Published: 3/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x | Cited by: 6445
Mark M. Carhart
Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk‐adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) “hot hands” result is mostly driven by the one‐year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst‐return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.
Published: 6/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x | Cited by: 5235
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
Published: 4/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00115 | Cited by: 4770
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
Published: 3/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04702.x | Cited by: 4262
NARASIMHAN JEGADEESH, SHERIDAN TITMAN
This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3‐to 12‐month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.
Published: 6/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04398.x | Cited by: 4082
EUGENE F. FAMA, KENNETH R. FRENCH
Two easily measured variables, size and book‐to‐market equity, combine to capture the cross‐sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β, size, leverage, book‐to‐market equity, and earnings‐price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between market β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.
Published: 7/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x | Cited by: 3761
RAFAEL LA PORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
Published: 7/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x | Cited by: 3159
MICHAEL C. JENSEN
Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Published: 9/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x | Cited by: 3031
Edward I. Altman
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00077 | Cited by: 2633
Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam
We propose a theory of securities market under‐ and overreactions based on two well‐known psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; and biased self‐attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment outcomes. We show that overconfidence implies negative long‐lag autocorrelations, excess volatility, and, when managerial actions are correlated with stock mispricing, public‐event‐based return predictability. Biased self‐attribution adds positive short‐lag autocorrelations (“momentum”), short‐run earnings “drift,” but negative correlation between future returns and long‐term past stock market and accounting performance. The theory also offers several untested implications and implications for corporate financial policy.
Published: 3/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05202.x | Cited by: 2496
EUGENE F. FAMA, KENNETH R. FRENCH
Previous work shows that average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, cash flow/price, book‐to‐market equity, past sales growth, long‐term past return, and short‐term past return. Because these patterns in average returns apparently are not explained by the CAPM, they are called anomalies. We find that, except for the continuation of short‐term returns, the anomalies largely disappear in a three‐factor model. Our results are consistent with rational ICAPM or APT asset pricing, but we also consider irrational pricing and data problems as possible explanations.
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x | Cited by: 2369
WERNER F. M. De BONDT, RICHARD THALER
Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.
Published: 12/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05128.x | Cited by: 2331
LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, RAVI JAGANNATHAN, DAVID E. RUNKLE
We find support for a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly return, using a GARCH‐M model modified by allowing (1) seasonal patterns in volatility, (2) positive and negative innovations to returns having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (3) nominal interest rates to predict conditional variance. Using the modified GARCH‐M model, we also show that monthly conditional volatility may not be as persistent as was thought. Positive unanticipated returns appear to result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility.
Published: 5/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00567 | Cited by: 2303
Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb
We investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.
Published: 12/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x | Cited by: 2274
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, LUIGI ZINGALES
We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G‐7 countries. We find that factors identified by previous studies as correlated in the cross‐section with firm leverage in the United States, are similarly correlated in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still largely unresolved.
Published: 3/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x | Cited by: 2197
Published: 3/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x | Cited by: 2188
Published: 3/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x | Cited by: 1959
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.
Published: 9/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x | Cited by: 1943
William F. Sharpe
Published: 8/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00670.x | Cited by: 1936
Ravi Bansal, Amir Yaron
We model consumption and dividend growth rates as containing (1) a small long‐run predictable component, and (2) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility). These dynamics, for which we provide empirical support, in conjunction with Epstein and Zin's (1989) preferences, can explain key asset markets phenomena. In our economy, financial markets dislike economic uncertainty and better long‐run growth prospects raise equity prices. The model can justify the equity premium, the risk‐free rate, and the volatility of the market return, risk‐free rate, and the price–dividend ratio. As in the data, dividend yields predict returns and the volatility of returns is time‐varying.
Published: 1/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00836.x | Cited by: 1935
ANDREW ANG, ROBERT J. HODRICK, YUHANG XING, XIAOYAN ZHANG
We examine the pricing of aggregate volatility risk in the cross‐section of stock returns. Consistent with theory, we find that stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility have low average returns. Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French (1993, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 2349) model have abysmally low average returns. This phenomenon cannot be explained by exposure to aggregate volatility risk. Size, book‐to‐market, momentum, and liquidity effects cannot account for either the low average returns earned by stocks with high exposure to systematic volatility risk or for the low average returns of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
Published: 8/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00885.x | Cited by: 1932
MALCOLM BAKER, JEFFREY WURGLER
We study how investor sentiment affects the cross‐section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning‐of‐period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non‐dividend‐paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.
