Pages: 2147-biv | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00793.x | Cited by: 1
Pages: i-vi | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00774.x | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1595-1638 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00775.x | Cited by: 546
RENÉ M. STULZ
Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision‐making because of “twin agency problems” that arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and corporate insiders must co‐invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization.
Pages: 1639-1672 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00776.x | Cited by: 348
RAVI BANSAL, ROBERT F. DITTMAR, CHRISTIAN T. LUNDBLAD
Pages: 1673-1712 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00777.x | Cited by: 60
GREGORY R. DUFFEE
The conditional covariance between aggregate stock returns and aggregate consumption growth varies substantially over time. When stock market wealth is high relative to consumption, both the conditional covariance and correlation are high. This pattern is consistent with the “composition effect,” where agents' consumption growth is more closely tied to stock returns when stock wealth is a larger share of total wealth. This variation can be used to test asset‐pricing models in which the price of consumption risk varies. After accounting for variations in this price, the relation between expected excess stock returns and the conditional covariance is negative.
Pages: 1713-1757 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00778.x | Cited by: 261
ĽUBOŠ PÁSTOR, PIETRO VERONESI
We argue that the number of firms going public changes over time in response to time variation in market conditions. We develop a model of optimal initial public offering (IPO) timing in which IPO waves are caused by declines in expected market return, increases in expected aggregate profitability, or increases in prior uncertainty about the average future profitability of IPOs. We test and find support for the model's empirical predictions. For example, we find that IPO waves tend to be preceded by high market returns and followed by low market returns.
Pages: 1759-1790 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00779.x | Cited by: 99
ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, WILLIAM J. WILHELM
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision‐maker's satisfaction with the underwriter's performance based on Loughran and Ritter (2002) and assess its ability to explain the decision‐maker's choice among underwriters in subsequent securities offerings. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter's performance. Underwriters also extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision‐makers. Although our tests suggest that the behavioral model has explanatory power, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns.
Pages: 1791-1823 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x | Cited by: 885
STEVEN N. KAPLAN, ANTOINETTE SCHOAR
This paper investigates the performance and capital inflows of private equity partnerships. Average fund returns (net of fees) approximately equal the S&P 500 although substantial heterogeneity across funds exists. Returns persist strongly across subsequent funds of a partnership. Better performing partnerships are more likely to raise follow‐on funds and larger funds. This relationship is concave, so top performing partnerships grow proportionally less than average performers. At the industry level, market entry and fund performance are procyclical; however, established funds are less sensitive to cycles than new entrants. Several of these results differ markedly from those for mutual funds.
Pages: 1825-1863 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00781.x | Cited by: 400
MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN
This paper studies predatory trading, trading that induces and/or exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits from triggering another trader's crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders and across markets.
Pages: 1865-1902 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00782.x | Cited by: 40
MATTI KELOHARJU, KJELL G. NYBORG, KRISTIAN RYDQVIST
We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developing and testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner's curse.
Pages: 1903-1949 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00783.x | Cited by: 241
This paper provides evidence that top managers have contrarian views on firm value. Managers' perceptions of fundamental value diverge systematically from market valuations, and perceived mispricing seems an important determinant of managers' decision making. Insider trading patterns shows that low valuation firms are regarded as undervalued by their own managers relative to high valuation firms. This finding is robust to controlling for noninformation motivated trading. Further evidence links managers' private portfolio decisions to changes in corporate capital structures, suggesting that managers try to actively time the market both in their private trades and in firm‐level decisions.
Pages: 1951-1982 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00784.x | Cited by: 303
I find that the market reaction to a merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement predicts whether the companies later consummate the deal. The relation cannot be explained by the market's anticipation of the closing decision or its perception of the deal quality at the announcement. Merging companies appear to extract information from the market reaction and later consider it in closing the deal. Furthermore, the relation varies with deal characteristics, suggesting that companies seem to have a higher incentive to learn from the market when canceling the announced deal is easier or when the market has more information that the companies do not know.
Pages: 1983-2011 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00785.x | Cited by: 531
MARCIN KACPERCZYK, CLEMENS SIALM, LU ZHENG
Mutual fund managers may decide to deviate from a well‐diversified portfolio and concentrate their holdings in industries where they have informational advantages. In this paper, we study the relation between the industry concentration and the performance of actively managed U.S. mutual funds from 1984 to 1999. Our results indicate that, on average, more concentrated funds perform better after controlling for risk and style differences using various performance measures. This finding suggests that investment ability is more evident among managers who hold portfolios concentrated in a few industries.
Pages: 2013-2041 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00786.x | Cited by: 41
Using a large sample of litigation events involving publicly listed defendants, we document a surprising fact. The resolution of litigation through a court's decision dominates settlement of litigation from the shareholders' point of view, even when the firm loses. We develop a model using agency costs within the firm to explain why the market views settlement as a negative outcome on average and find empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. Specifically, firms with weak corporate governance settle litigation more quickly, and the market reacts more negatively to settlements involving firms with higher agency costs.
Pages: 2043-2082 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00787.x | Cited by: 96
JASON KARCESKI, STEVEN ONGENA, DAVID C. SMITH
We estimate the impact of bank merger announcements on borrowers' stock prices for publicly traded Norwegian firms. Borrowers of target banks lose about 0.8% in equity value, while borrowers of acquiring banks earn positive abnormal returns, suggesting that borrower welfare is influenced by a strategic focus favoring acquiring borrowers. Bank mergers lead to higher relationship exit rates among borrowers of target banks. Larger merger‐induced increases in relationship termination rates are associated with less negative abnormal returns, suggesting that firms with low switching costs switch banks, while similar firms with high switching costs are locked into their current relationship.
Pages: 2083-2123 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x | Cited by: 178
TOD PERRY, URS PEYER
While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.
Pages: 2125-2139 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00789.x | Cited by: 0
ROBERT F. STAMBAUGH
Pages: 2141-2142 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00790.x | Cited by: 0
Pages: 2143-2144 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00791.x | Cited by: 0
David H. Pyle
Pages: 2145-2146 | Published: 8/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00792.x | Cited by: 0