The Journal of Finance

International Portfolio Investment Flows

Published: 12/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02744.x  |  Cited by: 833

MICHAEL J. BRENNAN, H. HENRY CAO

This article develops a model of international equity portfolio investment flows based on differences in informational endowments between foreign and domestic investors. It is shown that when domestic investors possess a cumulative information advantage over foreign investors about their domestic market, investors tend to purchase foreign assets in periods when the return on foreign assets is high and to sell when the return is low. The implications of the model are tested using data on United States (U.S.) equity portfolio flows.

Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders

Published: 10/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00282  |  Cited by: 266

Kerry Back, C. Henry Cao, Gregory A. Willard

We analyze competition among informed traders in the continuous‐time Kyle(1985) model, as Foster and Viswanathan (1996) do in discrete time. We explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and confirm the conjecture of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that there is no linear equilibrium when signals are perfectly correlated. One result is that at some date, and at all dates thereafter, the market would have been more informationally efficient had there been a monopolist informed trader instead of competing traders. The relatively large amount of private information remaining near the end of trading causes the market to approach complete illiquidity.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUSINESS PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES*

Published: 12/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04232.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry Thomassen

THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRIANGULAR ARBITRAGE FOR FORWARD EXCHANGE POLICY*

Published: 9/1964,  Volume: 19,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02873.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry N. Goldstein

THE NEW JERSEY PROPERTY TAX—SUBSTITUTE FOR STATE AID?*

Published: 9/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb01605.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry J. Frank

HOW THE PATMAN “TEXTBOOKS” WERE WRITTEN*

Published: 5/1953,  Volume: 8,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1953.tb01152.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry C. Murphy

RATIONAL DECISION‐MAKING IN PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT*

Published: 9/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00132.x  |  Cited by: 1

Henry Allen Latané

Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity Prices

Published: 4/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00219  |  Cited by: 848

Peter Blair Henry

A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country's government to allow foreigners to purchase shares in that country's stock market. On average, a country's aggregate equity price index experiences abnormal returns of 3.3 percent per month in real dollar terms during an eight‐month window leading up to the implementation of its initial stock market liberalization. This result is consistent with the prediction of standard international asset pricing models that stock market liberalization may reduce the liberalizing country's cost of equity capital by allowing for risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents.

THE ROLE OF INTEREST RATES IN A CHANGING WORLD*

Published: 6/1951,  Volume: 6,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04464.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry C. Murphy

Is Disinflation Good for the Stock Market?

Published: 8/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00473  |  Cited by: 24

Peter Blair Henry

The stock market appreciates by an average of 24 percent in real dollar terms when countries attempt to stabilize annual inflation rates that are greater than 40 percent. In contrast, the average market response is 0 when the prestabilization rate of inflation is less than 40 percent. These results suggest that the potential long‐run benefits of stabilization may dominate shortrun costs at high levels of inflation, but at low to moderate levels of inflation, benefits may be offset by costs in a present value sense. Stock market responses also help predict the change in inflation and output in the year following all 81 stabilization efforts.

THE FEDERAL MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT

Published: 9/1950,  Volume: 5,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1950.tb03787.x  |  Cited by: 5

Henry W. Lehmann

A STUDY OF FINANCIAL EXPANSION IN THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, 1947–56*

Published: 3/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04256.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry Suihun Ang

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATMAN INQUIRY

Published: 5/1953,  Volume: 8,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1953.tb01157.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry C. Wallich

PRICE CHANGES IN EQUITY SECURITIES

Published: 9/1954,  Volume: 9,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01229.x  |  Cited by: 1

Henry Allan Latané

FEDERAL REVENUES FROM TAXING MUNICIPALS

Published: 9/1961,  Volume: 16,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02837.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry J. Frank

SHOULD THE TREASURY AUCTION LONG‐TERM SECURITIES?*

Published: 9/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04299.x  |  Cited by: 2

Henry N. Goldstein

INDIVIDUAL RISK PREFERENCE IN PORTFOLIO SELECTION

Published: 3/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb04835.x  |  Cited by: 5

Henry Allen Latané

TWO FORMULA METHODS FOR CHOOSING COMMON STOCKS

Published: 6/1951,  Volume: 6,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04463.x  |  Cited by: 2

Henry S. Schneider

Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Published: 6/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00663.x  |  Cited by: 248

Anusha Chari, Peter Blair Henry

When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1%. Since the historical covariance of the average investible firm's stock return with the local market is roughly 200 times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: (1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm‐specific revaluations are directly proportional to the firm‐specific changes in systematic risk.

