Search results: 43.
OPTIMAL TRANSACTIONS BEHAVIOR AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY*
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03041.x | Cited by: 0
Anthony M. Santomero
A MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY BY HOUSEHOLDS
Published: 3/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00026.x | Cited by: 22
Anthony M. Santomero
Fixed Versus Variable Rate Loans
Published: 12/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03829.x | Cited by: 30
ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO
This paper discusses the nature of fixed and variable loan contracts and derives the conditions which determine the optimal quantity of each. The results indicate that the payoff functions are quite different and dependent upon the project financed. The appropriate conditions for the allocation of loan terms to a set of borrowers are then developed. Finally, the analysis derives the optimal portfolio frontier and risk‐return trade‐off for the banking firm. Here, it is demonstrated that the solution is unlikely to be at a point of zero interest rate risk.
A NOTE ON INTEREST RATES AND PRICES IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Published: 9/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01421.x | Cited by: 3
Anthony M. Santomero
Controlling Monetary Aggregates: The Discount Window
Published: 6/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02504.x | Cited by: 10
ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO
This paper argues that current discount window policy, coupled with non‐borrowed reserve targeting of the Federal Reserve, makes the quantity of high‐powered money endogenous. Examination of the advisability of this procedure in a stochastic environment is conducted using a general equilibrium financial model. It is concluded that the current policy reduces the destabilizing effects of shifts between various depository financial assets, but increases the effect of other asset portfolio shifts and aggregate supply disturbances. These results are consistent with the work of Poole inasmuch as the current debate over discount policy is a repackaging of the debate over interest rate or aggregates control for monetary policy.
THE ERROR‐LEARNING HYPOTHESIS AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES IN EURODOLLARS
Published: 6/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01849.x | Cited by: 3
Anthony M. Santomero
Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk
Published: 12/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02206.x | Cited by: 502
MICHAEL KOEHN, ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO
Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation
Published: 12/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03966.x | Cited by: 662
DAESIK KIM, ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO
This paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. It is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing the mean‐variance model, the following results are shown: (a) the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks; (b) as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation, the “theoretically correct” risk weights under the risk‐based capital plan are explicitly derived; and (c) the “theoretically correct” risk weights are restrictions on asset composition, which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms.
A General Equilibrium Money and Banking Paradigm
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03558.x | Cited by: 6
ANTHONY M. SANTOMERO, JEREMY J. SIEGEL
DETERMINING AN OPTIMAL CAPITAL STANDARD FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY
Published: 9/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03325.x | Cited by: 39
Anthony M. Santomero, Ronald D. Watson
MONETARY THEORY IMPLICIT IN CAPITAL THEORY*
Published: 9/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04147.x | Cited by: 0
Anthony Costantino
Homeowner Borrowing and Housing Collateral: New Evidence from Expiring Price Controls
Published: 2/21/2018, Volume: 73, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12602 | Cited by: 101
ANTHONY A. DEFUSCO
I empirically analyze how changes in access to housing collateral affect homeowner borrowing behavior. To isolate the role of collateral constraints from that of wealth effects, I exploit the fully anticipated expiration of resale price controls on owner‐occupied housing in Montgomery County, Maryland. I estimate a marginal propensity to borrow out of housing collateral that ranges between $0.04 and $0.13 and is correlated with homeowners' initial leverage. Additional analysis of residential investment and ex‐post loan performance indicates that some of the extracted funds generated new expenditures. These results suggest a potentially important role for collateral constraints in driving household expenditures.
The Interrelation of Stock and Options Market Trading‐Volume Data
Published: 9/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02614.x | Cited by: 87
JOSEPH H. ANTHONY
This research empirically investigates the relation between common stock and call option trading volumes. The paper hyothesizes and tests a sequential flow of information between the stock and option markets. If information trading for CBOE‐listed firms is predominantly accomplished through option trading, then existing research methodologies may be biased against finding any significant economic consequences in those instances where option listing is an important variable. Results indicate that trading in call options leads trading in the underlying shares, with a one‐day lag.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00465.x | Cited by: 0
ANTHONY J. CURLEY
A FACTOR ANALYSIS APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE RELATIVE ENDOGENIETY OF TRADE CREDIT
Published: 9/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03088.x | Cited by: 5
Anthony F. Herbst
A STOCHASTIC SIMULATION OF THE PERSONAL INVESTMENT DECISION*
Published: 9/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00398.x | Cited by: 0
Anthony J. Curley
MEASURING THE RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL
Published: 3/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00342.x | Cited by: 0
Anthony A. Sampson
Winner‐Loser Reversals in National Stock Market Indices: Can They be Explained?
