How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?
Pages: 1901-1941 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00277 | Cited by: 1055
John R. Graham
I integrate under firm‐specific benefit functions to estimate that the capitalized tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value (or as low as 4.3 percent, net of personal taxes). The typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. I infer how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing the shape of its tax benefit function. Paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt conservatively. Product market factors, growth options, low asset collateral, and planning for future expenditures lead to conservative debt usage. Conservative debt policy is persistent.
Specification Analysis of Affine Term Structure Models
Pages: 1943-1978 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00278 | Cited by: 1274
Qiang Dai, Kenneth J. Singleton
This paper explores the structural differences and relative goodness‐of‐fits of affine term structure models (ATSMs). Within the family of ATSMs there is a trade‐off between flexibility in modeling the conditional correlations and volatilities of the risk factors. This trade‐off is formalized by our classification of N‐factor affine family into N+1 non‐nested subfamilies of models. Specializing to three‐factor ATSMs, our analysis suggests, based on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, that some subfamilies of ATSMs are better suited than others to explaining historical interest rate behavior.
Pages: 1979-2016 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00279 | Cited by: 156
Alon Brav
Statistical inference in long‐horizon event studies has been hampered by the fact that abnormal returns are neither normally distributed nor independent. This study presents a new approach to inference that overcomes these difficulties and dominates other popular testing methods. I illustrate the use of the methodology by examining the long‐horizon returns of initial public offerings (IPOs). I find that the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model is inconsistent with the observed long‐horizon price performance of these IPOs, whereas a characteristic‐based model cannot be rejected.
Price Momentum and Trading Volume
Pages: 2017-2069 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00280 | Cited by: 1000
Charles M.C. Lee, Bhaskaran Swaminathan
This study shows that past trading volume provides an important link between “momentum” and “value” strategies. Specifically, we find that firms with high (low) past turnover ratios exhibit many glamour (value) characteristics, earn lower (higher) future returns, and have consistently more negative (positive) earnings surprises over the next eight quarters. Past trading volume also predicts both the magnitude and persistence of price momentum. Specifically, price momentum effects reverse over the next five years, and high (low) volume winners (losers) experience faster reversals. Collectively, our findings show that past volume helps to reconcile intermediate‐horizon “underreaction” and long‐horizon “overreaction” effects.
Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance
Pages: 2071-2115 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00281 | Cited by: 168
Terrence Hendershott, Haim Mendelson
This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive (‘liquidity’) and negative (‘crowding’) externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a ‘market of last resort’ can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.
Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders
Pages: 2117-2155 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00282 | Cited by: 237
Kerry Back, C. Henry Cao, Gregory A. Willard
Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts
Pages: 2157-2195 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00283 | Cited by: 248
Cheol Park
This paper presents a theory of optimal debt structure when the moral hazard problem is severe. The main idea is that the optimal debt contract delegates monitoring to a single senior lender and that seniority allows the monitoring senior lender to appropriate the full return from his monitoring activities. The theory explains (i) why debt contracts are prioritized, (ii) why short‐term debt is senior to long‐term debt, and (iii) why financial intermediaries usually hold short‐term senior debt whereas long‐term junior debt is widely held. Another implication of the theory is that covenant and maturity structures will be set to conform to the seniority structure.
The Effect of Bank Relations on Investment Decisions: An Investigation of Japanese Takeover Bids
Pages: 2197-2218 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00284 | Cited by: 127
Jun‐Koo Kang, Anil Shivdasani, Takeshi Yamada
We study 154 domestic mergers in Japan during 1977 to 1993. In contrast to U.S. evidence, mergers are viewed favorably by investors of acquiring firms. We document a two‐day acquirer abnormal return of 1.2 percent and a mean cumulative abnormal return of 5.4 percent for the duration of the takeover. Announcement returns display a strong positive association with the strength of acquirer's relationships with banks. The benefits of bank relations appear to be greater for firms with poor investment opportunities and when the banking sector is healthy. We conclude that close ties with informed creditors, such as banks, facilitate investment policies that enhance shareholder wealth.
