fewer low productivity projects. The difference in our results derives, of course, from differences in our models.

In a dynamic model which shares features with ours, Ebrahimy (2022) examines the choice of producer investment when producers have the choice between high return low pledgeability projects and low return high pledgeability projects. Unlike us, he does not allow investors to differ in their consumption preferences, or for projects to differ by maturity, and hence for investors to have a choice between claims of different maturity. Ebrahimy (2022) shows that an increase in the pledgeability of the low return project, a form of financial development, can move the economy away from the social optimum, as more is invested in the more pledgeable but lower return project. However, an increase in the pledgeability of the high return project tends to attract more investment to it, which is the case in our model only when the returns to maturity on long and short financial claims are equal (short glut region).

6 Extensions and Robustness

6.1 Risk Aversion

The benchmark model assumed that consumers are risk-neutral. We now show that resource allocation and equilibrium prices remain unchanged if consumers are risk averse. Specifically, let us assume that with probability q, the consumer is a late type with utility function $u(C_1+C_2)$ whereas with probability $1-q$, the consumer's type is early with utility function $u(C_1)$. The function u satisfies the standard conditions: $u'>0$ and $u''\leq 0$. The rest of the model is unchanged.

The expected payoff of the consumer becomes

$$U=\max_{\theta}\,(1-q)u\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}b_F+\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)+qu\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X+\frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X\right).$$

An interior optimal θ leads to the following FOC

$$(1-q)u'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}b_F+\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{b_F}{p_L}-\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\right)+qu'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X+\frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X\right)\left(\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}-\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S b_F}\gamma_L X\right)=0.$$

It is easily verified that the FOC holds under $\theta=q$ and $b_F=\frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}$. Moreover, if $b_F=\gamma_L X$, the FOC can only hold if $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}=\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$. The rest of the equilibrium conditions are unchanged given that producers are still risk neutral. Therefore, introducing risk-aversion does not affect the consumer's resource allocation.

6.2 Limited Transactability

We extend the analysis by adding limited transactability in the financial market. We assume that only a fraction μ of buyers are sufficiently informed or unworried about moral hazard, and therefore confident to purchase. Specifically, while consumers can always sell their long claims because they are better informed than potential buyers, they can only buy with probability $\mu\in(0,1)$, where we have assumed $\mu=1$ thus far. Let us term μ *transactability* – it can be both a property of the long term asset, as well as of market structure. Of course, since a lower μ thins out the buy side, it will (weakly) lower the sale price of the long asset, ensuring that buyers who are actually able to buy get better deals. This approach was used in Diamond (1997).

Figure 5: Equilibrium Cases a function of γ_L and γ_S



This figure plots equilibrium regimes when γ_L and γ_S vary. The parameters are: $\mu = 0.5$, $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$ and $\eta = 0.75$.

Figure 5 plots an example of the equilibrium regions as a function of γ_L and γ_S. A simple comparison with Figure 1 reveals several patterns. The short dominance region remains unchanged. Meanwhile, the short glut region shrinks, while the illiquid long region expands. At high γ_S, the no rents region expands, which corresponds to a shrinkage in the illiquid long region. The opposite seems to hold when γ_S is relatively lower. Compared to the case of $\mu = 1$, only the consumer's FOCs are different under $\mu < 1$. The analysis within the short-dominance and short glut regions is unchanged, because the transactability of the long asset drops out of the consumer's FOC. In the illiquid long with rent region, Equation (3) and (6), modified for limited transactability μ, imply that the consumer's FOC becomes

$$q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}\left[1 - \frac{1-q}{q}\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\right] = (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\left[1 - \mu\frac{q}{1-q}\frac{1-\theta}{\theta} + (1-\mu)\frac{q}{1-q}\right].$$

The model is more complicated than the full transactability model; as we show in the appendix, the equilibrium solution can be captured as a cubic equation in θ in the illiquid long region. In the no long rent region, the equilibrium solution can be captured as a quadratic equation in θ. Finally in the short dominance and short glut region, μ is irrelevant because either no long-term asset is produced or there is no essential difference between the long- and short-term asset.

Figure 6: Equilibrium Cases as a function of γ_L under Limited Transactability



This figure plots equilibrium regimes under $\mu < 1$ when γ_L varies. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$, $\mu = 0.5$, $\eta = 0.75$, and $\gamma_S = 0.1$.

The limited transactability model has qualitative features that are very similar to that with $\mu = 1$. The conditions for dominance of short assets are unchanged, and the signs of comparative statics within short dominance and short glut regions are unchanged. Although the parameter values for long pledgeability yielding short dominance are unchanged, the short glut region shrinks (its upper bound is reached at a lower value of γ_L) because only a fraction $\mu < 1$ of short claims are available to buy longs, so longs become illiquid sooner. When $\mu = 1$, we entered the illiquid long region from the short glut region at the point when producing longs becomes profitable. This occurs when consumers' returns to held maturity exceed shorts, at which point consumers choose $\theta = q$. When $\mu < 1$, this point – longs have returns held to maturity exceeding shorts – occurs at a point where $\theta < q$. For a range then, increases in γ_L lead consumers to increase θ, substituting toward long claims. Higher γ_L leads producers to substitute toward short production whose pledgeability, γ_S is unchanged and less than one. Even higher levels of γ_L will eliminate producer rents, as with $\mu = 1$. Broadly, then, the results of our earlier analysis go through, with some nuances at intermediate levels of γ_L.

6.3 Planner's Problem

In this subsection, we examine benchmark financing, production, trading, and consumption decisions in the planner's problem, generalizing our results where equal welfare weights

Figure 7: Equilibrium Allocation and Welfare as a function of γ_L under Limited Transactability



This figure plots equilibrium production when η varies. The parameters are: $X = 2$, $R = 1$, $q = 0.5$, $\mu = 0.5$, $\eta = 0.75$, and $\gamma_S = 0.1$.

on consumers and producers have been assumed. Throughout, we assume the social planner's objective function is to maximize

$$W = \alpha\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi = \alpha\eta\left((1-q)C_1^E + q\left(C_1^L + C_2^L\right)\right) + (1-\eta)\left(\Pi_1 + \Pi_2\right),$$

where $\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha}$ is the weight on consumers. We start with the first-best allocation and then move on to cases in which the planner faces different constraints. As we will see below, the first-best allocation and those under different constraints always yield a bang-bang solution whereby all the resources are either allocated to long- or short assets. Therefore, the decentralization outcome is never constrained-optimal, except for possibly the short-dominance.

We describe the allocation and leave the details to the appendix.

First-best allocation. The social planner wants no short asset produced since its return is dominated. Early consumers consume nothing since the consumer's expected utility is enhanced more for the same resource cost if late consumers consume (concave utility would change this stark assessment). Of course, depending on whose utility the social planner weighs more (that is, on α), either the consumer or the producer will consume.

Pledgeability-Constrained Allocation The pledgeability constraints require that the total consumption by consumers cannot exceed the pledgeable output produced by producers. These constraints alter how much can be promised to consumers out of the produced asset, and may tilt the social planner's preferences over which asset is produced, especially if consumers have high weight and short pledgeability exceeds long.

Pledgeability- and Private Information-Constrained Allocation When the consumer type is private information, two additional constraints are needed to get types to select the consumption for their type: $C_1^E \geq C_1^L$ to get the early to self select and $C_1^L + C_2^L \geq C_1^E + C_2^E$ for the late. The allocation turns out not affected by the introduction of these additional constraints.

