The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05021.x | Cited by: 0
DENNIS E. LOGUE
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04535.x | Cited by: 1
DENNIS E. LOGUE
MARKET‐MAKING AND THE ASSESSMENT OF MARKET EFFICIENCY
Published: 3/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb03163.x | Cited by: 14
Dennis E. Logue
AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MARKET FOR FIRST PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF COMMON STOCK*
Published: 3/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00635.x | Cited by: 0
Dennis Emhardt Logue
‘WHITE‐NOISE’ IN IMPERFECT MARKETS: THE CASE OF THE FRANC/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01986.x | Cited by: 11
Dennis E. Logue, Richard James Sweeney
THE BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT BANKERS: AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION
Published: 3/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00036.x | Cited by: 22
Dennis E. Logue, John R. Lindvall
Term Premia on Euro Rates
Published: 7/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03665.x | Cited by: 1
DENNIS E. LOGUE, RICHARD JAMES SWEENEY
EXTERNAL CURRENCY MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION OF THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET††
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02250.x | Cited by: 0
SANDRA SCHICKELE, DENNIS E. LOGUE, LEMMA W. SENBET
Arbitrage Pricing Theory and Utility Stock Returns
Published: 9/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03891.x | Cited by: 49
DOROTHY H. BOWER, RICHARD S. BOWER, DENNIS E. LOGUE
This paper presents some new evidence that Arbitrage Pricing Theory may lead to different and better estimates of expected return than the Capital Asset Pricing Model, particularly in the case of utility stock returns. Results for monthly portfolio returns for 1971–1979 lead to the conclusion that regulators should not adopt the single‐factor risk approach of the CAPM as the principal measure of risk, but give greater weight to APT, whose multiple factors provide a better indication of asset risk and a better estimate of expected return.
The Total Cost of Transactions on the NYSE
Published: 3/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02591.x | Cited by: 233
STEPHEN A. BERKOWITZ, DENNIS E. LOGUE, EUGENE A. NOSER
This paper develops a measure of execution costs (market impact) of transactions on the NYSE. The measure is the volume‐weighted average price over the trading day. It yields results that are less biased than measures that use single prices, such as closes. The paper then applies this measure to a data set containing more than 14,000 actual trades. We show that total transaction costs, commission plus market impact costs, average twenty‐three basis points of principal value for our sample. Commission costs, averaging eighteen basis points, are considerably higher than execution costs, which average five basis points. They vary slightly across brokers and significantly across money managers. Though brokers do not incur consistently high or low transaction costs, money managers experience persistently high or lost costs. Finally, the paper explores the possible tradeoff between commission expenditures and market impact costs. Paying higher commissions does not yield commensurately lower execution costs, even after adjusting for trade difficulty. We cannot determine whether other valuable brokerage services are being purchased with higher commission payments or whether some money managers really are inefficient consumers of brokerage trading services.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00458.x | Cited by: 1
D. E. LOGUE
THE SPECIFICATION OF MONEY DEMAND‐SUPPLY MODELS WHICH INVOLVE THE USE OF DISTRIBUTED LAGS
Published: 9/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00549.x | Cited by: 6
Dennis R. Starleaf
NONMEMBER BANKS AND MONETARY CONTROL
Published: 9/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01014.x | Cited by: 5
Dennis R. Starleaf
SKEWNESS AS A MEASURE OF OPPORTUNITY IN WARRANTS*
Published: 6/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb01505.x | Cited by: 0
Dennis Arnold Tanner
REPLY
Published: 9/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00853.x | Cited by: 0
Dennis R. Starleaf, Richard Reimer
Who Blinks in Volatile Markets, Individuals or Institutions?
Published: 10/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00484 | Cited by: 217
Patrick J. Dennis, Deon Strickland
We investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and returns of firms on days when the absolute value of the market's return is two percent or more. We find that a firm's abnormal return on these days is related to the percentage of institutional ownership, that there is abnormally high turnover in the firm's shares on these days, and that this abnormal turnover is significantly related to the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with positive feedback herding behavior on the part of some institutions, particularly mutual and pension funds.
Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity
Published: 3/21/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00551 | Cited by: 205
Paul Brockman, Dennis Y. Chung
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection and firm liquidity. We posit that less protective environments lead to wider bid‐ask spreads and thinner depths because they fail to minimize information asymmetries. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare liquidity costs across distinct investor protection environments, but still within a common trading mechanism and currency. Our empirical findings verify that firm liquidity is significantly affected by investor protection. Regression and matched‐sample results show that Hong Kong‐based equities exhibit narrower spreads and thicker depths than their China‐based counterparts.
THE KEYNESIAN DEMAND FUNCTION FOR MONEY: SOME STATISTICAL TESTS*
Published: 3/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb01656.x | Cited by: 0
Dennis R. Starleaf, Richard Reimer
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT INVESTOR RELATIONS FIRMS ON COMMON STOCK PRICES
Published: 5/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01780.x | Cited by: 0
James Gillies, Charles N. Dennis
Graduated Reserve Requirements and Monetary Control
Published: 9/1979, Volume: 34, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03452.x | Cited by: 1
DENNIS E. FARLEY, THOMAS D. SIMPSON
Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry
Published: 9/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13176 | Cited by: 89
PATRICK DENNIS, KRISTOPHER GERARDI, CAROLA SCHENONE
Institutions often own equity in multiple firms that compete in the same product market. Prior research has shown that these institutional “common owners” induce anticompetitive pricing behavior in the airline industry. This paper reevaluates this evidence and shows that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and airline ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components. We further show that the results are sensitive to measures of investor control and to assumptions about equity holders' ownership and control during bankruptcy.
POLYNOMIAL DISTRIBUTED LAG STRUCTURES IN THE DEMAND FUNCTION FOR MONEY
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03021.x | Cited by: 3
Harold D. Dickson, Dennis R. Starleaf
Corporate Bankruptcy and Managers' Self‐Serving Behavior
Published: 9/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02639.x | Cited by: 28
CLAUDIO F. LODERER, DENNIS P. SHEEHAN
We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time‐series and cross‐sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.
THE DETERMINANTS OF MEMBER BANK BORROWING: A CRITIQUE
Published: 12/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00320.x | Cited by: 2
Dennis J. Aigner, William R. Bryan
THE FULL EMPLOYMENT INTEREST RATE AND THE NEUTRALIZED MONEY STOCK: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00595.x | Cited by: 0
Dennis R. Starleaf, James A. Stephenson
A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE MONETARY‐POLICY INDICATOR PROBLEM: THE MONETARY FULL EMPLOYMENT INTEREST RATE
Published: 9/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00387.x | Cited by: 7
Dennis R. Starleaf, James A. Stephenson
Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression
Published: 4/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00114 | Cited by: 299
Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner, Dennis P. Sheehan
We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange‐listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.