On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Published: 3/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x | Cited by: 11442
Mark M. Carhart
Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk‐adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) “hot hands” result is mostly driven by the one‐year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst‐return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Published: 6/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x | Cited by: 8812
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency
Published: 3/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04702.x | Cited by: 7002
NARASIMHAN JEGADEESH, SHERIDAN TITMAN
This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3‐to 12‐month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.
Corporate Ownership Around the World
Published: 4/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00115 | Cited by: 6962
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Published: 9/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x | Cited by: 6926
Edward I. Altman
The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns
Published: 6/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04398.x | Cited by: 6281
EUGENE F. FAMA, KENNETH R. FRENCH
Two easily measured variables, size and book‐to‐market equity, combine to capture the cross‐sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β, size, leverage, book‐to‐market equity, and earnings‐price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between market β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.
Legal Determinants of External Finance
Published: 7/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x | Cited by: 5602
RAFAEL LA PORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Published: 7/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x | Cited by: 5254
MICHAEL C. JENSEN
Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Investor Sentiment and the Cross‐Section of Stock Returns
Published: 8/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00885.x | Cited by: 4655
MALCOLM BAKER, JEFFREY WURGLER
We study how investor sentiment affects the cross‐section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning‐of‐period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non‐dividend‐paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.
Published: 3/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x | Cited by: 4416
Harry Markowitz
On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks
Published: 12/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05128.x | Cited by: 4291
LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, RAVI JAGANNATHAN, DAVID E. RUNKLE
We find support for a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly return, using a GARCH‐M model modified by allowing (1) seasonal patterns in volatility, (2) positive and negative innovations to returns having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (3) nominal interest rates to predict conditional variance. Using the modified GARCH‐M model, we also show that monthly conditional volatility may not be as persistent as was thought. Positive unanticipated returns appear to result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility.
When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks
Published: 1/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x | Cited by: 4049
TIM LOUGHRAN, BILL MCDONALD
Previous research uses negative word counts to measure the tone of a text. We show that word lists developed for other disciplines misclassify common words in financial text. In a large sample of 10‐Ks during 1994 to 2008, almost three‐fourths of the words identified as negative by the widely used Harvard Dictionary are words typically not considered negative in financial contexts. We develop an alternative negative word list, along with five other word lists, that better reflect tone in financial text. We link the word lists to 10‐K filing returns, trading volume, return volatility, fraud, material weakness, and unexpected earnings.
Investor Psychology and Security Market Under‐ and Overreactions
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00077 | Cited by: 3883
Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam
We propose a theory of securities market under‐ and overreactions based on two well‐known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self‐attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long‐lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public‐event‐based return predictability. Biased self‐attribution adds positive short‐lag autocorrelations (“momentum”), short‐run earnings “drift,” but negative correlation between future returns and long‐term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate financial policy.
Does the Stock Market Overreact?
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x | Cited by: 3743
WERNER F. M. De BONDT, RICHARD THALER
Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
Published: 5/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00567 | Cited by: 3698
Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb
We investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.
CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*
Published: 9/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x | Cited by: 3658
William F. Sharpe
What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
Published: 12/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x | Cited by: 3637
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, LUIGI ZINGALES
The Cross‐Section of Volatility and Expected Returns
Published: 1/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00836.x | Cited by: 3564
ANDREW ANG, ROBERT J. HODRICK, YUHANG XING, XIAOYAN ZHANG
We examine the pricing of aggregate volatility risk in the cross‐section of stock returns. Consistent with theory, we find that stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility have low average returns. Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French (1993, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 2349) model have abysmally low average returns. This phenomenon cannot be explained by exposure to aggregate volatility risk. Size, book‐to‐market, momentum, and liquidity effects cannot account for either the low average returns earned by stocks with high exposure to systematic volatility risk or for the low average returns of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies
Published: 3/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05202.x | Cited by: 3552
EUGENE F. FAMA, KENNETH R. FRENCH
Previous work shows that average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, cash flow/price, book‐to‐market equity, past sales growth, long‐term past return, and short‐term past return. Because these patterns in average returns apparently are not explained by the CAPM, they are called anomalies. We find that, except for the continuation of short‐term returns, the anomalies largely disappear in a three‐factor model. Our results are consistent with rational ICAPM or APT asset pricing, but we also consider irrational pricing and data problems as possible explanations.