Published: 3/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x | Cited by: 1914
MITCHELL A. PETERSEN, RAGHURAM G. RAJAN
This paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm. We analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the Small Business Administration. The primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases. We find smaller effects on the price of credit. Attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit. In sum, relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices.
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00184 | Cited by: 1903
Harrison Hong, Jeremy C. Stein
We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.
Published: 6/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00457 | Cited by: 1836
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash‐flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash‐flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Published: 3/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x | Cited by: 1816
SHERIDAN TITMAN, ROBERTO WESSELS
This paper analyzes the explanatory power of some of the recent theories of optimal capital structure. The study extends empirical work on capital structure theory in three ways. First, it examines a much broader set of capital structure theories, many of which have not previously been analyzed empirically. Second, since the theories have different empirical implications in regard to different types of debt instruments, the authors analyze measures of short‐term, long‐term, and convertible debt rather than an aggregate measure of total debt. Third, the study uses a factor‐analytic technique that mitigates the measurement problems encountered when working with proxy variables.
Published: 10/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00494 | Cited by: 1800
Kristin J. Forbes, Roberto Rigobon
Heteroskedasticity biases tests for contagion based on correlation coefficients. When contagion is defined as a significant increase in market comovement after a shock to one country, previous work suggests contagion occurred during recent crises. This paper shows that correlation coefficients are conditional on market volatility. Under certain assumptions, it is possible to adjust for this bias. Using this adjustment, there was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coefficients (i.e., no contagion) during the 1997 Asian crisis, 1994 Mexican devaluation, and 1987 U.S. market crash. There is a high level of market comovement in all periods, however, which we call interdependence.
Published: 12/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00511 | Cited by: 1761
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang
This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash‐flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash‐flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
Published: 12/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x | Cited by: 1753
EUGENE F. FAMA
Published: 12/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x | Cited by: 1695
JOSEF LAKONISHOK, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY
For many years, scholars and investment professionals have argued that value strategies outperform the market. These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book assets, or other measures of fundamental value. While there is some agreement that value strategies produce higher returns, the interpretation of why they do so is more controversial. This article provides evidence that value strategies yield higher returns because these strategies exploit the suboptimal behavior of the typical investor and not because these strategies are fundamentally riskier.
Published: 10/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00072 | Cited by: 1683
I test the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, by analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage house. These investors demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers. Their behavior does not appear to be motivated by a desire to rebalance portfolios, or to avoid the higher trading costs of low priced stocks. Nor is it justified by subsequent portfolio performance. For taxable investments, it is suboptimal and leads to lower after‐tax returns. Tax‐motivated selling is most evident in December.
Published: 4/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00226 | Cited by: 1663
Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean
Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Of 66,465 households with accounts at a large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual return of 11.4 percent, while the market returns 17.9 percent. The average household earns an annual return of 16.4 percent, tilts its common stock investment toward high‐beta, small, value stocks, and turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors. Our central message is that trading is hazardous to your wealth.
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x | Cited by: 1661
Robert C. Merton
Published: 10/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00066 | Cited by: 1547
Erik R. Sirri, Peter Tufano
This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x | Cited by: 1522
ROBERT C. MERTON
Published: 9/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x | Cited by: 1515
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN
While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.
Published: 3/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05166.x | Cited by: 1467
TIM LOUGHRAN, JAY R. RITTER
Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long‐run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book‐to‐market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date.
Published: 3/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03743.x | Cited by: 1449
JAY R. RITTER
The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) that has been widely documented appears to be a short‐run phenomenon. Issuing firms during 1975–84 substantially underperformed a sample of matching firms from the closing price on the first day of public trading to their three‐year anniversaries. There is substantial variation in the underperformance year‐to‐year and across industries, with companies that went public in high‐volume years faring the worst. The patterns are consistent with an IPO market in which (1) investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth companies, and (2) firms take advantage of these “windows of opportunity.”
