The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Stock Splits and Stock Dividends: Why, Who, and When
Published: 9/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03919.x | Cited by: 195
JOSEF LAKONISHOK, BARUCH LEV
This study investigates empirically why firms split their stock or distribute stock dividends and why the market reacts favorably to these distributions. The findings suggest that stock splits are mainly aimed at restoring stock prices to a “normal range.” Some support can also be found for the oft‐mentioned signalling motive of stock splits. Stock dividends are altogether different from stock splits, and they appear to be a decreasing phenomenon. The clue to stock dividend distributions may lie in their perceived substitution for relatively low cash dividends.
Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains
Published: 12/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00305 | Cited by: 1256
David Aboody, Baruch Lev
Although researchers have documented gains from insider trading, the sources of private information leading to information asymmetry and insider gains have not been comprehensively investigated. We focus on research and development (R&D)—an increasingly important yet poorly disclosed productive input—as a potential source of insider gains. Our findings, for the period from 1985 to 1997 indicate that insider gains in R&D‐intensive firms are substantially larger than insider gains in firms without R&D. Insiders also take advantage of information on planned changes in R&D budgets. R&D is thus a major contributor to information asymmetry and insider gains, raising issues concerning management compensation, incentives, and disclosure policies.
A MULTIPERIOD ADJUSTMENT MODEL FOR THE FIRM'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Published: 3/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb03161.x | Cited by: 10
Baruch Lev, Dov Pekelman
ANALYSIS OF THE LEASE‐OR‐BUY DECISION: COMMENT
Published: 9/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01427.x | Cited by: 2
Baruch Lev, Yair E. Orgler
Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
Published: 6/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03706.x | Cited by: 235
YAKOV AMIHUD, BARUCH LEV, NICKOLAOS G. TRAVLOS
We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.
Working Orders in Limit Order Markets and Floor Exchanges
Published: 8/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01252.x | Cited by: 61
KERRY BACK, SHMUEL BARUCH
We analyze limit order markets and floor exchanges, assuming an informed trader and discretionary liquidity traders use market orders and can either submit block orders or work their demands as a series of small orders. By working their demands, large market order traders pool with small traders. We show that every equilibrium on a floor exchange must involve at least partial pooling. Moreover, there is always a fully pooling (worked order) equilibrium on a floor exchange that is equivalent to a block order equilibrium in a limit order market.
A PORTFOLIO APPROACH TO FOSSIL FUEL PROCUREMENT IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
Published: 6/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01935.x | Cited by: 103
Dan Bar‐Lev, Steven Katz
Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence
Published: 9/4/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01272.x | Cited by: 124
SHMUEL BARUCH, G. ANDREW KAROLYI, MICHAEL L. LEMMON
We develop a new model of multimarket trading to explain the differences in the foreign share of trading volume of internationally cross‐listed stocks. The model predicts that the trading volume of a cross‐listed stock is proportionally higher on the exchange in which the cross‐listed asset returns have greater correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. We find robust empirical support for this prediction using stock return and volume data on 251 non‐U.S. stocks cross‐listed on major U.S. exchanges.