Published: 12/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02755.x | Cited by: 135
ANTHONY J. RICHARDS
This article examines possible explanations for “winner‐loser reversals” in the national stock market indices of 16 countries. There is no evidence that loser countries are riskier than winner countries either in terms of standard deviations, covariance with the world market or other risk factors, or performance in adverse economic states of the world. While there is evidence that small markets are subject to larger reversals than large markets, perhaps due to some form of market imperfection, the reversals are not only a small‐market phenomenon. The apparent anomaly of winner‐loser reversals in national market indices therefore remains unresolved.
Decision Frequency and Synchronization Across Agents: Implications for Aggregate Consumption and Equity Return
Published: 9/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04076.x | Cited by: 86
ANTHONY W. LYNCH
This article examines a model in which decisions are made at fixed intervals and are unsynchronized across agents. Agents choose nondurable consumption and portfolio composition, and either or both can be chosen infrequently. A small utility cost is associated with both decisions being made infrequently. Calibrating returns to the U.S. economy, less frequent and unsynchronized decision‐making delivers the low volatility of aggregate consumption growth and its low correlation with equity return found in U.S. data. Allowing portfolio rebalancing to occur every period has a negligible impact on the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and returns.
A Catastrophe Model of Bank Failure
Published: 12/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02203.x | Cited by: 21
THOMAS HO, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early‐warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area.
TOWARD A WORLD PAYMENTS SYSTEM: A REVIEW ARTICLE
Published: 3/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb01654.x | Cited by: 0
Anthony Y. C. Koo
Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?
Published: 9/12/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01769.x | Cited by: 129
AMAR GANDE, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
Secondary market trading in loans elicits a significant positive stock price response by a borrowing firm's equity investors. We find the major reason for this response is the alleviation of borrowing firms’ financial constraints. We also find that new loan announcements are associated with a positive stock price effect even when prior loans made to the same borrower already trade on the secondary market. We conclude that the special role of banks has changed due to their ability to create an active secondary loan market while simultaneously maintaining their traditional role as information producers.
Predictability and Transaction Costs: The Impact on Rebalancing Rules and Behavior
Published: 10/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00287 | Cited by: 159
Anthony W. Lynch, Pierluigi Balduzzi
Recent papers show that predictability calibrated to U.S. data has a large effect on the rebalancing behavior of a multiperiod investor. We find that this continues to be true in the presence of realistic transaction costs. In particular, predictability causes the no‐trade region for the risky‐asset holding to become state dependent and, on average, wider and higher. Predictability also motivates the investor to spend considerably more on rebalancing and to rebalance more often. In other results, we find that introducing costly liquidation of the risky asset for consumption lowers the average allocation to the risky asset, though only marginally early in life. Our experiments also vary the nature of the return predictability and introduce return heteroskedasticity.
Session Topic: What Should Housing Policies be?
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03079.x | Cited by: 0
ANTHONY DOWNS, JOHN F. KAIN
No Job, No Money, No Refi: Frictions to Refinancing in a Recession
Published: 6/13/2020, Volume: 75, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12952 | Cited by: 65
ANTHONY A. DEFUSCO, JOHN MONDRAGON
We study how employment documentation requirements and out‐of‐pocket closing costs constrain mortgage refinancing. These frictions, which bind most severely during recessions, may significantly inhibit monetary policy pass‐through. To study their effects on refinancing, we exploit a Federal Housing Administration policy change that excluded unemployed borrowers from refinancing and increased others' out‐of‐pocket costs substantially. These changes dramatically reduced refinancing rates, particularly among the likely unemployed and those facing new out‐of‐pocket costs. Our results imply that unemployed and liquidity‐constrained borrowers have a high latent demand for refinancing. Cyclical variation in these factors may therefore affect both the aggregate and distributional consequences of monetary policy.