Pledgeability-, Private Information, and Producer Incentive-Constrained Allocation When the planner cannot set the total allocations to each asset, z_S and z_L, there is an incentive constraint on producers. Producers obtain all of the non-pledgeable parts of any production. That is, only combinations of C_1 and C_2 that are no less profitable than others that the producer could produce are incentive compatible. In this case, the social planner's preferences over which asset is produced can be tilted if consumers have high weight and producers have conflicting preferences for production, that is, if $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S)\, R > \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L)\, X$ and $(1-\gamma_S)R > (1-\gamma_L)X$ or $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S)\, R < \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L)\, X$ and $(1-\gamma_S)R \leq (1-\gamma_L)X$. In the first case, the planner prefers the short asset whereas producers prefer long production, whereas the opposite holds in the second case. In both situations, more rents need to be offered to the producers than when the planner can choose the maturity of investment.

7 Conclusion

This paper examines how financial and credit development, through improved pledgeability of returns, affects production decisions and welfare in an economy with distinct producer and consumer groups. We find that increased pledgeability does not always lead to higher output or welfare. In certain equilibrium regions, improving long pledgeability can actually reduce long-term production and overall welfare. The effects of financial development depend critically on the existing level of development and the relative scarcity of producer capital.

Our model implies important conflicts of interest over financial development between producers and consumers. This dynamic helps explain why economies may face impediments to financial development and growth, especially when producer capital is scarce. Interestingly, our results suggest that financial development becomes easier and faces less opposition at higher levels of development. This is partly because financing rents diminish and conflicts of interest abate as the economy progresses, creating a form of virtuous cycle in advanced stages of development.

Our results help explain why some economies may struggle to implement financial reforms or fall into development traps. Future research could explore how these dynamics play out in specific country contexts and examine policy interventions to overcome potential obstacles to financial development. By providing a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationships between pledgeability, production decisions, and welfare, this paper contributes to ongoing debates about the role of financial development in economic growth.

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A Appendix

A.1 Conditions for all cases

We derive conditions for the various regions to exist if γ_L is allowed to vary.

1. $X < \frac{1-\eta q}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S)R$. There is not a *no long rent* region.

   (a) $\gamma_L \in [0, \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}]$: short dominance

   (b) $\gamma_L \in [\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}, \underline{\gamma}_L]$: short glut

   (c) $\gamma_L \in [\underline{\gamma}_L, 1]$: illiquid long.

2. $X > \frac{1}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S)R$. There is not a *short dominance region*

   (a) $\gamma_L \in [0, \underline{\gamma}_L]$: short glut

   (b) $\gamma_L \in [\underline{\gamma}_L, \frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta+\eta q)X-(1-\gamma_S)R}]$: illiquid long

   (c) $\gamma_L \in [\frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta+\eta q)X-(1-\gamma_S)R}, 1]$: no long rent

3. $\frac{1-\eta q}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S)R < X \leq \frac{1}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S)R$. All four regions exist

   (a) $\gamma_L \in [0, \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}]$: short dominance

   (b) $\gamma_L \in [\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}, \underline{\gamma}_L]$: short glut

   (c) $\gamma_L \in [\underline{\gamma}_L, \frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta+\eta q)X-(1-\gamma_S)R}]$: illiquid long

   (d) $\gamma_L \in [\frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta+\eta q)X-(1-\gamma_S)R}, 1]$: no long rent

First, we prove equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Second, we establish conditions for the existence of each case. These two steps finish the proofs for Proposition 1 and 2.

Short Dominance

1. The price $p_S = \eta \geq 1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}$ implies that

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-\eta} \geq X. \tag{9}$$

   Note that this condition is sufficient to guarantee that $p_S \geq \gamma_S$.

2. The condition of a shadow p_L requires

$$\frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R/p_S} \leq 1 - \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}(1-p_S) \Rightarrow \gamma_L \leq \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}.$$

Short glut

We know from Proposition 1 that $X(1-\gamma_L) > R(1-\gamma_S)$ must hold so that

$$\gamma_L < 1 - \frac{R}{X}(1-\gamma_S)$$

This condition implies $\gamma_L < \gamma_S$, $p_L < p_S$, and $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$. These results come from

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L} = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S}.$$

The condition $X(1-\gamma_L) > R(1-\gamma_S)$ implies $1-p_L > 1-p_S$ and equivalently $p_S > p_L$. Note that $\frac{p_S}{p_L} = \frac{\gamma_S R}{\gamma_L X}$, so that $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$. Given $X > R$, it must be that $\gamma_L < \gamma_S$.

Moreover, we know

$$p_S = \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)}{\gamma_S - \gamma_L}$$
$$p_L = \frac{\gamma_L}{R}\frac{X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)}{\gamma_S - \gamma_L}.$$

1. $\theta = \frac{p_L(p_S-\eta)}{\eta(p_S-p_L)} \in [0,1]$ requires $\eta \leq p_S$ and $\eta \geq p_L$.

2. $y_L = \frac{\eta\theta(1-p_L)}{(1-\eta)p_L} \in [0,1]$, which requires $\frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \geq \frac{1-p_L}{p_L}\theta$ and $p_L < 1$. The first condition becomes

$$\frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \geq \frac{(1-p_L)(p_S-\eta)}{\eta(p_S-p_L)}$$

which simplifies to $\eta \geq p_L$. This is redundant given the first constraint. The second constraint becomes

$$\frac{\gamma_L}{R}\frac{X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)}{\gamma_S - \gamma_L} < 1 \Rightarrow \gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$$

which always holds under Proposition 1.

3. $p_L \geq \gamma_L$ (and $p_S \geq 1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}$). The first simplifies into

$$(X-R)(1-\gamma_L) \geq 0,$$

which always holds. The second simplifies into

$$\gamma_S \geq \gamma_S - \gamma_L,$$

which also always holds.

4. $\frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}} \geq \gamma_L X$, which becomes $\theta \leq q$. This is stronger than the first condition.

To summarize, beyond $R(1-\gamma_S) < X(1-\gamma_L)$, we only need conditions such that $\theta \in [0,q]$, which becomes

1) $\eta \le p_S$ and 2) $\frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \le q\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} + (1-q)\frac{1-p_S}{p_S}$. We know

$$\frac{1-p_S}{p_S} = \frac{1-\gamma_S}{\gamma_S}\frac{\gamma_S R - \gamma_L X}{X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)}$$
$$\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} = \frac{1-\gamma_L}{\gamma_L}\frac{\gamma_S R - \gamma_L X}{X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)}$$

The first condition simplifies to

$$\gamma_S(X-R) \ge \left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S) - \gamma_S\right](\gamma_S R - X\gamma_L).$$

- If $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S) - \gamma_S \le 0 \Rightarrow \gamma_S \ge \eta$, this condition is redundant.
- If $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\gamma_S) - \gamma_S < 0 \Rightarrow \gamma_S < \eta$, then we need

  $$\gamma_L \ge \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\left(R - \frac{(X-R)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta} - (\frac{1}{1-\eta})\gamma_S}\right) \Rightarrow \gamma_L \ge \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R - (1-\eta)X}{\eta - \gamma_S}$$

  We can show that the RHS falls below $1 - \frac{R}{X}(1-\gamma_S)$. Note that if $(\frac{1}{1-\eta})(1-\gamma_S)R < X$ holds, so that (9) is violated, then the condition above is redundant.

