The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information
Published: 6/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05047.x | Cited by: 21
GEORGE KANATAS
The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.
Integration of Lending and Underwriting: Implications of Scope Economies
Published: 5/6/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00562 | Cited by: 63
George Kanatas, Jianping Qi
AbstractInformational scope economies provide a cost advantage to universal banks offering “one‐stop shopping” for lending and underwriting that enables them to “lock in” their clients' subsequent business. This market power reduces universal banks' incentive, relative to that of specialized investment banks, to apply costly underwriting efforts; consequently, universal banks are less successful in selling their clients' securities. Our results suggest that an integrated financial services market is less innovative than one with specialized intermediaries. Our analysis also identifies economy, intermediary, and firm characteristics that motivate either the integration or segmentation of bank lending and underwriting.
Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments
Published: 9/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03589.x | Cited by: 12
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit‐funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short‐run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.
Interest Rate Uncertainty and the Financial Intermediary's Choice of Exposure
Published: 3/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03631.x | Cited by: 25
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
The financial intermediary's choice of operating as a broker with minimal risk exposure or as an asset‐transformer with interest rate risk is modeled as a funds inventory decision made prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the borrowing or lending interest rates. It is shown that an increase in the interest rate uncertainty leads the intermediary to reduce its exposure, thereby offering decreased asset‐transformation and more brokerage services. However, a stochastic increase in the interest rates leads to greater asset‐transformation and less brokerage services.
Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries Facing Credit and Funding Risk
Published: 6/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02507.x | Cited by: 10
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
This paper compares the optimal lending decisions of financial intermediaries that differ in their risk exposure. All intermediaries are assumed to face a loan demand described by a random applicant arrival process with each applicant offering a unique risk‐adjusted rate of return; loan demand is therefore uncertain in both quantity and quality. The intermediaries differ in terms of their risk exposure because of disparate funding practices. Intermediaries functioning as brokers minimize their exposure by borrowing funds only as demand is realized, whereas those behaving as asset‐transformers borrow in advance of realizing loan demand, thereby maintaining a loanable funds inventory and sustaining the related exposure. The optimal sequential lending policy is shown to involve setting a credit standard that becomes stricter with the length of the intermediary's planning horizon and the volume of loans outstanding. Most importantly, it is shown that brokers adopt stricter credit standards than asset‐transformers and therby reduce their volume of lending.
PROJECTING MARKET STRUCTURE BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION: A STUDY OF BANK EXPANSION IN NEW JERSEY
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03027.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Juncker, George S. Oldfield
THE LONG‐RUN EFFECTS UPON THE UNITED STATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EAST*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02488.x | Cited by: 0
George Rosen
VALUATION PARAMETERS OF PROPERTY‐LIABILITY COMPANIES
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01991.x | Cited by: 12
George Foster
INTRODUCTION
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00201.x | Cited by: 0
George Garvy
TIGHT MONEY, MONETARY RESTRAINT, AND THE PRICE LEVEL*
Published: 3/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02952.x | Cited by: 2
George Horwich
TIGHT MONEY AS A CAUSE OF INFLATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00600.x | Cited by: 1
George Horwich
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04997.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE TAUCHEN
ELEMENTS OF TIMING AND RESPONSE IN THE BALANCE SHEET OF BANKING, 1953–55*
Published: 5/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04133.x | Cited by: 0
George Horwich
Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question
Published: 12/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04680.x | Cited by: 24
GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER
Periodic antitrust attacks on corporations may have influenced stock prices. For the period 1904 to 1944, each antitrust case filed is associated with a 0.5 to 1.9 percent drop of the Dow, and each unexpected case with even larger drops. Other aspects of antitrust besides actual filings may help account for other movements, in particular the 1929 Crash. Historical evidence bears on the question of whether antitrust is exogenous and also links antitrust and the “corporation problem.” These results illustrate the sorts of real factors aside from changes in concurrent output that may account for stock price volatility.
Externalities and Financial Reporting
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02183.x | Cited by: 55
GEORGE FOSTER
Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural Experiment: Germany, 1880–1940
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00090 | Cited by: 210
George Bittlingmayer
Why does stock volatility increase when output declines? The theory of investment under uncertainty implies that political uncertainty may simultaneously increase volatility and reduce output. Though cause and effect are typically hard to separate, the transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany offers a natural experiment because major political events left clear traces on stock prices. Current and past increases in volatility are associated with output declines, consistent with U.S. experience. However, political events are more clearly the source of volatility, and the results support the view that the relationship between volatility and output reflects the joint effects of political factors.