Explaining the Magnitude of Liquidity Premia: The Roles of Return Predictability, Wealth Shocks, and State‐Dependent Transaction Costs
Published: 7/19/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01662.x | Cited by: 74
ANTHONY W. LYNCH, SINAN TAN
Constantinides (1986) documents how the impact of transaction costs on per‐annum liquidity premia in the standard dynamic allocation problem with i.i.d. returns is an order of magnitude smaller than the cost rate itself. Recent papers form portfolios sorted on liquidity measures and find spreads in expected per‐annum return that are the same order of magnitude as the transaction cost spread. When we allow returns to be predictable and introduce wealth shocks calibrated to labor income, transaction costs are able to produce per‐annum liquidity premia that are the same order of magnitude as the transaction cost spread.
Option Prices, Implied Price Processes, and Stochastic Volatility
Published: 4/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00228 | Cited by: 728
Mark Britten‐Jones, Anthony Neuberger
This paper characterizes all continuous price processes that are consistent with current option prices. This extends Derman and Kani (1994), Dupire (1994, 1997), and Rubinstein (1994), who only consider processes with deterministic volatility. Our characterization implies a volatility forecast that does not require a specific model, only current option prices. We show how arbitrary volatility processes can be adjusted to fit current option prices exactly, just as interest rate processes can be adjusted to fit bond prices exactly. The procedure works with many volatility models, is fast to calibrate, and can price exotic options efficiently using familiar lattice techniques.
Why Don't We Agree? Evidence from a Social Network of Investors
Published: 11/7/2019, Volume: 75, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12852 | Cited by: 396
J. ANTHONY COOKSON, MARINA NIESSNER
We study sources of investor disagreement using sentiment of investors from a social media investing platform, combined with information on the users' investment approaches (e.g., technical, fundamental). We examine how much of overall disagreement is driven by different information sets versus differential interpretation of information by studying disagreement within and across investment approaches. Overall disagreement is evenly split between both sources of disagreement, but within‐group disagreement is more tightly related to trading volume than cross‐group disagreement. Although both sources of disagreement are important, our findings suggest that information differences are more important for trading than differences across market approaches.
Specialization in Banking
Published: 3/29/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70032 | Cited by: 2
KRISTIAN BLICKLE, CECILIA PARLATORE, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry‐specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge‐offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high‐quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital as well as after surges in deposits.
How Investors Interpret Past Fund Returns
Published: 9/11/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00596 | Cited by: 292
Anthony W. Lynch, David K. Musto
AbstractThe literature documents a convex relation between past returns and fund flows of mutual funds. We show this to be consistent with fund incentives, because funds discard exactly those strategies which underperform. Past returns tell less about the future performance of funds which discard, so flows are less sensitive to them when they are poor. Our model predicts that strategy changes only occur after bad performance, and that bad performers who change strategy have dollar flow and future performance that are less sensitive to current performance than those that do not. Empirical tests support both predictions.
VALUE AND YIELD RISK ON OUTSTANDING INSURED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
Published: 5/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03279.x | Cited by: 14
Anthony J. Curley, Jack M. Guttentag
A Micro Model of the Federal Funds Market
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05026.x | Cited by: 95
THOMAS S. Y. HO, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
This paper demonstrates that valuable insights into the determination of Federal funds rates can be gained through modeling the micro‐decisions of market participants. Fed fund demand functions are derived for different bank valuation functions and several implications are discussed. Specifically, it is: (i) possible to rationalize the observation that large banks are net purchasers and small banks net sellers of Fed funds; (ii) to explain the positive spread of Fed funds rates over other short‐term money market rates; and (iii) to link the size of this spread to the Federal Reserve's underlying monetary policy strategy.
Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships
Published: 2/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00528 | Cited by: 152
Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, Anand Srinivasan
We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement‐period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.
The Total Cost of Corporate Borrowing in the Loan Market: Don't Ignore the Fees
Published: 5/11/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12281 | Cited by: 331
TOBIAS BERG, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, SASCHA STEFFEN
More than 80% of U.S. syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spreads and fee types. We test the predictions of existing theories on the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts such as the drawdown option for credit lines and the cancellation option in term loans, and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers based on the likelihood of exercising these options. We also propose a new total‐cost‐of‐borrowing measure that includes various fees charged by lenders.
