DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS PRIZES FOR 2019
Pages: 589-589 | Published: 3/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12872 | Cited by: 0
Retracted: Risk Management in Financial Institutions
Pages: 591-637 | Published: 2/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12868 | Cited by: 31
ADRIANO A. RAMPINI, S. VISWANATHAN, GUILLAUME VUILLEMEY
We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to declines in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise‐similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.
What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery”
Pages: 639-682 | Published: 12/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12867 | Cited by: 148
JOAN FARRE‐MENSA, DEEPAK HEGDE, ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST
We provide evidence on the value of patents to startups by leveraging the quasi‐random assignment of applications to examiners with different propensities to grant patents. Using unique data on all first‐time applications filed at the U.S. Patent Office since 2001, we find that startups that win the patent “lottery” by drawing lenient examiners have, on average, 55% higher employment growth and 80% higher sales growth five years later. Patent winners also pursue more, and higher quality, follow‐on innovation. Winning a first patent boosts a startup’s subsequent growth and innovation by facilitating access to funding from venture capitalists, banks, and public investors.
Relationship Trading in Over‐the‐Counter Markets
Pages: 683-734 | Published: 12/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12864 | Cited by: 92
TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, DAN LI, DMITRY LIVDAN, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF
We examine the network of trading relationships between insurers and dealers in the over‐the‐counter (OTC) corporate bond market. Regulatory data show that one‐third of insurers use a single dealer, whereas other insurers have large dealer networks. Execution prices are nonmonotone in network size, initially declining with more dealers but increasing once networks exceed 20 dealers. A model of decentralized trade in which insurers trade off the benefits of repeat business and faster execution quantitatively fits the distribution of insurers' network size and explains the price–network size relationship. Counterfactual analysis shows that regulations to unbundle trade and nontrade services can decrease welfare.
Tax‐Efficient Asset Management: Evidence from Equity Mutual Funds
Pages: 735-777 | Published: 11/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12843 | Cited by: 30
CLEMENS SIALM, HANJIANG ZHANG
We investigate the relation between tax burdens and mutual fund performance from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The theoretical model introduces heterogeneous tax clienteles in an environment with decreasing returns to scale and shows that the equilibrium performance of mutual funds depends on the size of the tax clienteles. Our empirical results show that the performance of U.S. equity mutual funds is related to their tax burdens. We find that tax‐efficient funds exhibit not only superior after‐tax performance, but also superior before‐tax performance due to lower trading costs, favorable style exposures, and better selectivity.
Measuring Innovation and Product Differentiation: Evidence from Mutual Funds
Pages: 779-823 | Published: 11/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12853 | Cited by: 54
LEONARD KOSTOVETSKY, JEROLD B. WARNER
Beyond Random Assignment: Credible Inference and Extrapolation in Dynamic Economies
Pages: 825-866 | Published: 12/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12862 | Cited by: 14
CHRISTOPHER A. HENNESSY, ILYA A. STREBULAEV
We derive analytical relationships between shock responses and theory‐implied causal effects (comparative statics) in dynamic settings with linear profits and linear‐quadratic stock accumulation costs. For permanent profitability shocks, responses can have incorrect signs, undershoot, or overshoot depending on the size and sign of realized changes. For profitability shocks that are i.i.d., uniformly distributed, binary, or unanticipated and temporary, there is attenuation bias, which exceeds 50% under plausible parameterizations. We derive a novel sufficient condition for profitability shock responses to equal causal effects: martingale profitability. We establish a battery of sufficient conditions for correct sign estimation, including stochastic monotonicity. Simple extrapolation/error correction formulas are presented.
The Market for Conflicted Advice
Pages: 867-903 | Published: 11/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12848 | Cited by: 17
BRIANA CHANG, MARTIN SZYDLOWSKI
We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. Although conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers' welfare: banning conflicted fees improves only the information quality, not customers' welfare. Instead, financial literacy education for the least informed customers can improve all customers' welfare because of a spillover effect. Furthermore, customers who trade through advisers realize lower average returns, which rationalizes empirical findings.