The second condition simplifies to

$$X\left(\eta(1-q) - \gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2 + \gamma_S\left(R(\eta q - 1 + \gamma_S) + (1-\eta+\eta q)X\right)\gamma_L - qR\eta\gamma_S^2 \le 0$$

We know the LHS is negative for $\gamma_L = 0$. If we evaluate the LHS at $\gamma_L = 1 - \frac{R}{X}(1-\gamma_S)$, we get

$$\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(X-R)(1-\gamma_S)\left((1-q)(X-R) + R\gamma_S\right)}{X} > 0.$$

If we evaluate the LHS at $\gamma_L = \frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}$, we get

$$-\frac{\eta q(X-r)^2(1-\gamma_S)\gamma_S^2}{X(\eta-\gamma_S)^2} < 0.$$

Define $\underline{\gamma}_L \in \left(\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}, 1 - \frac{R}{X}(1-\gamma_S)\right)$ be the unique root that solves

$$X\left(\eta(1-q) - \gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2 + \gamma_S\left(R(\eta q - 1 + \gamma_S) + (1-\eta+\eta q)X\right)\gamma_L - qR\eta\gamma_S^2 = 0.$$

- If $(\frac{1}{1-\eta})(1-\gamma_S)R < X$, then we need
  $$\gamma_L \in [0, \underline{\gamma}_L].$$
- Otherwise, we need
  $$\gamma_L \in \left[\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}, \underline{\gamma}_L\right].$$

Illiquid long with rent

Simple calculation shows that the equilibrium reduces to a quadratic equation on y_L:

$$(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))\, y_L^2 + \\ \left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\left(qX(1-\gamma_L) + (1-q)R(1-\gamma_S)\right) - \left(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)\right)\right] y_L - \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} qX(1-\gamma_L) = 0.$$

In equilibrium, both $(1-\gamma_L)X > (1-\gamma_S)R$ and $(1-\gamma_L)X < (1-\gamma_S)R$ can hold. In the first case, $p_L < p_S$, and $y_L > q$. In the second case, $p_L > p_S$, and $y_L < q$. By evaluating the LHS of the above equation, we know that the value is negative at $y_L = 0$. At $y_L = 1$, the value is

$$\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)R(1-\gamma_S) > 0.$$

Therefore, there exists a unique y_L that solves this equation.

1. $y_L \in [0,1]$. This is obviously satisfied.
2. $\theta = q \in [0,1]$ is always satisfied
3. $b_F = \frac{p_L \gamma_S R}{p_S} \leq \gamma_L X$, $p_L = \frac{q}{q + \frac{y_L(1-\eta)}{\eta}}$ and $p_S = \frac{1-q}{1-q+\frac{(1-y_L)(1-\eta)}{\eta}}$. The first condition simplifies into

$$y_L \geq \frac{q\left[\gamma_S R(1-\eta q) - (1-q)\eta\gamma_L X\right]}{(1-\eta)\left[(1-q)\gamma_L X + q\gamma_S R\right]}.$$

   - If $\gamma_S R(1-\eta q) - (1-q)\eta\gamma_L X < 0 \Rightarrow \gamma_L > \frac{\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)}{X\eta(1-q)}$ so that the RHS is negative, this condition is redundant.
   - If $\gamma_S R(1-\eta q) - (1-q)\eta\gamma_L X > 0$, then there are two cases:
     - If $X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S) > 0$, then we need to plug in $\frac{q[\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)-(1-q)\eta\gamma_L X]}{(1-\eta)[(1-q)\gamma_L X+q\gamma_S R]}$ into the equation and the resulting number is negative.
     - If $X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S) \leq 0$, then we also need to plug in $\frac{q[\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)-(1-q)\eta\gamma_L X]}{(1-\eta)[(1-q)\gamma_L X+q\gamma_S R]}$ into the equation and the resulting number is negative.
     - In both cases, when we plug in, we get the sign is equal to the sign of

$$-\frac{1}{1-\eta}\left\{\gamma_L\gamma_S\left[R(\eta q-1) + \eta qX + R\gamma_S + (1-\eta)X\right] - X\gamma_L^2(\eta(q-1)+\gamma_S) - \eta qR\gamma_S^2\right\},$$

       which is the same one as the short glut case. In order for this to be negative, we need

$$\frac{1}{1-\eta}\left\{\gamma_L\gamma_S\left[R(\eta q-1) + \eta qX + R\gamma_S + (1-\eta)X\right] - X\gamma_L^2(\eta(q-1)+\gamma_S) - \eta qR\gamma_S^2\right\},$$

       which requires $\gamma_L \geq \underline{\gamma}_L$.
   - Combining the previous two cases, all we need is to have $\gamma_L \geq \min\{\underline{\gamma}_L, \frac{\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)}{X\eta(1-q)}\}$. We evaluate the LHS of the equation above at $\frac{\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)}{X\eta(1-q)}$ and the sign is the same as $\eta(1-q)X - (1-\eta q)\gamma_S R$. We know that the above equation is positive whenever $\gamma_S R(1-\eta q) - (1-q)\eta\gamma_L X < 0$, which implies $\underline{\gamma}_L = \min\{\underline{\gamma}_L, \frac{\gamma_S R(1-\eta q)}{X\eta(1-q)}\}$. Therefore, this case needs $\gamma_L \geq \underline{\gamma}_L$.

4. $p_S \geq 1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}$, $p_L \geq \gamma_L$. The two conditions become:

$$y_L \geq \frac{X-(1-\gamma_S)R\left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+1\right]}{X-(1-\gamma_S)R}$$

and

$$\frac{q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}{q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}+y_L} \geq \gamma_L \Rightarrow y_L \leq q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{1-\gamma_L}{\gamma_L}.$$

When we evaluate the LHS of the equation at $\frac{X-(1-\gamma_S)R\left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+1\right]}{X-(1-\gamma_S)R}$, we need it to be negative. When we evaluate the LHS of the equation at $q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{1-\gamma_L}{\gamma_L}$, we need it to be positive. It turns out that both equations reduce to

$$\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q\left(X-R(1-\gamma_S)\right) > \gamma_L\left((1+\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q)X-(\frac{1}{1-\eta})(1-\gamma_S)R\right)$$
$$\Rightarrow \gamma_L < \frac{\eta q\left(X-(1-\gamma_S)R\right)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R}.$$

- If $X-(1-\gamma_S)R\left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+1\right] < 0$, the first condition is not needed, and $\frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R} > 1$. In this case, no further condition is needed.
- If $X-(1-\gamma_S)R\left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+1\right] \geq 0$, then we need $\gamma_L < \frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R}$.

To summarize, this case needs $\gamma_L > \underline{\gamma}_L$. If in addition,

$$\left(1-\eta q\right)\left(1-\gamma_S\right)R < (1-\eta)X$$

this case also needs

$$\gamma_L < \frac{\eta q\left(X-(1-\gamma_S)R\right)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R}.$$

Illiquid long no rent

We know in equilibrium $\theta = q$, $y_L = \frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q(1-\gamma_L)}{\gamma_L}$, $y_S = \frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}$ and $b_F = \frac{\gamma_L\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}$.