Is Debt Relief Efficient?

Published: 3/2/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00754.x  |  Cited by: 66

SERKAN ARSLANALP, PETER BLAIR HENRY

When developing countries announce debt relief agreements under the Brady Plan, their stock markets appreciate by an average of 60% in real dollar terms—a $42 billion increase in shareholder value. There is no significant stock market increase for a control group of countries that do not sign Brady agreements. The stock market appreciations successfully forecast higher future resource transfers, investment, and growth. Since the market capitalization of U.S. commercial banks with developing country loan exposure also rises—by $13 billion—the results suggest that both borrower and lenders can benefit from debt relief when the borrower suffers from debt overhang.

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Published: 9/10/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12069  |  Cited by: 38

MELANIE CAO, RONG WANG

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.

TREASURY BILL AUCTION PROCEDURES: COMMENT

Published: 6/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01864.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry N. Goldstein, George G. Kaufman

WEALTH ACCUMULATION OF BLACK AND WHITE FAMILIES: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Published: 5/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00904.x  |  Cited by: 1

Andrew F. Brimmer, Henry S. Terrell

STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED EARNINGS—A PROGRESS REPORT

Published: 12/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03347.x  |  Cited by: 11

Henry A. Latané, Charles P. Jones

Callable Bonds: A Risk‐Reducing Signalling Mechanism—A Reply

Published: 9/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02625.x  |  Cited by: 6

EDWARD HENRY ROBBINS, JOHN D. SCHATZBERG

Expectations, Tobin's q, and Investment: A Note

Published: 3/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01106.x  |  Cited by: 14

HENRY W. CHAPPELL, DAVID C. CHENG

Ex‐Dividend Profitability and Institutional Trading Skill

Published: 1/12/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12472  |  Cited by: 46

TYLER R. HENRY, JENNIFER L. KOSKI

We use institutional trading data to examine whether skilled institutions exploit positive abnormal ex‐dividend returns. Results show that institutions concentrate trading around certain ex‐dates, and earn higher profits around these events. Dividend capture trades represent 6% of all institutional buy trades but contribute 15% of overall abnormal returns. Institutional dividend capture trading is persistent. Institutional ex‐day profitability is also strongly cross‐sectionally related to trade execution skill. The relation between execution skill and profits disappears around placebo non‐ex‐days. Results suggest that skilled institutions target certain opportunities rather than benefiting uniformly over time. Furthermore, only skilled institutions can profit from dividend capture.

A REPLY

Published: 9/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00937.x  |  Cited by: 0

Henry A. Latané, Willam E. Young

TEST OF PORTFOLIO BUILDING RULES

Published: 9/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00385.x  |  Cited by: 24

Henry A. Latané, William E. Young

CRITERIA FOR PORTFOLIO BUILDING

Published: 9/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02973.x  |  Cited by: 42

Henry A. Latané, Donald L. Tuttle

AUTHOR'S CORRECTION

Published: 9/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03464.x  |  Cited by: 0

HENRY A. LATANÉ, RICHARD J. RENDLEMAN

Standardized Unexpected Earnings—1971–77

Published: 6/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02136.x  |  Cited by: 23

HENRY A. LATANÉ, CHARLES P. JONES

STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF STOCK PRICE RATIOS IMPLIED IN OPTION PRICES

Published: 5/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01892.x  |  Cited by: 371

Henry A. Latané, Richard J. Rendleman

DECISION THEORY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Published: 5/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00223.x  |  Cited by: 1

