The Mortgage‐Cash Premium Puzzle
Published: 7/23/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13373
MICHAEL REHER, ROSSEN VALKANOV
All‐cash homebuyers account for one‐third of U.S. home purchases between 1980 and 2017. We use multiple data sets and research designs to robustly estimate that mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all‐cash buyers to compensate home sellers for mortgage transaction frictions. A dynamic, representative‐seller model implies only a 3% premium, which would suggest an 8% puzzle. Accounting for heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half of this difference, but a puzzle holds in conditions with high transaction risk. An experimental survey of U.S. homeowners replicates these patterns and suggests that belief distortions can explain the puzzle in these high‐risk states.
Published: 7/18/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13372
BOONE BOWLES, ADAM V. REED, MATTHEW C. RINGGENBERG, JACOB R. THORNOCK
We examine the timing of returns around the publication of anomaly trading signals. Using a database that captures when information is first publicly released, we show that anomaly returns are concentrated in the first month after information release dates, and these returns decay soon thereafter. We also show that the academic convention of forming portfolios in June underestimates predictability because it uses stale information, which makes some anomalies appear insignificant. In contrast, we show many anomalies do predict returns if portfolios are formed immediately after information releases. Finally, we develop guidance on forming portfolios without using stale information.
On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring
Published: 7/18/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13374
SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES, EDWARD D. VAN WESEP, BRIAN WATERS
We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.
Very Noisy Option Prices and Inference Regarding the Volatility Risk Premium
Published: 7/17/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13365
JEFFERSON DUARTE, CHRISTOPHER S. JONES, JUNBO L. WANG
The stylized fact that volatility is not priced in individual equity options does not withstand scrutiny. First, we show that the average return of heavily traded deep out‐of‐the‐money call options on stocks is −116 basis points per day. Second, Fama‐MacBeth estimates of the volatility risk premium in stock options are similar to those in S&P 500 Index call options. Third, the mean return of heavily traded delta‐hedged at‐the‐money calls (puts) is −23 (−30) basis points. Fourth, the variance risk premium in stock options is negative. Our analysis highlights the importance of microstructure biases and robustness in empirical work with options.
Unobserved Performance of Hedge Funds
Published: 7/10/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13368
VIKAS AGARWAL, STEFAN RUENZI, FLORIAN WEIGERT
We investigate hedge fund firms’ unobserved performance (UP), measured as the risk‐adjusted return difference between a firm's reported gross return and its portfolio return inferred from its disclosed long‐equity holdings. Firms with high UP outperform those with low UP by 6.36% per annum on a risk‐adjusted basis. UP is negatively associated with a firm's trading costs and positively associated with intraquarter trading in equity positions, derivatives usage, short selling, and confidential holdings. We show that limited investor attention can delay investors’ response to UP and lead to longer lived predictability of fund firm performance.
Do Women Receive Worse Financial Advice?
Published: 7/5/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13366
UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, AMIT KUMAR, SUJATA VISARIA, JING ZHAO
We arranged for trained undercover men and women to pose as potential clients and visit all 65 local financial advisory firms in Hong Kong. At financial planning firms, but not at securities firms, women were more likely than men to receive advice to buy only individual or only local securities. Female clients who signaled high confidence, high risk tolerance, or a domestic outlook were especially likely to receive this suboptimal advice. Our theoretical model explains these patterns as a result of statistical discrimination interacting with advisors’ incentives. Taste‐based discrimination is unlikely to explain the results.
Published: 7/5/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13370
VIRAL V. ACHARYA, RAGHURAM RAJAN
Central bank balance sheet expansion, through actions like quantitative easing, is run through commercial banks. While this increases liquid central bank reserves held on commercial bank balance sheets, demandable uninsured deposits issued to finance the reserves also increase. Subsequent shrinkage in the central bank balance sheet may entail shrinkage in bank‐held reserves without a commensurate reduction in deposit claims. Furthermore, during episodes of liquidity stress, when many claims on liquidity are called, surplus banks may hoard reserves. As a result, central bank balance sheet expansion may create less additional liquidity than typically thought, and indeed, may increase the probability and severity of episodes of liquidity stress.
Did Banks Pay Fair Returns to Taxpayers on TARP?
Published: 6/24/2024 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13367
THOMAS FLANAGAN, AMIYATOSH PURNANANDAM
Financial institutions received investments under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in a bad state of the world but repaid them in a relatively good state. We show that the recipients paid considerably lower returns to taxpayers compared to private‐market securities with similar risk over the same investment horizon, resulting in a subsidy of over $50 billion on the preferred equity investment by the government. Ex‐post renegotiation of contract terms limited the upside gains received by taxpayers in good times and contributed to the subsidy. These findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future bailouts. Our simple methodology for calculating the subsidy can be applied to evaluate the financial costs of other bailouts.