1. $\theta \in [0,1]$ is always guaranteed.
2. $b_F \leq \gamma_L X$ can be shown simplified into $R \leq X$ so always holds.
3. $y_S \in [0,1]$, $y_L \in [0,1]$ and $y_S + y_L \in [0,1]$. $y_S \in [0,1]$ becomes

$$\left(1-\eta q\right)\left(1-\gamma_S\right)R < (1-\eta)X.$$

Note this condition does not require γ_L. $y_L \in [0,1]$ is less stringent than $y_L \leq 1-y_S$, which becomes

$$\gamma_L > \frac{\eta q}{\eta q+(1-\eta)-\frac{\eta(1-q)(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}} = \frac{\eta q\left(X-(1-\gamma_S)R\right)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R}. \tag{10}$$

A.2 Comparative Statics with respect to γ_L

Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. In the case of short glut, we just showed

$$p_S = \frac{\gamma_S}{X} \frac{(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))}{(\gamma_S - \gamma_L)}$$
$$p_L = \frac{\gamma_L}{R} \frac{(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))}{(\gamma_S - \gamma_L)}.$$

A producer's return must also be strictly above X, the return from retention. Therefore, $\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L} > X \Rightarrow p_L > \gamma_L$. Therefore

$$p_L = \frac{\gamma_L}{R} \frac{(X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S))}{(\gamma_S - \gamma_L)} > \gamma_L,$$

which is true only if $\gamma_S > \gamma_L$.[12] Given $\gamma_S > \gamma_L$, it must be that:

$$(1-\gamma_S) < (1-\gamma_L)$$
$$\Rightarrow (1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X.$$

Then, from producer indifference $\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R}$, we know it must be that

$$1 - p_S < 1 - p_L \Rightarrow p_L < p_S.$$

Then, from consumer indifference $\frac{p_L}{p_S} = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}$, we know it must be that pledgeability and total returns are misaligned so $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$. In the short dominance region, γ_L is even lower so $\gamma_L X < \gamma_S R$ and $(1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X$ must also hold in that case.

∎

Proof of Lemma 4

Proof. We know that

$$\frac{\partial p_S}{\partial \gamma_L} = \frac{-(1-\gamma_S)\gamma_S(R-X)}{X(\gamma_L-\gamma_S)^2}.$$

Given $R - X < 0$, we know that

$$\frac{\partial p_S}{\partial \gamma_L} > 0.$$

Because $\frac{p_L}{p_S} = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R}$, this immediately implies that $\frac{\partial p_L}{\partial \gamma_L} > 0$, and also p_L must increase more than proportionately with γ_L for the equality to hold, so that $\frac{\partial(\gamma_L/p_L)}{\partial \gamma_L} < 0$. Given that

$$\theta = \frac{\frac{1-\eta}{\eta} - \frac{1-p_S}{p_S}}{\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} - \frac{1-p_S}{p_S}} \in (0,1),$$

[12] If $\gamma_S < \gamma_L$, then cross-multiplying, it must be that $R(\gamma_S - \gamma_L) > X(1-\gamma_L) - R(1-\gamma_S)$ or $R > X$,which is impossible

we know that if p_L stays unchanged, the RHS would increase in γ_L. Now that $\frac{1-p_L}{p_L}$ decreases with γ_L, we know θ must increase in γ_L. The market clearing condition implies

$$y_S = \frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\theta)(1-p_S)}{p_S}$$

must decrease in γ_L, implying that y_L increases in γ_L.

Both sides of the producer's equilibrium condition

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$$

go up with γ_L, given that p_S increases. Therefore, producer's profits Π increases with γ_L. We know that consumer welfare is

$$U = \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$$

which decreases with γ_L. Finally, turning to total welfare, we can write

$$W = (\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\theta + y_L)X + (\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\theta) + (1-y_L))R,$$

which increases in γ_L given both y_L and θ increase in γ_L.

□

Proof of Lemma 5

Proof. (i) From

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}(1-y_L) = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q + y_L}y_L,$$

we know that when γ_L goes up, producer investment in the long asset, y_L, must go down. Consequently, $p_S = \frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}$ falls with γ_L so that $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ increases with γ_L. Now, let us turn to $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$. We are going to show this also increases. If p_S goes down with γ_L,the producer's cum-financing return on the short asset falls (the LHS of the producer's FOC below), so the cum-financing return on the long asset should also fall (the RHS of the FOC below).

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$$

This implies

$$\frac{d\frac{(1-\gamma_L)}{1-p_L}}{d\gamma_L} < 0 \Rightarrow -(1-p_L) + (1-\gamma_L)\frac{dp_L}{d\gamma_L} < 0 \Rightarrow \frac{dp_L}{d\gamma_L} < \frac{1-p_L}{1-\gamma_L}.$$

Meanwhile,

$$\frac{d\frac{\gamma_L}{p_L}}{d\gamma_L} = \frac{p_L - \gamma_L\frac{dp_L}{d\gamma_L}}{\gamma_L^2} > \frac{p_L - \gamma_L\frac{1-p_L}{1-\gamma_L}}{\gamma_L^2} > \frac{\frac{p_L}{\gamma_L} - \frac{1-p_L}{1-\gamma_L}}{\gamma_L} > 0.$$

The last inequality holds because $p_L \geq \gamma_L$. Therefore, both $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ and $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ increase with γ_L.

(ii) Consumer welfare is given by $U = (1-q)\,\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$, which clearly increases in consumer returns $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ and $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$, and hence increases with γ_L. Turning to producer profits: $\Pi = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$ which falls in γ_L since the cum financing producer returns fall on either asset. Finally, total welfare

$$\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi = Xy_L + R(1-y_L) + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(qX + (1-q)R),$$

increases in y_L, and hence falls in γ_L.

$\square$

Proof of Lemma 6

Proof. The other expressions are obvious. We supplement the expressions for welfare here. consumer welfare is

$$U = (1-q)\,\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = (1-q)\,\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\,\frac{R}{X}} + qX.$$

Producer profits are $\Pi = X$.

$\square$

A.3 Comparative Statics with respect to γ_S

Suppose that one is in the short glut region. For consumers to hold both claims after an increase in γ_S, $\frac{p_L}{p_S}(=\frac{\gamma_L X}{\gamma_S R})$, the ratio of fractions of consumer capital in longs relative to shorts, should fall. Think of this as relative financeability. At the same time, from the producer's perspective, $\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_S}(=\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{(1-\gamma_S)R})$ should increase. Think of this as relative producer rents. Both conditions can be met with a fall in p_L and a rise in p_S as γ_S rises.

If γ_S is low relative to γ_L (recall it cannot be too low for the economy to be in the region), an increase in γ_S will have more effect on relative financeability and little effect on relative producer rents. It makes sense for the producer to shift to producing more short assets, with consumers allocating more capital to short claims, away from long claims. Given that each unit of long releases more producer capital than each unit of short requires (recall $1-p_L > 1-p_S$ in this region), and vice versa for consumer capital, it must be that a disproportionate amount of consumer capital leaves longs, pushing down p_L. So returns to consumers from holding longs will increase in the new equilibrium. Of course, for producers to see a financing reason to shift allocations, it must be that p_S rises. Since in equilibrium, the consumer returns to holding shorts must rise to equal the returns to holding longs, $\frac{\gamma_S}{p_S}$ increases with γ_S.

As γ_S rises further, an increase in γ_S reduces relative producer rents significantly while not increasing relative financeability as much. The trade-off shifts. This is when the producer starts increasing long production with further increases in γ_S, which is why total welfare is non monotonic. So while each unit of short not produced allows less than one unit of long to be produced because the latter needs more producer capital, the released consumer capital has to pay both for the more pledgeable remaining short claims and the additional long claims. Given the limited consumer capital, consumer returns continue rising, as is true in the entire region.