“IS THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REALLY NECESSARY?”: COMMENT
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02913.x | Cited by: 1
George G. Kaufman
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05003.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
REVENUE SHARING: PRIORITIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00800.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
FEDERAL TAXING AND SPENDING IN VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY
Published: 3/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04446.x | Cited by: 0
George W. McKinney
“A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS” AND THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03412.x | Cited by: 5
George E. Pinches
SEASONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FLOW OF FUNDS*
Published: 3/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00198.x | Cited by: 0
George J. Viksnins
COMMERCIAL BANK PRICE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SMALL LOANS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
Published: 12/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02889.x | Cited by: 1
George J. Benston
ON THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CAPITAL LOSSES UNDER THE INCOME TAX
Published: 5/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01532.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
DIVIDEND REMITTANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*
Published: 9/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01332.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Kopits
FINANCIAL CONGENERICS*
Published: 6/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01875.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Ulseth
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02248.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE R. HALL
INTEREST RATES VERSUS INTEREST CEILINGS IN THE ALLOCATION OF CREDIT FLOWS
Published: 5/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00012.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
THE EFFECT OF “MARKET INDEXES” ON THE EX‐POST PERFORMANCE OF THE SHARPE PORTFOLIO SELECTION MODEL
Published: 6/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01936.x | Cited by: 6
George M. Frankfurter
THE CHANGING ROLE OF U.S. BANKS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00202.x | Cited by: 1
George H. Chittenden
A MARGINAL ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFIT‐COST RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS*
Published: 12/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00883.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Hettenhouse
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO BANKING COMPETITION: COMMENT
Published: 6/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00997.x | Cited by: 3
George J. Benston
BUSINESS PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
Published: 5/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01592.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
PROPERTY TAXATION IN RELATION TO INVESTMENT IN URBAN AREAS
Published: 6/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04459.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK, 1960–1967: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00598.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Pinches
THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE DEBT MANAGEMENT*
Published: 12/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01764.x | Cited by: 0
George M. Frankfurter
LAND DEVELOPMENT‐VALUE PROBLEMS AND THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT OF 1947*
Published: 12/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01307.x | Cited by: 0
George G. Sause
THE PROXIMATE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON FLOWS OF FUNDS THROUGH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES*
Published: 9/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00263.x | Cited by: 0
William George Nelson
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN BANKING
Published: 12/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01253.x | Cited by: 3
George Taylor Harris
Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value
Published: 7/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04006.x | Cited by: 63
GEORGE P. BAKER
This paper chronicles the history of the Beatrice company from its founding in 1891 as a small creamery, through its growth by acquisition into a diversified consumer and industrial products firm, and its subsequent leveraged buyout and sell‐off. The paper analyzes the value consequences the firm's acquisition and divestiture policies, its organizational strategy, and its governance. The analysis sheds light on a number of issues in organization theory, strategy, and corporate finance, including the sources of value in diversifying aquisitions, the cost of over‐centralization and weak corporate governance, and the mechanisms of value creation in the market for corporate control.
Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting December 29, 1959
Published: 5/1960, Volume: 15, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb00174.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
RESPONSES OF SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANKS TO FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY, JANUARY, 1957, TO APRIL, 1959*
Published: 3/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01627.x | Cited by: 0
George G. Kaufman
Managerial Preference, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Structure
Published: 9/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03915.x | Cited by: 42
GEORGE W. BLAZENKO
If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high‐quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin.
AN EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL “BANKRUPTCY” LAWS AND PROCEDURES
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01462.x | Cited by: 5
George H. Hempel
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb00579.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Pinches
SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL TAXATION* OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
Published: 9/1953, Volume: 8, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1953.tb01178.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
FINANCING CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK*
Published: 12/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00334.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Pinches
GRADUATED INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND OPERATING COSTS BY SIZE OF SMALL CONSUMER CASH LOANS
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01981.x | Cited by: 7
George J. Benston