The Journal of Finance

Style‐Related Comovement: Fundamentals or Labels?

Published: 1/6/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01633.x  |  Cited by: 165

BRIAN H. BOYER

I find that economically meaningless index labels cause stock returns to covary in excess of fundamentals. S&P/Barra follow a simple mechanical procedure to define their Value and Growth indices. In doing so, they reclassify some stocks from Value to Growth even after their book‐to‐market ratios have risen, and vice versa. Such stocks begin to covary more with the index they join and less with the index they leave. Backdated constituent data from Barra reveal no such label‐related shifts in comovement during the 10 years prior to the actual introduction of the indices in 1992.

Stock Options as Lotteries

Published: 7/18/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12152  |  Cited by: 275

BRIAN H. BOYER, KEITH VORKINK

We investigate the relationship between ex ante total skewness and holding returns on individual equity options. Recent theoretical developments predict a negative relationship between total skewness and average returns, in contrast to the traditional view that only coskewness is priced. We find, consistent with recent theory, that total skewness exhibits a strong negative relationship with average option returns. Differences in average returns for option portfolios sorted on ex ante skewness range from 10% to 50% per week, even after controlling for risk. Our findings suggest that these large premiums compensate intermediaries for bearing unhedgeable risk when accommodating investor demand for lottery‐like options.

How Do Crises Spread? Evidence from Accessible and Inaccessible Stock Indices

Published: 3/9/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00860.x  |  Cited by: 340

BRIAN H. BOYER, TOMOMI KUMAGAI, KATHY YUAN

We provide empirical evidence that stock market crises are spread globally through asset holdings of international investors. By separating emerging market stocks into two categories, namely, those that are eligible for purchase by foreigners (accessible) and those that are not (inaccessible), we estimate and compare the degree to which accessible and inaccessible stock index returns co‐move with crisis country index returns. Our results show greater co‐movement during high volatility periods, especially for accessible stock index returns, suggesting that crises spread through the asset holdings of international investors rather than through changes in fundamentals.

Discount‐Rate Risk in Private Equity: Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions

Published: 2/16/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13202  |  Cited by: 25

BRIAN H. BOYER, TAYLOR D. NADAULD, KEITH P. VORKINK, MICHAEL S. WEISBACH

Measures of private equity (PE) performance based on cash flows do not account for a discount‐rate risk premium that is a component of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) alpha. We create secondary market PE indices and find that PE discount rates vary considerably. Net asset values are too smooth because they fail to reflect variation in discount rates. Although the CAPM alpha for our index is zero, the generalized public market equivalent based on cash flows is large and positive. We obtain similar results for a set of synthetic funds that invest in small cap stocks. Ignoring variation in PE discount rates can lead to a misallocation of capital.

EQUILIBRIUM IN LINEAR CAPITAL MARKET NETWORKS

Published: 12/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01049.x  |  Cited by: 7

Sverre Storøy, Sten Thore, Marcel Boyer

INFLATION AND COMMON STOCK VALUES: COMMENT

Published: 6/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00371.x  |  Cited by: 12

Brian Motley

A DEMAND‐FOR‐MONEY FUNCTION FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR—SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS*

Published: 9/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02976.x  |  Cited by: 0

Brian Motley

FHLB Advances and the Cost and Availability of Funds to S&Ls: A Comment

Published: 9/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04899.x  |  Cited by: 0

BRIAN A. MARIS

Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default

Published: 3/21/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12482  |  Cited by: 112

BRIAN T. MELZER

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.

Stochastic Portfolio Theory and Stock Market Equilibrium

Published: 5/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03584.x  |  Cited by: 103

ROBERT FERNHOLZ, BRIAN SHAY

Options on Leveraged Equity: Theory and Empirical Tests

Published: 7/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02728.x  |  Cited by: 70

KLAUS BJERRE TOFT, BRIAN PRUCYK

We develop an option pricing model for calls and puts written on leveraged equity in an economy with corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs. The model explains implied Black‐Scholes volatility biases by relating them to the firm's structural characteristics such as leverage and debt covenants. We test the model by comparing predicted pricing biases with biases observed in a large cross‐section of firms with liquid exchange traded option contracts. Our empirical study detects leverage related pricing biases. The magnitudes of these biases correspond to those predicted by our model. We also find significant pricing biases for firms financed primarily by short‐term debt. This supports our model because short‐term debt introduces net‐worth hurdles similar to net‐worth covenants.