Lemma 7. *In the short glut equilibrium, p_L decreases with γ_S, and $\frac{\gamma_S}{p_S}$ increases with γ_S, consumer welfare U increases with γ_S, producer profits Π decrease with γ_S. Total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ is non-monotonic in γ_S.*

Proof of Lemma 7

Proof. We know that

$$\frac{\partial p_L}{\partial \gamma_S} = -\frac{(1-\gamma_L)\,\gamma_L(X-R)}{R\,(\gamma_L-\gamma_S)^{\,2}} < 0.$$

Therefore, $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ goes up, which implies $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ also goes up. consumer welfare $U = \frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ goes up. Producer's profits $\Pi = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$ go down.

□

Lemma 8. *In the illiquid long asset region, y_L increases with γ_S, p_S increases with γ_S, and p_L decreases with γ_S. Consumer welfare U increases with γ_S, producer profits Π decreases with γ_S, and total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ increases with γ_S.*

Proof. From

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}(1-y_L) = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q+y_L}y_L,$$

we know that when γ_S goes up, y_L must go up. If y_L goes down, the RHS goes down, whereas the LHS goes up so that the equation cannot hold. Given this result, the total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ goes up. Also $p_L = \frac{q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}{q\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}+y_L}$ goes down and $p_S = \frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}$ goes up. Coming to consumer welfare

$$U = (1-q)\,\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}.$$

Clearly, $\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}$ goes up. We show $\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$ also goes up. Specifically, we know

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$$

both go down. This implies

$$\frac{d\frac{(1-\gamma_S)}{1-p_S}}{d\gamma_S} < 0 \Rightarrow -(1-p_S)+(1-\gamma_S)\frac{dp_S}{d\gamma_S} < 0 \Rightarrow \frac{dp_S}{d\gamma_S} < \frac{1-p_S}{1-\gamma_S}.$$

Meanwhile,

$$\frac{d\frac{\gamma_S}{p_S}}{d\gamma_S} = \frac{p_S - \gamma_S\frac{dp_S}{d\gamma_S}}{\gamma_S^2} > \frac{p_S - \gamma_S\frac{1-p_S}{1-\gamma_S}}{\gamma_S^2} > \frac{\frac{p_S}{\gamma_S} - \frac{1-p_S}{1-\gamma_S}}{\gamma_S} > 0.$$

The last inequality holds because $p_S > \gamma_S$. Therefore, consumer welfare goes up. Finally, producer profits are:

$$\Pi = \frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$$

Given that p_L goes down, Π also goes down.

□

Lemma 9. *In the no long rent region, y_L is unchanged with γ_S, and y_S decreases with γ_S so producer self-financed long goes up with γ_S. θ and p_L are independent of γ_S. p_S increases with γ_S, and $\frac{\gamma_S}{p_S}$ increases with γ_S. Consumer welfare increases with γ_S, producer profits Π are independent of γ_S. Total welfare $\eta U + (1-\eta)\Pi$ increases with γ_S.*

Proof. In the no long rent region, an increase in short pledgeability allows the producer to allocate more to the self-funded long asset. So her allocation to short production falls. The consumer's allocations are fixed at $\theta = q$, and his return on the long claim is fixed. With the increase in short pledgeability, the price of the short claim rises but by less than the increase in γ_S, so consumer returns rise. As a result, the consumer is better off – essentially her gains come from the greater overall allocation to the higher return long asset, away from the more pledgeable short asset.

□

A.4 Comparative Statics with respect to η

We supplement the analysis on how the thresholds in γ_L for different regions vary. By taking first-order derivatives, it is easily verified that both $\frac{\gamma_S}{X}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R-(1-\eta)X}{\eta-\gamma_S}$ and $\frac{\eta q(X-(1-\gamma_S)R)}{(1-\eta)X+\eta qX-(1-\gamma_S)R}$ increase with η. To study $\underline{\gamma}_L$, let us rewrite the equation that solves $\underline{\gamma}_L$:

$$X\left(\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)-(\frac{1}{1-\eta})\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2+\gamma_S\left(R(\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(q-1)-1)+\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qX+(\frac{1}{1-\eta})R\gamma_S+X\right)\gamma_L-qR\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\gamma_S^2=0$$

$$\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\left\{X\left((1-q)-\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2+\gamma_S\left(R((q-1))+qX+R\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L-qR\gamma_S^2\right\}+X\left(-\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2+\gamma_S\left(-R+R\gamma_S+X\right)\gamma_L=0$$

$$\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\left\{X\left((1-q)-\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2+\gamma_S\left(R((q-1))+qX+R\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L-qR\gamma_S^2\right\}+\left[X\left(1-\gamma_L\right)-R(1-\gamma_S)\right]\gamma_S\gamma_L=0$$

Given that $X(1-\gamma_L)-R(1-\gamma_S)>0$ holds on $(\underline{\gamma}_L-\varepsilon,\underline{\gamma}_L+\varepsilon)$ for ε sufficiently small, we know that the coefficient in front of $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}$ must satisfy

$$X\left((1-q)-\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L^2+\gamma_S\left(R((q-1))+qX+R\gamma_S\right)\gamma_L-qR\gamma_S^2<0.$$

Therefore, the solution $\underline{\gamma}_L$ must increase in η.

Lemma 10. *In the short glut region, y_L decreases with η, θ decreases with η, p_S and p_L are independent of η. Consumer welfare U and producer profits Π are independent of η.*

Proof. Clearly, the closed-form solutions for the fractions of consumer capital backing each asset, p_S and p_L, derived in section 3.3.2 show that both are independent of η. From $\theta=\frac{\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}-\frac{1-p_S}{p_S}}{\frac{1-p_L}{p_L}-\frac{1-p_S}{p_S}}$, we know that θ decreases with η. From $y_S=\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-\theta)(1-p_S)}{p_S}$, we know y_S must increase with η, so that $y_L=1-y_s$ decreases with η. Consumer welfare $U=\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}$, producer profits $\Pi=\frac{1-\gamma_L}{1-p_L}X$ are both independent of η.

□

Lemma 11. *In the illiquid long region, y_L increases with η if and only if $(1-\gamma_S)R>(1-\gamma_L)X$. θ is independent of η.*

Proof. We can rewrite the equation that determines y_L as

$$(1-\gamma_L)X\frac{1-y_L}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)+(1-y_L)}=(1-\gamma_S)R\frac{y_L}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q+y_L}$$

$$\Rightarrow\frac{(1-\eta)y_L(1-y_L)+\eta q(1-y_L)}{(1-\eta)(1-y_L)y_L+\eta(1-q)y_L}=\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}.$$

We differentiate both sides and get:

$$\underbrace{\left[\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{1-q}{(1-y_L)^2}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}+\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{q}{y_L^2}\right]}_{>0}\frac{dy_L}{d\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}=\frac{q}{y_L}-\frac{1-q}{1-y_L}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}.$$

Therefore, the sign of $\frac{dy_L}{d\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}$ depends on the sign of $\frac{q}{y_L}-\frac{1-q}{1-y_L}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}$. Clearly,

$$\begin{aligned}\text{sign}\left(\frac{q}{y_L}-\frac{1-q}{1-y_L}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}\right)&=\text{sign}\left(\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q}{y_L}-\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{1-q}{1-y_L}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}\right)\\&=\text{sign}\left(\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}-1\right),\end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows from

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{1+\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q/y_L}{1+\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)/(1-y_L)}&=\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}\\ \Rightarrow 1+\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q}{y_L}&=\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}+\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)/(1-y_L)\\ \Rightarrow\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}q}{y_L}-\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{1-q}{1-y_L}\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}&=\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{(1-\gamma_L)X}-1.\end{aligned}$$

□

Lemma 12. *In the illiquid long no rent equilibrium, both y_L and y_S increases with η. θ, p_L, and p_S are independent of η.*

Proof. Obvious from the solutions.

