The Journal of Finance

Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

Published: 05/13/2013   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12057

ANDREW ELLUL, VIJAY YERRAMILLI

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.

Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange

Published: 05/08/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01235.x

ROBERT BATTALIO, ANDREW ELLUL, ROBERT JENNINGS

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.

Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading

Published: 09/04/2015   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12357

ANDREW ELLUL, CHOTIBHAK JOTIKASTHIRA, CHRISTIAN T. LUNDBLAD, YIHUI WANG

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.