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Published: 3/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x | Cited by: 3402
William Vickrey
Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market
Published: 5/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01232.x | Cited by: 3265
PAUL C. TETLOCK
Published: 3/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x | Cited by: 3186
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
Published: 3/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x | Cited by: 3070
MITCHELL A. PETERSEN, RAGHURAM G. RAJAN
Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles
Published: 8/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00670.x | Cited by: 3028
Ravi Bansal, Amir Yaron
A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00184 | Cited by: 2921
Harrison Hong, Jeremy C. Stein
A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x | Cited by: 2919
ROBERT C. MERTON
No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market Comovements
Published: 10/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00494 | Cited by: 2899
Kristin J. Forbes, Roberto Rigobon
The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice
Published: 3/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x | Cited by: 2864
SHERIDAN TITMAN, ROBERTO WESSELS
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
Published: 11/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x | Cited by: 2769
ULRIKE MALMENDIER, GEOFFREY TATE
Published: 5/2017, Volume: 72, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12505 | Cited by: 2762
KARL V. LINS, HENRI SERVAES, ANE TAMAYO
Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors
Published: 4/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00226 | Cited by: 2679
Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean
Published: 12/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x | Cited by: 2649
EUGENE F. FAMA
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Published: 6/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00457 | Cited by: 2623
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
Published: 12/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00511 | Cited by: 2569
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang
ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x | Cited by: 2560
Robert C. Merton
Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?
Published: 10/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00072 | Cited by: 2465
Terrance Odean
Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk
Published: 12/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x | Cited by: 2402
JOSEF LAKONISHOK, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND DIVERGENCE OF OPINION
Published: 9/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03317.x | Cited by: 2367
Edward M. Miller
Published: 9/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01679.x | Cited by: 2361
ZHI DA, JOSEPH ENGELBERG, PENGJIE GAO
We propose a new and direct measure of investor attention using search frequency in Google (Search Volume Index (SVI)). In a sample of Russell 3000 stocks from 2004 to 2008, we find that SVI (1) is correlated with but different from existing proxies of investor attention; (2) captures investor attention in a more timely fashion and (3) likely measures the attention of retail investors. An increase in SVI predicts higher stock prices in the next 2 weeks and an eventual price reversal within the year. It also contributes to the large first‐day return and long‐run underperformance of IPO stocks.
Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows
Published: 10/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00066 | Cited by: 2341
Erik R. Sirri, Peter Tufano
This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.
The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash
Published: 8/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00679.x | Cited by: 2324
Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello, Michael S. Weisbach
We model a firm's demand for liquidity to develop a new test of the effect of financial constraints on corporate policies. The effect of financial constraints is captured by the firm's propensity to save cash out of cash flows (the cash flow sensitivity of cash). We hypothesize that constrained firms should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, while unconstrained firms' cash savings should not be systematically related to cash flows. We empirically estimate the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a large sample of manufacturing firms over the 1971 to 2000 period and find robust support for our theory.
Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States
Published: 9/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01589.x | Cited by: 2320
THORSTEN BECK, ROSS LEVINE, ALEXEY LEVKOV
We assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the United States. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and improved bank performance. Exploiting the cross‐state, cross‐time variation in the timing of branch deregulation, we find that deregulation materially tightened the distribution of income by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while having little impact on incomes above the median. Bank deregulation tightened the distribution of income by increasing the relative wage rates and working hours of unskilled workers.
Market Timing and Capital Structure
Published: 2/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00414 | Cited by: 2258
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler
It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.
Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00181 | Cited by: 2162
Joshua D. Coval, Tobias J. Moskowitz
The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.
Conditional Skewness in Asset Pricing Tests
Published: 6/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00247 | Cited by: 2081
Campbell R. Harvey, Akhtar Siddique
If asset returns have systematic skewness, expected returns should include rewards for accepting this risk. We formalize this intuition with an asset pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Our results show that conditional skewness helps explain the cross‐sectional variation of expected returns across assets and is significant even when factors based on size and book‐to‐market are included. Systematic skewness is economically important and commands a risk premium, on average, of 3.60 percent per year. Our results suggest that the momentum effect is related to systematic skewness. The low expected return momentum portfolios have higher skewness than high expected return portfolios.
Information and the Cost of Capital
Published: 8/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00672.x | Cited by: 2061
David Easley, Maureen O'hara
We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
Published: 9/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x | Cited by: 2045
DOUGLAS W. DIAMOND, ROBERT E. VERRECCHIA
This paper shows that revealing public information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large investors due to increased liquidity of its securities. Large firms will disclose more information since they benefit most. Disclosure also reduces the risk bearing capacity available through market makers. If initial information asymmetry is large, reducing it will increase the current price of the security. However, the maximum current price occurs with some asymmetry of information: further reduction of information asymmetry accentuates the undesirable effects of exit from market making.
Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt
Published: 9/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x | Cited by: 2036
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN
While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.
Published: 3/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05166.x | Cited by: 2035
TIM LOUGHRAN, JAY R. RITTER
Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long‐run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book‐to‐market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date.
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
Published: 2/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00199 | Cited by: 1995
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome model,” dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the “substitute model,” insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.