The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Search results: 11.
CONSUMERS' CHOICE IN INSURANCE*
Published: 9/1953, Volume: 8, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1953.tb01175.x | Cited by: 0
Alice M. Morrison
TRENDS IN INVESTMENT POLICIES OF INDIVIDUALS
Published: 6/1949, Volume: 4, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1949.tb02345.x | Cited by: 2
Paul L. Morrison
A FURTHER NOTE ON TIME DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
Published: 3/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00488.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Morrison
Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation
Published: 5/20/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01460.x | Cited by: 76
ALAN D. MORRISON, LUCY WHITE
We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy.
WELLESLEY, A CASE HISTORY IN NEW ENGLAND TOWN FINANCE*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02492.x | Cited by: 0
Alice John Vandermeulen
CRITERIA OF “ADEQUATE” GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Published: 3/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04438.x | Cited by: 0
Alice John Vandermeulen
The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence
Published: 1/10/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01317.x | Cited by: 65
ALAN D. MORRISON, WILLIAM J. WILHELM
In 1970 the New York Stock Exchange relaxed rules that prohibited the public incorporation of member firms. Investment banking concerns went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. We explain the pattern of investment bank flotations. We argue that partnerships foster the formation of human capital and we use technological advances that undermine the role of human capital to explain the partnership's going‐public decision. We support our theory using a new data set of investment bank partnership statistics.
A NOTE ON ADJUSTING R2
Published: 9/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01423.x | Cited by: 6
David B. Montgomery, Donald G. Morrison
Mergers, Product Prices, and Innovation: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
Published: 3/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13321 | Cited by: 16
ALICE BONAIMÉ, YE (EMMA) WANG
Using novel data from the pharmaceutical industry, we study product prices and innovation around mergers. Exploiting within‐deal variation in product market consolidation, we show that prices increase more for drugs in consolidating markets than for matched control drugs. Estimates indicate a 2% average price effect that persists for about one year. Price increases expand with acquirer‐target product similarity and are more pronounced within less competitive product markets with fewer players and no generic competition. Examination of trade‐offs reveals these deals generate significant shareholder value. They also spur labeling and other manufacturing‐related innovation, but not the development of new drugs.
SOFASIM: A Dynamic Insurance Model with Investment Structure, Policy Benefits and Taxes
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03581.x | Cited by: 2
ALICE B. GOLDSTEIN, BARBARA G. MARKOWITZ