Returns and Risks of U.S. Bank Foreign Currency Activities
Published: 7/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04530.x | Cited by: 17
THEOHARRY GRAMMATIKOS, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, ITZHAK SWARY
In this paper the risks and returns on U.S. banks' foreign currency positions are analyzed in a portfolio setting when both exchange rate and foreign interest rate risks are present. It is shown that U.S. banks could achieve considerable reductions in risk by optimally selecting their foreign currency positions. Actual foreign currency portfolio returns generated from expected exchange rate changes and exchange rate surprises were positive on average but those generated from interest rate surprises were negative. Although the total portfolio returns were positive, on a risk‐adjusted basis bank return performance was relatively poor. Nevertheless, despite this relatively poor performance, the risk of ruin or failure for a “representative bank” from foreign currency activities was found to be approximately zero when judged in comparison to the capital funds available to large money center banks to cushion such losses.
Can Social Media Inform Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Merger Withdrawals
Published: 11/25/2025, Volume: 81, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13508 | Cited by: 10
J. ANTHONY COOKSON, MARINA NIESSNER, CHRISTOPH SCHILLER
This paper studies whether social media sentiment predicts merger withdrawals. We find that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in social media sentiment after a merger announcement is associated with a 0.64 percentage point lower probability of withdrawal (16.6% of the average). This effect is unexplained by abnormal price reactions, traditional news, and analyst recommendations. Consistent with manager learning, the informativeness of social media strengthens after firms start corporate Twitter accounts. The informativeness is driven by longer acquisition‐related tweets by fundamental investors, rather than memes and price trend tweets. These findings suggest that social media signals can be important for corporate decisions.
Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking
Published: 6/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03709.x | Cited by: 696
ANTHONY SAUNDERS, ELIZABETH STROCK, NICKOLAOS G. TRAVLOS
This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It is hypothesized that stockholder controlled banks have incentives to take higher risk than managerially controlled banks and that these differences in risk become more pronounced in periods of deregulation. In support of this hypothesis, we show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks during the 1979–1982 period of relative deregulation.
Asymmetry of Information, Regulatory Lags and Optimal Incentive Contracts: Theory and Evidence
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02245.x | Cited by: 0
RICHARD S. BOWER, KOSE JOHN, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
The Value of Investment Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Collapse of Lehman Brothers
Published: 1/17/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01711.x | Cited by: 128
CHITRU S. FERNANDO, ANTHONY D. MAY, WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON
We examine the long‐standing question of whether firms derive value from investment bank relationships by studying how the Lehman collapse affected industrial firms that received underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market‐making services from Lehman. Equity underwriting clients experienced an abnormal return of around −5%, on average, in the 7 days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy, amounting to $23 billion in aggregate risk‐adjusted losses. Losses were especially severe for companies that had stronger and broader security underwriting relationships with Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more financially constrained. Other client groups were not adversely affected.
The Effect of Government Regulations on Personal Loan Markets: A Tobit Estimation of a Microeconomic Model
Published: 9/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02293.x | Cited by: 15
JAMES R. BARTH, PADMA GOTUR, NEELA MANAGE, ANTHONY M. J. YEZER
The purpose of this paper is to analyze both theoretically and empirically the effect of selected government regulations on a high‐risk personal loan market. Unlike previous studies, which have generally relied on a loosely specified theory and then tested this theory with statewide aggregate data, our analysis is based on a more tightly specified model for individual loans which is then tested using statewide disaggregated data. The empirical results indicate that the regulatory effects are not only significant but consistent with our theoretical microeconomic model.
Managers, Owners, and The Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis
Published: 6/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05148.x | Cited by: 51
ELIZABETH STROCK BAGNANI, NIKOLAOS T. MILONAS, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, NICKOLAOS G. TRAVLOS
This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range.
An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Models of the Short‐Term Interest Rate
Published: 7/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04011.x | Cited by: 740
K. C. CHAN, G. ANDREW KAROLYI, FRANCIS A. LONGSTAFF, ANTHONY B. SANDERS
We estimate and compare a variety of continuous‐time models of the short‐term riskless rate using the Generalized Method of Moments. We find that the most successful models in capturing the dynamics of the short‐term interest rate are those that allow the volatility of interest rate changes to be highly sensitive to the level of the riskless rate. A number of well‐known models perform poorly in the comparisons because of their implicit restrictions on term structure volatility. We show that these results have important implications for the use of different term structure models in valuing interest rate contingent claims and in hedging interest rate risk.
Nonstandard Errors
Published: 4/17/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337 | Cited by: 106
ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.