The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns
Pages: 2219-2257 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00285 | Cited by: 745
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler
The share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong predictor of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. In particular, firms issue relatively more equity than debt just before periods of low market returns. The equity share in new issues has stable predictive power in both halves of the sample period and after controlling for other known predictors. We do not find support for efficient market explanations of the results. Instead, the fact that the equity share sometimes predicts significantly negative market returns suggests inefficiency and that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing securities.
Order Flow, Transaction Clock, and Normality of Asset Returns
Pages: 2259-2284 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00286 | Cited by: 302
Thierry Ané, Hélyette Geman
The goal of this paper is to show that normality of asset returns can be recovered through a stochastic time change. Clark (1973) addressed this issue by representing the price process as a subordinated process with volume as the lognormally distributed subordinator. We extend Clark's results and find the following: (i) stochastic time changes are mathematically much less constraining than subordinators; (ii) the cumulative number of trades is a better stochastic clock than the volume for generating virtually perfect normality in returns; (iii) this clock can be modeled nonparametrically, allowing both the time‐change and price processes to take the form of jump diffusions.
Predictability and Transaction Costs: The Impact on Rebalancing Rules and Behavior
Pages: 2285-2309 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00287 | Cited by: 149
Anthony W. Lynch, Pierluigi Balduzzi
Recent papers show that predictability calibrated to U.S. data has a large effect on the rebalancing behavior of a multiperiod investor. We find that this continues to be true in the presence of realistic transaction costs. In particular, predictability causes the no‐trade region for the risky‐asset holding to become state dependent and, on average, wider and higher. Predictability also motivates the investor to spend considerably more on rebalancing and to rebalance more often. In other results, we find that introducing costly liquidation of the risky asset for consumption lowers the average allocation to the risky asset, though only marginally early in life. Our experiments also vary the nature of the return predictability and introduce return heteroskedasticity.
Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?
Pages: 2311-2331 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00288 | Cited by: 682
Jennifer N. Carpenter
This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager's optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Sometimes, the manager's optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account. Furthermore, giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility.
The American Put Option and Its Critical Stock Price
Pages: 2333-2356 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00289 | Cited by: 82
David S. Bunch, Herb Johnson
We derive an expression for the critical stock price for the American put. We start by expressing the put price as an integral involving first‐passage probabilities. This approach yields intuition for Merton's result for the perpetual put. We then consider the finite‐lived case. Using (1) the fact that the put value ceases to depend on time when the critical stock price is reached and (2) the result that an American put equals a European put plus an early‐exercise premium, we derive the critical stock price. We approximate the critical‐stock‐price function to compute accurate put prices.
Time Variation of Ex‐Dividend Day Stock Returns and Corporate Dividend Capture: A Reexamination
Pages: 2357-2372 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00290 | Cited by: 54
Andy Naranjo, M. Nimalendran, Mike Ryngaert
This paper documents some empirical facts about ex‐day abnormal returns to high dividend yield stocks that are potentially subject to corporate dividend capture. We find that average abnormal ex‐dividend day returns are uniformly negative in each year after the introduction of negotiated commission rates and that time variation in ex‐day returns during the negotiated commission rates era is consistent with corporate tax‐based dividend capture. Ex‐day returns are more negative when the tax advantage to corporate dividend capture is greatest and more positive when increases in transaction costs and risk reduce incentives to engage in corporate tax‐based dividend capture.
Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading
Pages: 2373-2397 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00291 | Cited by: 279
David Ikenberry, Josef Lakonishok, Theo Vermaelen
During the 1980s, U.S. firms announcing stock repurchases earned favorable long‐run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised over the robustness of these findings. This concern comes at a time of explosive growth in repurchase programs. Thus, we study new evidence from the 1990s for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs. Moreover, because of Canadian law, we can carefully track repurchase activity monthly. Similarly to the situation in the United States, the Canadian stock market discounts the information in repurchase announcements, particularly for value stocks. Completion rates in Canada are sensitive to mispricing. Trades also appear linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall.
Equity Undervaluation and Decisions Related to Repurchase Tender Offers: An Empirical Investigation
Pages: 2399-2424 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00292 | Cited by: 167
Ranjan D'mello, Pervin K. Shroff
Pages: 2429-2430 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00295 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 2429-2430 | Published: 10/2000 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00295 | Cited by: 0