The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Derivative Pricing with Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market
Published: 01/06/2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01630.x
DION BONGAERTS, FRANK DE JONG, JOOST DRIESSEN
We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivatives, and short‐selling due to hedging of nontraded risk. We show that illiquid assets can have lower expected returns if the short‐sellers have more wealth, lower risk aversion, or shorter horizon. The pricing of liquidity risk is different for derivatives than for positive‐net‐supply assets, and depends on investors' net nontraded risk exposure. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market. We find strong evidence for an expected liquidity premium earned by the credit protection seller. The effect of liquidity risk is significant but economically small.
Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings
Published: 01/17/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01709.x
DION BONGAERTS, K. J. MARTIJN CREMERS, WILLIAM N. GOETZMANN
This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping, and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction, and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for, regulatory purposes. They do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.