The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Maturity Intermediation and Intertemporal Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries
Published: 09/01/1987 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03925.x
GEORGE EMIR MORGAN, STEPHEN D. SMITH
This paper considers the maturity intermediation and intertemporal lending decisions of risk‐averse financial intermediaries. In particular, the maturity mismatch problem and the fixed‐versus‐variable‐rate lending decision are modeled when the major source of risk involves uncertain future interest rates. The results imply that the strategy of matching the maturity of assets and liabilities is not generally optimal or even minimum risk. This is due primarily to the “built‐in” hedge that the intermediary has as a result of rolling over short‐term loans while continuing to finance long‐term loans. Intertemporal dependencies between loan demand and costs (or both) also have an effect on the optimal degree of maturity mismatching and provide one rationale for making loans at rates below current marginal cost.
Default Risk in Futures Markets: The Customer‐Broker Relationship
Published: 07/01/1990 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05112.x
JAMES V. JORDAN, GEORGE EMIR MORGAN
The traditional view of the futures clearinghouse as an insurer that eliminates the need for customers to evaluate default risk is inaccurate. A clearinghouse member default in 1985 confirms that the clearinghouse only guarantees payment from member to member, not from customer to customer or member to customer. Thus, non‐defaulting customers are subject to losses as a result of the action of individuals with whom thay have no contractual obligations. This study models the behavior of customers choosing a futures commission merchant (FCM) given the current legal position of the clearinghouse. In a single‐period model with symmetric information, customers can eliminate their exposure to defaults of other customers or of their FCM only by choosing to trade through “boutique” (undiversified) FCMs. In practice, monitoring and rebalancing costs may impede the attainment of zero default risk. However, FCM diversification remains an important factor in customer choice of an FCM. When setting capital requirements, clearinghouses and government regulators need to consider the implications of diversification for both customer and market protection.
Optimal Futures Positions for Large Banking Firms
Published: 03/01/1988 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02596.x
GEORGE EMIR MORGAN, DILIP K. SHOME, STEPHEN D. SMITH
In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank‐specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre‐deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.