Henry A. Latané, Donald L. Tuttle

Callable Bonds: A Risk‐Reducing Signalling Mechanism

Published: 9/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04558.x  |  Cited by: 34

EDWARD HENRY ROBBINS, JOHN D. SCHATZBERG

The theory of financial economics has failed to distinguish advantages of callable bonds from those of short‐term debt. This paper shows that either type of borrowing can signal a firm's better prospects but that short‐term debt does so at the cost of weakened risk‐sharing with capital markets. By issuing either equity or long‐term, non‐callable debt, a firm with poor investment opportunities will not pool its prospects with those of a better firm. But equity produces superior risk‐sharing. Perhaps this explains the almost complete absence of long‐term, non‐callable bonds from observed corporate capital structures.

The Economics of Hedge Fund Startups: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Published: 3/5/2021,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13009  |  Cited by: 18

CHARLES CAO, GRANT FARNSWORTH, HONG ZHANG

This paper examines how market frictions influence the managerial incentives and organizational structure of new hedge funds. We develop a stylized model in which new managers search for accredited investors and have stronger incentives to acquire managerial skill when encountering low investor demand. Fund families endogenously arise to mitigate frictions and weaken the performance incentives of affiliated new funds. Empirically, based on a TASS‐HFR‐BarclayHedge merged database, we find that ex ante identified cold inceptions facing low investor demand outperform existing hedge funds and hot inceptions facing high demand and that cold stand‐alone inceptions outperform all types of family‐affiliated inceptions.

Does the Specialist Matter? Differential Execution Costs and Intersecurity Subsidization on the New York Stock Exchange

Published: 9/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01123.x  |  Cited by: 47

CHARLES CAO, HYUK CHOE, FRANK HATHEWAY

This article tests for differences in execution costs among specialist firms for New York Stock Exchange listed securities. Execution cost differences provide a measure of the relative performance of specialist firms. We find a substantial difference in effective spreads and order processing costs across specialist firms, controlling for stock characteristics. While economically significant, the differences in execution costs between specialist firms are much smaller than the cross‐market differences reported by Huang and Stoll (1996). Within a specialist firm, there is a positive relation between order processing costs and trading activity that is consistent with the hypothesis that active stocks subsidize inactive stocks.

Empirical Performance of Alternative Option Pricing Models

Published: 12/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02749.x  |  Cited by: 2101

Gurdip Bakshi, Charles Cao, Zhiwu Chen

Substantial progress has been made in developing more realistic option pricing models. Empirically, however, it is not known whether and by how much each generalization improves option pricing and hedging. We fill this gap by first deriving an option model that allows volatility, interest rates and jumps to be stochastic. Using S&P 500 options, we examine several alternative models from three perspectives: (1) internal consistency of implied parameters/volatility with relevant time‐series data, (2) out‐of‐sample pricing, and (3) hedging. Overall, incorporating stochastic volatility and jumps is important for pricing and internal consistency. But for hedging, modeling stochastic volatility alone yields the best performance.

Price Discovery without Trading: Evidence from the Nasdaq Preopening

Published: 6/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00249  |  Cited by: 190

Charles Cao, Eric Ghysels, Frank Hatheway

This paper studies Nasdaq market makers' activities during the one and one‐half hour preopening period. Price discovery during the preopening is conducted via price signaling as opposed to the auction used to open the NYSE or the continuous market used during trading. In the absence of trades, Nasdaq dealers use crossed and locked inside quotes to signal to other market makers which direction the price should move. Furthermore, we find evidence of price leadership among market makers that bears little resemblance to their IPO/SEO lead underwriter participation.

THE COMMISSION ON MONEY AND CREDIT'S RESEARCH STUDIES: A COLLECTIVE REVIEW ARTICLE

Published: 9/1964,  Volume: 19,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02870.x  |  Cited by: 1

David A. Alhadeff, Peter L. Bernstein, Colin D. Campbell, Lester V. Chandler, Edward C. Ettin, Victor R. Farhi, Jack M. Guttentag, Henry A. Latané, Kenyon E. Poole

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 105

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.