□

A.5 Detailed Analysis of Extensions and Robustness

Risk Aversion

We show that resource allocation and equilibrium prices, remain unchanged if consumers are risk averse. The expected payoff of the consumer becomes

$$U=\max_\theta\,(1-q)u\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}b_F+\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)+qu\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X+\frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X\right).$$

We first rule out the corner solution $\theta=1$: if $\theta=1$, then $b_F=0$, and $\frac{\partial U}{\partial\theta}\to-\infty$, violating that $\theta=1$ is optimal. An interior optimal θ leads to the following FOC

$$(1-q)u'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}b_F+\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{b_F}{p_L}-\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\right)+qu'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X+\frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{b_F}\gamma_L X\right)\left(\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}-\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S b_F}\gamma_L X\right)=0.$$

If $b_F = \frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}} \leq \gamma_L X$, the FOC gets simplified to

$$(1-q)u'\left(\frac{1}{1-q}\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{q(1-\theta)}{(1-q)\theta}-1\right)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} + qu'\left(\frac{1}{q}\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X\right)\left(1-\frac{(1-q)\theta}{q(1-\theta)}\right)\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = 0$$
$$\Rightarrow u'\left(\frac{1}{1-q}\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{q(1-\theta)-(1-q)\theta}{\theta}\right)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} = u'\left(\frac{1}{q}\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X\right)\left(\frac{(1-q)\theta - q(1-\theta)}{(1-\theta)}\right)\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L},$$

where the only solution is $\theta = q$. Otherwise, we will have

$$u'\left(\frac{1}{1-q}\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{1}{\theta}\right)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S} = -u'\left(\frac{1}{q}\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X\right)\left(\frac{1}{(1-\theta)}\right)\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L},$$

which can never hold.

If $b_F = \gamma_L X \leq \frac{q\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{(1-q)\frac{\theta}{p_L}}$ instead, the FOC gets simplified to

$$(1-q)u'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X + \frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right)\left(\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} - \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\right) + qu'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X + \frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{\gamma_L X}\gamma_L X\right)\left(\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} - \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\right) = 0.$$

Again, this can only hold if

$$\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L} = \frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}.$$

Otherwise, we have

$$(1-q)u'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X + \frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R\right) + qu'\left(\frac{\theta}{p_L}\gamma_L X + \frac{\frac{1-\theta}{p_S}\gamma_S R}{\gamma_L X}\gamma_L X\right) = 0,$$

which can never hold.

Therefore, introducing risk-aversion does not affect the consumer's resource allocation. Moreover, the rest of the equilibrium conditions are unchanged given that producers are still risk neutral. Therefore, we can conclude that resource allocation and equilibrium prices, remain unchanged.

Limited Transactionability

Here we provide the details analysis of the market pricing case under limited transactionability $\mu < 1$. Let us being by listing the system of equations

$$\frac{(1-\gamma_S)R}{1-p_S} = \frac{(1-\gamma_L)X}{1-p_L}$$
$$q\frac{\gamma_L X}{p_L}\left(1-\frac{1-q}{q}\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\right) = (1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{p_S}\left[1-\mu\frac{q}{1-q}\frac{1-\theta}{\theta} + (1-\mu)\frac{q}{1-q}\right]$$
$$\theta\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} + (1-\theta)\frac{1-p_S}{p_S} = \frac{1-\eta}{\eta}.$$

Now, we show that this reduces to a cubic one on θ. Specifically, let $\hat{z} = \frac{1-q}{q}\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$ and $z = \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} = \frac{q}{1-q}\hat{z} \Rightarrow \theta = \frac{z}{z+1}$, $1-\theta = \frac{1}{z+1}$. The middle equation becomes

$$\frac{p_L}{A} = \frac{p_S}{B},$$

where

$$A = A_1 - A_2 z, \qquad A_1 = q\gamma_L X, \qquad A_2 = (1-q)\gamma_L X$$
$$B = B_1 - \frac{B_2}{z}, \qquad B_1 = (1-q)\gamma_S R\left(1 + (1-\mu)\frac{q}{1-q}\right), \qquad B_2 = q\gamma_S R\mu.$$

The first equation becomes

$$\frac{1-p_S}{C} = \frac{1-p_L}{D},$$

where

$$C = (1-\gamma_S)R, \qquad D = (1-\gamma_L)X.$$

From here, we get

$$p_S = \frac{D-C}{D-C\frac{A}{B}} \Rightarrow \frac{1-p_S}{p_S} = \frac{C - C\frac{A}{B}}{D-C}$$
$$p_L = \frac{D-C}{\frac{B}{A}D - C} \Rightarrow \frac{1-p_L}{p_L} = \frac{\frac{B}{A}D - D}{D-C}.$$

The cubic equation is

$$\begin{aligned}
&\left(-A_2^2 C + A_2 B_1 D - \frac{A_2 B_1 (C-D)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\right) z^3 \\
&\quad + \left(A_2(2A_1 - B_1)C + (-A_1 B_1 + B_1^2 - A_2 B_2)D + \frac{\left[A_1 B_1 + A_2(B_2 - B_1)\right](C-D)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\right) z^2 \\
&\quad + \left(-A_1^2 C + A_1 B_1 C + A_2 B_2 C + A_1 B_2 D - 2B_1 B_2 D + \frac{\left[A_1(B_1 - B_2) + A_2 B_2\right](C-D)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\right) z \\
&\quad - A_1 B_2 C + B_2^2 D - \frac{A_1 B_2 (C-D)}{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} = 0
\end{aligned}$$

If it occurs that $(1-\gamma_S)\,R = (1-\gamma_L)\,X$, then we immediately have

$$p_L = p_S = \eta.$$

In this case, let $\hat{z} = \frac{1-q}{q}\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}$, the middle equation becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
&q\gamma_L X\,(1-\hat{z}) = (1-q)\,\gamma_S R\left[1 - \mu\frac{1}{\hat{z}} + (1-\mu)\,\frac{q}{1-q}\right] \\
&\Rightarrow q\gamma_L X \hat{z}^2 - \left(q\gamma_L X - (1-q)\,\gamma_S R\left[1 + (1-\mu)\,\frac{q}{1-q}\right]\right)\hat{z} - (1-q)\,\gamma_S R\mu = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, let us supplement the result that in the short glut region, the consumer's FOC becomes

$$
\begin{aligned}
& q\mu\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}+qX=(1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}+(1-q)\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}X+q(1-\mu)\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}} \\
& \Rightarrow q\mu\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}\left(\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\right)^2 \\
& +\left(qX-(1-q)\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}-q(1-\mu)\frac{\gamma_S R}{1-(1-\gamma_S)\frac{R}{X}}\right)\left(\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}\right)-(1-q)X=0.
\end{aligned}
$$

A.6 Social Planner's Problem

First-best allocation

Let us assume the social-welfare function takes the form

$$\alpha\eta U+(1-\eta)\Pi=\alpha\eta\left((1-q)C_1^E+q(C_1^L+C_2^L)\right)+(1-\eta)\left(\Pi_1+\Pi_2\right).$$

Implicitly, we assume the welfare function has equal weights within consumers. The resource constraint is

$$\eta\frac{(1-q)C_1^E}{R}+\eta\frac{qC_1^L}{R}+\eta\frac{qC_2^L}{X}+(1-\eta)\frac{\Pi_1}{R}+(1-\eta)\frac{\Pi_2}{X}=1.$$

Our next result describes the first-best allocation. The proof is obvious and therefore omitted.