Stock Price Volatility, Ordinary Dividends, and Other Cash Flows to Shareholders

Published: 9/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04749.x  |  Cited by: 47

LUCY F. ACKERT, BRIAN F. SMITH

This paper shows that the results of variance‐bound tests depend on how cash distributions to shareholders are measured. As in prior studies, we find apparent evidence of excess volatility when a narrow definition of cash flow (dividends only) is applied. However, we are unable to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency when the cash flow measure also includes share repurchases and takeover distributions in addition to ordinary cash dividends.

Are Judgment Errors Reflected in Market Prices and Allocations? Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem

Published: 6/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00654.x  |  Cited by: 56

Brian D. Kluger, Steve B. Wyatt

The question of whether individual judgment errors survive in market equilibrium is an issue that naturally lends itself to experimental analysis. Here, the Monty Hall problem is used to detect probability judgment errors both in a cohort of individuals and in a market setting. When all subjects in a cohort made probability judgment errors, market prices also reflected the error. However, competition among two bias‐free subjects was sufficient to drive prices to error‐free levels. Thus, heterogeneity in behavior can be an important factor in asset pricing, and further, it may take few bias‐free traders to make asset prices bias‐free.

Noncognitive Abilities and Financial Delinquency: The Role of Self‐Efficacy in Avoiding Financial Distress

Published: 10/24/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12724  |  Cited by: 125

CAMELIA M. KUHNEN, BRIAN T. MELZER

We investigate a novel determinant of financial distress, namely, individuals' self‐efficacy, or belief that their actions can influence the future. Individuals with high self‐efficacy are more likely to take precautions that mitigate adverse financial shocks. They are subsequently less likely to default on their debt and bill payments, especially after experiencing negative shocks such as job loss or illness. Thus, noncognitive abilities are an important determinant of financial fragility and subjective expectations are an important factor in household financial decisions.

Toward a National Market System for U.S. Exchange–listed Equity Options

Published: 3/25/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00653.x  |  Cited by: 102

Robert Battalio, Brian Hatch, Robert Jennings

In its response to the 1975 Congressional mandate to implement a national market system for financial securities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially exempted the option market. Recent dramatic changes in the structure of the option market prompted the SEC to revisit this issue. We examine a sample of actively traded, multiply listed equity options to ask whether this market's characteristics appear consistent with the goals of producing economically efficient transactions and facilitating “best execution.” We find marked changes between June 2000, when quotes are often ignored, and January 2002, when the market more closely resembles a national market.

Learning by Owning in a Lemons Market

Published: 4/19/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13125  |  Cited by: 2

JORDAN MARTEL, KENNETH MIRKIN, BRIAN WATERS

We study market dynamics when an owner learns about the quality of her asset over time. Since this information is private, the owner sells strategically to a less informed buyer following sufficient negative information. In response, market prices feature a “U‐shape” and trading probabilities a “hump‐shape” with respect to the time to sale. As the owner initially acquires greater information, buyers suffer greater adverse selection, and prices fall accordingly. Eventually, the probability of an informed sale shrinks, and prices rebound. We provide evidence consistent with our model in markets for residential real estate, venture capital investments, and construction equipment.

Can Taxes Shape an Industry? Evidence from the Implementation of the “Amazon Tax”

Published: 5/24/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12687  |  Cited by: 67

BRIAN BAUGH, ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, HOONSUK PARK

For years, online retailers have maintained a price advantage over brick‐and‐mortar retailers by not collecting sales tax at the time of sale. Recently, several states have required that online retailer Amazon collect sales tax during checkout. Using transaction‐level data, we document that households living in these states reduced their Amazon purchases by 9.4% following the implementation of the sales tax laws, implying elasticities of –1.2 to –1.4. The effect is stronger for large purchases, where purchases declined by 29.1%, corresponding to an elasticity of –3.9. Studying competitors in the electronics field, we find some evidence of substitution toward competing retailers.

Debt Contracting on Management

Published: 3/13/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12893  |  Cited by: 38

BRIAN AKINS, DAVID DE ANGELIS, MACLEAN GAULIN

Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.

The Misguided Beliefs of Financial Advisors

Published: 12/20/2020,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12995  |  Cited by: 152

JUHANI T. LINNAINMAA, BRIAN T. MELZER, ALESSANDRO PREVITERO

A common view of retail finance is that conflicts of interest contribute to the high cost of advice. Within a large sample of Canadian financial advisors and their clients, however, we show that advisors typically invest personally just as they advise their clients. Advisors trade frequently, chase returns, prefer expensive and actively managed funds, and underdiversify. Advisors' net returns of −3% per year are similar to their clients' net returns. Advisors do not strategically hold expensive portfolios only to convince clients to do the same; they continue to do so after they leave the industry.

Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis

Published: 11/12/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12309  |  Cited by: 330

HEITOR ALMEIDA, CHANG‐SOO KIM, HWANKI BRIAN KIM

This paper examines capital reallocation among firms in Korean business groups () in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the consequences of this capital reallocation for the investment and performance of firms. We show that transferred cash from low‐growth to high‐growth member firms, using cross‐firm equity investments. This capital reallocation allowed chaebol firms with greater investment opportunities to invest more than control firms after the crisis. These firms also showed higher profitability and lower declines in valuation than control firms following the crisis. Our results suggest that chaebol internal capital markets helped them mitigate the negative effects of the Asian crisis on investment and performance.

Retail Derivatives and Sentiment: A Sentiment Measure Constructed from Issuances of Retail Structured Equity Products

Published: 6/8/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13253  |  Cited by: 9

BRIAN J. HENDERSON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LI WANG

We use retail structured equity product (SEP) issuances to construct a new sentiment measure for large capitalization stocks. The SEP sentiment measure predicts negative abnormal returns on the SEP reference stocks based on a variety of factor models, and also predicts returns in Fama‐MacBeth regressions that include a wide range of covariates. Consistent with our interpretation that SEP issuances reflect investor sentiment, aggregate SEP issuances are highly correlated with the Baker‐Wurgler sentiment index. Tobit regressions reveal that proxies for attention and sentiment predict SEP issuance volumes, providing additional evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SEP issuances reflect sentiment.

On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring

Published: 7/18/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13374  |  Cited by: 2

SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES, EDWARD D. VAN WESEP, BRIAN WATERS

We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.

The Effect of Three Mile Island on Utility Bond Risk Premia: A Note

Published: 3/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04504.x  |  Cited by: 22

W. BRIAN BARRETT, ANDREA J. HEUSON, ROBERT W. KOLB

Retail Financial Advice: Does One Size Fit All?

Published: 5/25/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12514  |  Cited by: 248

STEPHEN FOERSTER, JUHANI T. LINNAINMAA, BRIAN T. MELZER, ALESSANDRO PREVITERO

Using unique data on Canadian households, we show that financial advisors exert substantial influence over their clients' asset allocation, but provide limited customization. Advisor fixed effects explain considerably more variation in portfolio risk and home bias than a broad set of investor attributes that includes risk tolerance, age, investment horizon, and financial sophistication. Advisor effects remain important even when controlling flexibly for unobserved heterogeneity through investor fixed effects. An advisor's own asset allocation strongly predicts the allocations chosen on clients' behalf. This one‐size‐fits‐all advice does not come cheap: advised portfolios cost 2.5% per year, or 1.5% more than life cycle funds.

Upstairs Market for Principal and Agency Trades: Analysis of Adverse Information and Price Effects

Published: 10/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00387  |  Cited by: 70

Brian F. Smith, D. Alasdair S. Turnbull, Robert W. White

This paper directly tests the hypothesis that upstairs intermediation lowers adverse selection cost. We find upstairs market makers effectively screen out information‐motivated orders and execute large liquidity‐motivated orders at a lower cost than the downstairs market. Upstairs markets do not cannibalize or free ride off the downstairs market. In one‐quarter of the trades, the upstairs market offers price improvement over the limit orders available in the consolidated limit order book. Trades are more likely to be executed upstairs at times when liquidity is lower in the downstairs market.

Subprime Mortgage Defaults and Credit Default Swaps

Published: 3/12/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12221  |  Cited by: 37

ERIC ARENTSEN, DAVID C. MAUER, BRIAN ROSENLUND, HAROLD H. ZHANG, FENG ZHAO

We offer the first empirical evidence on the adverse effect of credit default swap (CDS) coverage on subprime mortgage defaults. Using a large database of privately securitized mortgages, we find that higher defaults concentrate in mortgage pools with concurrent CDS coverage, and within these pools the loans originated after or shortly before the start of CDS coverage have an even higher delinquency rate. The results are robust across zip code and origination quarter cohorts. Overall, we show that CDS coverage helped drive higher mortgage defaults during the financial crisis.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 106

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.