Pages: i-vii | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1999.tb00524.x | Cited by: 0
Pages: viii-xxii | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1999.tb00525.x | Cited by: 0
Pages: 833-874 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00129 | Cited by: 612
Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally, David Ravenscraft
Hedge funds display several interesting characteristics that may influence performance, including: flexible investment strategies, strong managerial incentives, substantial managerial investment, sophisticated investors, and limited government oversight. Using a large sample of hedge fund data from 1988–1995, we find that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds, but not standard market indices. Hedge funds, however, are more volatile than both mutual funds and market indices. Incentive fees explain some of the higher performance, but not the increased total risk. The impact of six data‐conditioning biases is explored. We find evidence that positive and negative survival‐related biases offset each other.
Pages: 875-899 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00130 | Cited by: 498
Judith Chevalier, Glenn Ellison
We examine whether mutual fund performance is related to characteristics of fund managers that may indicate ability, knowledge, or effort. In particular, we study the relationship between performance and the manager's age, the average composite SAT score at the manager's undergraduate institution, and whether the manager has an MBA. Although the raw data suggest striking return differences between managers with different characteristics, most of these can be explained by behavioral differences between managers and by selection biases. After adjusting for these, some performance differences remain. In particular, managers who attended higher‐SAT undergraduate institutions have systematically higher risk‐adjusted excess returns.
Pages: 901-933 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00131 | Cited by: 407
A previous study finds evidence to support selection ability among active fund investors for equity funds listed in 1982. Using a large sample of equity funds, I find evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently perform significantly better than those that lose money. This effect is short‐lived and is largely but not completely explained by a strategy of betting on winners. In the aggregate, there is no significant evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently beat the market. However, it is possible to earn positive abnormal returns by using the cash flow information for small funds.
Pages: 935-952 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00132 | Cited by: 108
David K. Musto
A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross‐sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers.
Pages: 953-980 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00133 | Cited by: 280
Philippe Jorion, William N. Goetzmann
Long‐term estimates of expected return on equities are typically derived from U.S. data only. There are reasons to suspect that these estimates are subject to survivorship, as the United States is arguably the most successful capitalist system in the world. We collect a database of capital appreciation indexes for 39 markets going back to the 1920s. For 1921 to 1996, U.S. equities had the highest real return of all countries, at 4.3 percent, versus a median of 0.8 percent for other countries. The high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
Pages: 981-1013 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00134 | Cited by: 603
Stephen R. Foerster, G. Andrew Karolyi
Non‐U.S. firms cross‐listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.
Pages: 1015-1044 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00135 | Cited by: 198
Laurie Krigman, Wayne H. Shaw, Kent L. Womack
This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.
Pages: 1045-1082 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00136 | Cited by: 465
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Sheridan Titman
This paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency, the choice between private and public financing, and the development of capital markets in emerging economies. Generally, the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire, and if investors receive valuable information without cost. The value of public firms generally depends on public market size, which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public, so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public. The model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development.
Pages: 1083-1107 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00137 | Cited by: 74
Tom Arnold, Philip Hersch, J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry Netter
We study the causes and effects of the competition for order flow by U.S. regional stock exchanges. We trace the origins of competition for order flow to a change in the role of regional exchanges from being venues for listing local securities to being more direct competitors for the order flow of NYSE listings. We study the way regionals competed for order flow, concentrating on a series of stock‐exchange mergers that occurred in the midst of this transition of the regional exchanges. The merging exchanges attracted market share and experienced narrower bid‐ask spreads.
Pages: 1109-1129 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00138 | Cited by: 404
Chee K. Ng, Janet Kiholm Smith, Richard L. Smith
Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.
Pages: 1131-1152 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00139 | Cited by: 195
R. Glenn Hubbard, Darius Palia
One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less‐developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially “unconstrained” buyers acquire “constrained” targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing. We also find that bidders generally retain target management, suggesting that management may have provided company‐specific operational information, while the bidder provided capital‐budgeting expertise.
Pages: 1153-1167 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00140 | Cited by: 26
Jacob Boudoukh, Matthew Richardson, Tom Smith, Robert F. Whitelaw
We provide a formal test of the liquidity preference hypothesis (LPH), that is, the monotonicity of ex ante term premiums, using nonparametric estimates that do not require a structural model for conditional expected returns. Although the point estimates of the term premiums are consistent with previous conclusions in the literature regarding violations of the LPH, the test statistics are generally insignificant, even when powerful conditioning information is used. These results illustrate the importance of correctly accounting for correlations across maturities and of formally testing the inequality restrictions implied by the LPH.
Pages: 1169-1184 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00141 | Cited by: 121
Yakov Amihud, Haim Mendelson, Jun Uno
Merton (1987) proposes that an increase in a firm's investor base increases the firm's value. In Japan, companies can reduce their stock's minimum trading unit—the number of shares in a “round lot”—which facilitates trading in the stock by small investors. We find that a reduction in the minimum trading unit greatly increases a firm's base of individual investors and its stock liquidity, and is associated with a significant increase in the stock price. Further, the stock price appreciation is positively related to an increase in the number of shareholders.
Pages: 1185-1189 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00142 | Cited by: 0
The Mutual Fund Business. By ROBERT C. POZEN. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. Pp. xiii + 712.
Pages: 1185-1189 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.t01-1-00142 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1191-1197 | Published: 6/1999 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00143 | Cited by: 0