Lemma 13. *In the first-best allocation, it is without loss of generality to let $C_1^L=0$, $C_1^E=0$ and $\Pi_1=0$. Moreover,*

1. If $\alpha>1$, then $\Pi_2=0$, and $C_2^L=\frac{X}{\eta q}$.
2. If $\alpha<1$, then $C_2^L=0$, and $\Pi_2=X\left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)$.
3. If $\alpha=1$, then any combination of C_2^L and Π_2 that satisfies $\frac{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_2^L}{X}+\frac{\Pi_2}{X}=\frac{1}{1-\eta}$ attains first-best allocation.

Pledgeability-Constrained Allocation

Let z_S and z_L be the total resources allocated to short and long-term production at $t=0$. Clearly, we have $z_S+z_L=\frac{1}{1-\eta}$. Moreover, the pledgeability constraint implies that consumer's consumption on both dates are constrained by the pledgeable cash flows generated from the assets, i.e.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\eta(1-q)C_1^E+\eta qC_1^L &\le (1-\eta)z_S\gamma_S R \\
\eta qC_2^L &\le (1-\eta)z_L\gamma_L X,
\end{aligned}
$$

and producers' profits are bounded below by the non-pledgeable cash flows from producing the two types of assets

$$
\begin{aligned}
z_S R \ge \Pi_1 &\ge z_S(1-\gamma_S)R \\
z_L X \ge \Pi_2 &\ge z_L(1-\gamma_L)X.
\end{aligned}
$$

Finally, we introduce the resource constraints at both $t = 1$ and $t = 2$

$$\eta(1-q)C_1^E + \eta q C_1^L + (1-\eta)\Pi_1 = (1-\eta)z_S R$$
$$\eta q C_2^L + (1-\eta)\Pi_2 = (1-\eta)z_L X.$$

Our next result summarizes the pledgeability constrained-optimal allocation.

Lemma 14. *In the pledgeability constrained-optimal allocation, we have*

1. If $\alpha > 1$,
   - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S)R > \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L)X$, then $z_S = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$ and $z_L = 0$. In this case, $\eta(1-q)C_1^E + \eta q C_1^L = \gamma_S R$, $C_2^L = 0$, $\Pi_1 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)(1-\gamma_S)R$, and $\Pi_2 = 0$.
   - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S)R < \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L)X$, then $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$, $C_2^L = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\eta q}$, $\Pi_1 = 0$, and $\Pi_2 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)(1-\gamma_L)X$.
   - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S)R = \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L)X$, then any z_S and z_L satisfy $z_S + z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$ is a solution. In this case, $\eta(1-q)C_1^E + \eta q C_1^L = (1-\eta)z_S\gamma_S R$, and $C_2^L = \frac{1-z_S+z_S\eta}{\eta q}\gamma_L X$.
2. If $\alpha = 1$, then $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$, and $\forall C_2^L \leq (\frac{1}{1-\eta})\gamma_L X$ is a solution.
3. If $\alpha < 1$, then $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = C_2^L = 0$, $\Pi_1 = 0$, and $\Pi_2 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)X$.

Proof. Let z_S and z_L be the allocation to short and long-term production at $t = 0$. The problem becomes

$$\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \alpha\eta\left[(1-q)C_1^E + q(C_1^L + C_2^L)\right] + (1-\eta)(\Pi_1 + \Pi_2)$$
$$s.t.\ z_S + z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$$
$$z_S R \geq \Pi_1 \geq z_S(1-\gamma_S)R$$
$$z_L X \geq \Pi_2 \geq z_L(1-\gamma_L)X$$
$$\eta(1-q)C_1^E + \eta q C_1^L \leq (1-\eta)z_S\gamma_S R$$
$$\eta q C_2^L \leq (1-\eta)z_L\gamma_L X$$
$$\eta(1-q)C_1^E + \eta q C_1^L + (1-\eta)\Pi_1 = (1-\eta)z_S R$$
$$\eta q C_2^L + (1-\eta)\Pi_2 = (1-\eta)z_L X.$$

After the resource constraint, the first four are pledgeability constraints; the last two resource constraints.

To solve this problem, let $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)C_1^E + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_1^L = \tilde{C}_1$, and $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_2^L = \tilde{C}_2$. We can rewrite the problem as

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \; & \alpha \left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \Pi_1 + \Pi_2 \\
s.t. \; & z_S + z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta} \\
& z_S R \geq \Pi_1 \geq z_S(1-\gamma_S)R \\
& z_L X \geq \Pi_2 \geq z_L(1-\gamma_L)X \\
& \tilde{C}_1 \leq z_S\gamma_S R \\
& \tilde{C}_2 \leq z_L\gamma_L X \\
& \tilde{C}_1 + \Pi_1 = z_S R \\
& \tilde{C}_2 + \Pi_2 = z_L X,
\end{aligned}$$

which further becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \; & \alpha \left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \left(z_S R - \tilde{C}_1\right) + \left((\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)X - \tilde{C}_2\right) \\
s.t. & 0 \leq \tilde{C}_1 \leq z_S\gamma_S R \\
& 0 \leq \tilde{C}_2 \leq (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)\gamma_L X.
\end{aligned}$$

The objective function is equivalent to

$$\left[(\alpha-1)\tilde{C}_1 + (\alpha-1)\tilde{C}_2\right] + z_S\left(R - X\right)$$

The solution is

$\square$

- If $\alpha > 1$, then $\tilde{C}_1 = z_S\gamma_S R$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)\gamma_L X$, $\Pi_1 = z_S\left(1-\gamma_S\right)R$, and $\Pi_2 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)\left(1-\gamma_L\right)X$. The objective function is equivalent to

$$\left[(\alpha-1)(\gamma_S R - \gamma_L X) + (R - X)\right] z_S = \left\{\left[\alpha\gamma_S R + \left(1-\gamma_S\right)R\right] - \left[\alpha\gamma_L X + \left(1-\gamma_L\right)X\right]\right\} z_S$$

  - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + \left(1-\gamma_S\right)R > \alpha\gamma_L X + \left(1-\gamma_L\right)X$, then $z_S = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$ and $z_L = 0$. In this case, $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1-q)C_1^E + qC_1^L) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)\gamma_S R$, $C_2^L = 0$, $\Pi_1 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)\left(1-\gamma_S\right)R$, and $\Pi_2 = 0$.
  - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + \left(1-\gamma_S\right)R < \alpha\gamma_L X + \left(1-\gamma_L\right)X$, then $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$, $C_2^L = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\eta q}$, $\Pi_1 = 0$, and $\Pi_2 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right)\left(1-\gamma_L\right)X$.
  - If $\alpha\gamma_S R + \left(1-\gamma_S\right)R = \alpha\gamma_L X + \left(1-\gamma_L\right)X$, then any z_S and z_L satisfy $z_S + z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$ is a solution. In this case, $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}((1-q)C_1^E + qC_1^L) = z_S\gamma_S R$, and $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_2^L = (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)\gamma_L X$

- If $\alpha = 1$, then the objective function becomes $z_S(R-X)$ so that $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$, and $\forall C_2^L \leq (\frac{1}{1-\eta})\gamma_L X$ is a solution.
- If $\alpha < 1$, then $\tilde{C}_1 = 0$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = 0$. The objective function becomes

$$z_S R + (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)X,$$

in which case, the optimal is always $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta}$. In this case, $C_1^E = C_1^L = C_2^L = 0$, $\Pi_1 = 0$, and $\Pi_2 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta}\right) X$.