Published: 2/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00414 | Cited by: 1415
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler
It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.
Published: 9/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03317.x | Cited by: 1414
Edward M. Miller
Published: 5/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01232.x | Cited by: 1407
PAUL C. TETLOCK
I quantitatively measure the interactions between the media and the stock market using daily content from a popular Wall Street Journal column. I find that high media pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals, and unusually high or low pessimism predicts high market trading volume. These and similar results are consistent with theoretical models of noise and liquidity traders, and are inconsistent with theories of media content as a proxy for new information about fundamental asset values, as a proxy for market volatility, or as a sideshow with no relationship to asset markets.
Published: 12/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05127.x | Cited by: 1381
ROBERT F. ENGLE, VICTOR K. NG
This paper defines the news impact curve which measures how new information is incorporated into volatility estimates. Various new and existing ARCH models including a partially nonparametric one are compared and estimated with daily Japanese stock return data. New diagnostic tests are presented which emphasize the asymmetry of the volatility response to news. Our results suggest that the model by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle is the best parametric model. The EGARCH also can capture most of the asymmetry; however, there is evidence that the variability of the conditional variance implied by the EGARCH is too high.
Published: 4/2001, Volume: 56, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00340 | Cited by: 1362
François Longin, Bruno Solnik
Testing the hypothesis that international equity market correlation increases in volatile times is a difficult exercise and misleading results have often been reported in the past because of a spurious relationship between correlation and volatility. Using “extreme value theory” to model the multivariate distribution tails, we derive the distribution of extreme correlation for a wide class of return distributions. Empirically, we reject the null hypothesis of multivariate normality for the negative tail, but not for the positive tail. We also find that correlation is not related to market volatility per se but to the market trend. Correlation increases in bear markets, but not in bull markets.
Published: 12/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02647.x | Cited by: 1357
G. WILLIAM SCHWERT
This paper analyzes the relation of stock volatility with real and nominal macroeconomic volatility, economic activity, financial leverage, and stock trading activity using monthly data from 1857 to 1987. An important fact, previously noted by Officer (1973), is that stock return variability was unusually high during the 1929–1939 Great Depression. While aggregate leverage is significantly correlated with volatility, it explains a relatively small part of the movements in stock volatility. The amplitude of the fluctuations in aggregate stock volatility is difficult to explain using simple models of stock valuation, especially during the Great Depression.
Published: 11/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x | Cited by: 1347
ULRIKE MALMENDIER, GEOFFREY TATE
We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.
Published: 6/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00247 | Cited by: 1335
Campbell R. Harvey, Akhtar Siddique
If asset returns have systematic skewness, expected returns should include rewards for accepting this risk. We formalize this intuition with an asset pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Our results show that conditional skewness helps explain the cross‐sectional variation of expected returns across assets and is significant even when factors based on size and book‐to‐market are included. Systematic skewness is economically important and commands a risk premium, on average, of 3.60 percent per year. Our results suggest that the momentum effect is related to systematic skewness. The low expected return momentum portfolios have higher skewness than high expected return portfolios.
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00815.x | Cited by: 1312
Michael C. Jensen
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00181 | Cited by: 1285
Joshua D. Coval, Tobias J. Moskowitz
The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.
Published: 8/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00672.x | Cited by: 1284
David Easley, Maureen O'hara
We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.
Published: 4/2001, Volume: 56, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00342 | Cited by: 1284
Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Sheridan Titman
This paper evaluates various explanations for the profitability of momentum strategies documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The evidence indicates that momentum profits have continued in the 1990s, suggesting that the original results were not a product of data snooping bias. The paper also examines the predictions of recent behavioral models that propose that momentum profits are due to delayed overreactions that are eventually reversed. Our evidence provides support for the behavioral models, but this support should be tempered with caution.
Published: 3/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x | Cited by: 1283
MILTON HARRIS, ARTUR RAVIV
This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax‐based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.