Pages: 1327-1363 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12295 | Cited by: 131
Academicsâ view of the benefits of finance vastly exceeds societal perception. This dissonance is at least partly explained by an underappreciation by academia of how, without proper rules, finance can easily degenerate into a rentâseeking activity. I outline what finance academics can do, from a research point of view and from an educational point of view, to promote good finance and minimize the bad.
Pages: 1365-1403 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12275 | Cited by: 265
This paper investigates the effects of going public on innovation by comparing the innovation activity of firms that go public with firms that withdraw their initial public offering (IPO) filing and remain private. NASDAQ fluctuations during the bookâbuilding phase are used as an instrument for IPO completion. Using patentâbased metrics, I find that the quality of internal innovation declines following the IPO, and firms experience both an exodus of skilled inventors and a decline in the productivity of the remaining inventors. However, public firms attract new human capital and acquire external innovation. The analysis reveals that going public changes firms' strategies in pursuing innovation.
Pages: 1405-1455 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12207 | Cited by: 24
RUI ALBUQUERQUE, ENRIQUE SCHROTH
We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of controlling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less efficient acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a fire sale price. Third, absent a liquidity shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. Using a structural estimation approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public corporations, we estimate the value of control, blockholders' marketability discount, and dispersed shareholders' illiquidityâspillover discount.
Pages: 1457-1493 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12251 | Cited by: 71
JUN QJ QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN, ZHISHU YANG
In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.
Pages: 1495-1554 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12252 | Cited by: 145
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, JOĂO F. COCCO
In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zeroâprofit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loanâtoâvalue ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustableârate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.
Pages: 1555-1582 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12260 | Cited by: 128
PIERRE COLLIN-DUFRESNE, VYACHESLAV FOS
Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stock illiquidity are lower, even though prices are positively impacted. Two channels help explain this phenomenon: (1) activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade, and (2) activists use limit orders. We conclude that, when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading.
Pages: 1583-1628 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12234 | Cited by: 17
MANUEL ADELINO, KATHARINA LEWELLEN, ANANT SUNDARAM
This paper examines investment choices of nonprofit hospitals. It tests how shocks to cash flows caused by the performance of the hospitalsâ financial assets affect hospital expenditures. Capital expenditures increase, on average, by 10 to 28 cents for every dollar received from financial assets. The sensitivity is similar to that found earlier for shareholderâowned corporations. Executive compensation, other salaries, and perks do not respond significantly to cash flow shocks. Hospitals with an apparent tendency to overspend on medical procedures do not exhibit higher investmentâcash flow sensitivities. The sensitivities are higher for hospitals that appear financially constrained.
Pages: 1629-1682 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12198 | Cited by: 172
MARIASSUNTA GIANNETTI, GUANMIN LIAO, XIAOYUN YU
Pages: 1683-1722 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12253 | Cited by: 75
ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL G. HANSON, JEREMY C. STEIN
We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless shortâterm securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with shortâterm debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of shortâterm moneyâlike claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of shortâterm debt.
Pages: 1723-1765 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12226 | Cited by: 95
ITAY GOLDSTEIN, LIYAN YANG
We analyze a model in which different traders are informed of different fundamentals that affect the security value. We identify a source for strategic complementarities in trading and information acquisition: aggressive trading on information about one fundamental reduces uncertainty in trading on information about the other fundamental, encouraging more trading and information acquisition on that fundamental. This tends to amplify the effect of exogenous changes in the underlying information environment. Due to complementarities, greater diversity of information in the economy improves price informativeness. We discuss the relation between our model and recent financial phenomena and derive testable empirical implications.
Pages: 1767-1804 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12254 | Cited by: 81
XAVIER GIROUD, HOLGER M. MUELLER
We document how a positive shock to investment opportunities at one plant (âtreated plantâ) spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, the firm's headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firmâwide productivity increases. We do not find evidence of capital or labor spillovers among plants of financially unconstrained firms.
Pages: 1805-1837 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12270 | Cited by: 69
MATTHIEU BOUVARD, PIERRE CHAIGNEAU, ADOLFO DE MOTTA
We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bankâspecific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis.
Pages: 1839-1854 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12290 | Cited by: 0
KENNETH J. SINGLETON, BRUNO BIAIS, MICHAEL ROBERTS
Pages: 1855-1856 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12292 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1857-1858 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12291 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1859-1860 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12293 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1861-1861 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12294 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1862-1862 | Published: 7/2015 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12306 | Cited by: 0
ANDREW J. PATTON, TARUN RAMADORAI, MICHAEL STREATFIELD