Pledgeability- and Private Information-Constrained Allocation

When the consumer type is private information, two additional constraints are needed to get types to select the consumption for their type: $C_1^E \geq C_1^L$ to get the early to self select and $C_1^L + C_2^L \geq C_1^E + C_2^E$ for the late. Note that the allocations in Lemma 14 satisfy the two constraints.

Allocations where producers choose their allocation of investment

When the planner cannot set the allocations z_s and z_L, there is an incentive constraint on producers. Producers obtain all of the non-pledgeable part of any production. That is, only combinations of C_1 and C_2 that are no less profitable than others that the producer could produce are incentive compatible. One way to model this is for consumers to turn over all capital to producers and have them choose z_S and z_L constrained by both competition and producer incentives. We continue to assume that consumers do not trade at date 1. We continue to have $C_2^E = 0$.

The cases of $\alpha = 1$ and $\alpha < 1$ are unchanged. For $\alpha > 1$, we need to compare $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S) R$ with $\alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L) X$. In addition, we need to compare $(1-\gamma_S)R$ with $(1-\gamma_L)X$ to take into account the producers' incentives. Solutions are unchanged if $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S) R > \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L) X$ and $(1-\gamma_S)R > (1-\gamma_L)X$ or if $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S) R < \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L) X$ and $(1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X$, because in both cases, producers' incentives are aligned with the planner's preferences. Two cases remain.

Case 1: $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S) R > \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L) X$ **and** $(1-\gamma_S)R < (1-\gamma_L)X$**.** In this case, we need the additional constraint that $\Pi_1 \geq z_S(1-\gamma_L)X$ because when the producers receive z_S, they can instead produce long asset. Let $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)C_1^E + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_1^L = \tilde{C}_1$, and $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_2^L = \tilde{C}_2$. The problem therefore becomes

$$\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \alpha \left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \Pi_1 + \Pi_2$$

$$\begin{aligned}
s.t.\ z_S + z_L &= \frac{1}{1-\eta} \\
z_S R &\geq \Pi_1 \geq z_S(1-\gamma_L)X \\
z_L X &\geq \Pi_2 \geq z_L(1-\gamma_L)X \\
\tilde{C}_1 &\leq z_S\gamma_S R \\
\tilde{C}_2 &\leq z_L\gamma_L X \\
\tilde{C}_1 + \Pi_1 &= z_S R \\
\tilde{C}_2 + \Pi_2 &= z_L X.
\end{aligned}$$

We further simplify this into

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \ & \alpha \left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \left(z_S R - \tilde{C}_1\right) + \left(\left(\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S\right)X - \tilde{C}_2\right) \\
s.t. & 0 \le \tilde{C}_1 \le z_S R - z_S(1-\gamma_L)X \\
& 0 \le \tilde{C}_2 \le \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S\right)\gamma_L X.
\end{aligned}$$

The problem further becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \ & (\alpha - 1)\left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + z_S\left(R - X\right) \\
s.t. & 0 \le \tilde{C}_1 \le z_S R - z_S(1-\gamma_L)X \\
& 0 \le \tilde{C}_2 \le \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S\right)\gamma_L X.
\end{aligned}$$

Given that $\alpha > 1$, we have $\tilde{C}_1 = z_S R - z_S(1-\gamma_L)X$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S)\gamma_L X$. The objective function becomes

$$(\alpha - 1)\left(z_S R - z_S(1-\gamma_L)X\right) + (\alpha - 1)\left(\left(\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_S\right)\gamma_L X\right) + z_S\left(R - X\right),$$

which is equivalent to

$$\alpha(R - X)z_S.$$

Therefore, it is optimal to let $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = (\frac{1}{1-\eta})$. In this case, $\tilde{C}_1 = 0$, so that $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta})\gamma_L X$ so that $C_2^L = \frac{\gamma_L X}{\eta q}$. It is easily verified that the private information constraints are satisfied.

Case 2: $\alpha\gamma_S R + (1-\gamma_S) R < \alpha\gamma_L X + (1-\gamma_L) X$ **and** $(1-\gamma_S)R > (1-\gamma_L)X$**.** In this case, we need the additional constraint that $\Pi_2 \ge z_L(1-\gamma_S)R$ because when the producers receive z_L, they can instead produce short asset. Again, let $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}(1-q)C_1^E + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_1^L = \tilde{C}_1$, and $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}qC_2^L = \tilde{C}_2$. The problem therefore becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \ & \alpha\left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \Pi_1 + \Pi_2 \\
s.t. \ & z_S + z_L = \frac{1}{1-\eta} \\
& z_S R \ge \Pi_1 \ge z_S(1-\gamma_L)X \\
& z_L X \ge \Pi_2 \ge z_L(1-\gamma_S)R \\
& \tilde{C}_1 \le z_S \gamma_S R \\
& \tilde{C}_2 \le z_L \gamma_L X \\
& \tilde{C}_1 + \Pi_1 = z_S R \\
& \tilde{C}_2 + \Pi_2 = z_L X.
\end{aligned}$$

We further simplify this into

$$\max_{z_S, z_L \in [0,1]} \alpha \left[\tilde{C}_1 + \tilde{C}_2\right] + \left((\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_L) R - \tilde{C}_1 \right) + \left(z_L X - \tilde{C}_2 \right)$$
$$s.t. 0 \leq \tilde{C}_1 \leq (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_L) \gamma_S R$$
$$0 \leq \tilde{C}_2 \leq z_L X - z_L (1 - \gamma_S) R.$$

Given that $\alpha > 1$, we have $\tilde{C}_1 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_L)\gamma_S R$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = z_L X - z_L(1-\gamma_S)R$. The objective function becomes

$$(\alpha - 1)(\frac{1}{1-\eta} - z_L)\gamma_S R + (\alpha - 1)\left(z_L X - z_L (1-\gamma_S) R\right) + z_L \left(X - R \right),$$

which is equivalent to

$$\alpha z_L \left(X - R \right).$$

Therefore, it is optimal to let $z_S = 0$ and $z_L = (\frac{1}{1-\eta})$. In this case, $\tilde{C}_1 = 0$, so that $C_1^E = C_1^L = 0$ and $\tilde{C}_2 = (\frac{1}{1-\eta}) \left[X - (1-\gamma_S) R \right]$ so that $C_2^L = \frac{[X - (1-\gamma_S)R]}{\eta q}$. It is easily verified that the private information constraints are satisfied. Note that we now have $\Pi_2 = \left(\frac{1}{1-\eta} \right) (1 - \gamma_S) R$ so that producers receive *more than* the non-pledgeable part of their production.