Does Borrowing from Banks Cost More than Borrowing from the Market?
Pages: 905-947 | Published: 10/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12849 | Cited by: 90
MICHAEL SCHWERT
Pages: 949-994 | Published: 2/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12869 | Cited by: 81
ATIF MIAN, AMIR SUFI, EMIL VERNER
Credit supply expansion can affect an economy by increasing productive capacity or by boosting household demand. In this study, we develop a test to determine if the household demand channel is present, and we implement the test using both a natural experiment in the United States in the 1980s and an international panel of 56 countries over the last several decades. Consistent with the importance of the household demand channel, we find that credit supply expansion boosts nontradable sector employment and the price of nontradable goods, with limited effects on tradable sector employment. Such credit expansions amplify the business cycle and lead to more severe recessions.
Shorting in Speculative Markets
Pages: 995-1036 | Published: 1/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12871 | Cited by: 19
MARCEL NUTZ, JOSÉ A. SCHEINKMAN
In models of trading with heterogeneous beliefs following Harrison‐Kreps, short selling is prohibited and agents face constant marginal costs‐of‐carry. The resale option guarantees that prices exceed buy‐and‐hold prices and the difference is identified as a bubble. We propose a model where risk‐neutral agents face asymmetric increasing marginal costs on long and short positions. Here, agents also value an option to delay, and a Hamilton‐Jacobi‐Bellman equation quantifies the influence of costs on prices. An unexpected decrease in shorting costs may deflate a bubble, linking financial innovations that facilitated shorting of mortgage‐backed securities to the collapse of prices.
Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply
Pages: 1037-1082 | Published: 12/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12866 | Cited by: 34
BRENDAN DALEY, BRETT GREEN, VICTORIA VANASCO
We develop a framework to explore the effect of credit ratings on loan origination. We show that ratings endogenously shift the economy from a signaling equilibrium, in which banks inefficiently retain loans to signal quality, toward an originate‐to‐distribute equilibrium with zero retention and inefficiently low lending standards. Ratings increase overall efficiency, provided that the reduction in costly retention more than compensates for the origination of some negative net present value loans. We study how banks' ability to screen loans affects these predictions and use the model to analyze commonly proposed policies such as mandatory “skin in the game.”
Glued to the TV: Distracted Noise Traders and Stock Market Liquidity
Pages: 1083-1133 | Published: 2/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12863 | Cited by: 138
JOEL PERESS, DANIEL SCHMIDT
In this paper, we study the impact of noise traders’ limited attention on financial markets. Specifically, we exploit episodes of sensational news (exogenous to the market) that distract noise traders. We find that on “distraction days,” trading activity, liquidity, and volatility decrease, and prices reverse less among stocks owned predominantly by noise traders. These outcomes contrast sharply with those due to the inattention of informed speculators and market makers, and are consistent with noise traders mitigating adverse selection risk. We discuss the evolution of these outcomes over time and the role of technological changes.
Informed Trading and Intertemporal Substitution
Pages: 1135-1156 | Published: 11/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12857 | Cited by: 2
YIZHOU XIAO
I examine the possibility of information‐based trading in a multiperiod consumption setting. I develop a necessary and sufficient condition for trade to occur. Intertemporal substitution introduces a desire to correlate current consumption with future aggregate shocks. When agents have heterogeneous time‐inseparable preferences, information differentially affects relative preferences for current and future consumption, making information‐based trading mutually acceptable. The no‐trade result continues to hold if there is no aggregate shock, or if agents have either homogeneous or time‐separable preferences.
Report of the Editor of The Journal of Finance for the Year 2019
Pages: 1157-1172 | Published: 3/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12881 | Cited by: 2
STEFAN NAGEL
Minutes of the 2020 Annual Membership Meeting
Pages: 1173-1175 | Published: 3/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12886 | Cited by: 0
Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2019
Pages: 1177-1178 | Published: 3/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12887 | Cited by: 0
Pages: 1182-1183 | Published: 3/2020 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12660 | Cited by: 0