The Journal of Finance

A Model of Returns and Trading in Futures Markets

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00233

Harrison Hong

This paper develops an equilibrium model of a competitive futures market in which investors trade to hedge positions and to speculate on their private information. Equilibrium return and trading patterns are examined. (1) In markets where the information asymmetry among investors is small, the return volatility of a futures contract decreases with time‐to‐maturity (i.e., the Samuelson effect holds). (2) However, in markets where the information asymmetry among investors is large, the Samuelson effect need not hold. (3) Additionally, the model generates rich time‐to‐maturity patterns in open interest and spot price volatility that are consistent with empirical findings.

Trading and Returns under Periodic Market Closures

Published: 03/31/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00207

Harrison Hong, Jiang Wang

This paper studies how market closures affect investors' trading policies and the resulting return‐generating process. It shows that closures generate rich patterns of time variation in trading and returns, including those consistent with empirical findings: (1) U‐shaped patterns in the mean and volatility of returns over trading periods, (2) higher trading activity around the close and open, (3) more volatile open‐to‐open returns than close‐to‐close returns, (4) higher returns over trading periods than over nontrading periods, (5) more volatile returns over trading periods than over nontrading periods. It also shows that closures can make prices more informative about future payoffs.

Speculative Betas

Published: 05/27/2016   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12431

HARRISON HONG, DAVID A. SRAER

The risk and return trade‐off, the cornerstone of modern asset pricing theory, is often of the wrong sign. Our explanation is that high‐beta assets are prone to speculative overpricing. When investors disagree about the stock market's prospects, high‐beta assets are more sensitive to this aggregate disagreement, experience greater divergence of opinion about their payoffs, and are overpriced due to short‐sales constraints. When aggregate disagreement is low, the Security Market Line is upward‐sloping due to risk‐sharing. When it is high, expected returns can actually decrease with beta. We confirm our theory using a measure of disagreement about stock market earnings.

A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00184

Harrison Hong, Jeremy C. Stein

We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.

Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts

Published: 02/12/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00526

Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik

We examine security analysts' career concerns by relating their earnings forecasts to job separations. Relatively accurate forecasters are more likely to experience favorable career outcomes like moving up to a high‐status brokerage house. Controlling for accuracy, analysts who are optimistic relative to the consensus are more likely to experience favorable job separations. For analysts who cover stocks underwritten by their houses, job separations depend less on accuracy and more on optimism. Job separations were less sensitive to accuracy and more sensitive to optimism during the recent stock market mania. Brokerage houses apparently reward optimistic analysts who promote stocks.

Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles

Published: 05/16/2006   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00867.x

HARRISON HONG, JOSÉ SCHEINKMAN, WEI XIONG

We model the relationship between asset float (tradeable shares) and speculative bubbles. Investors with heterogeneous beliefs and short‐sales constraints trade a stock with limited float because of insider lockups. A bubble arises as price overweighs optimists' beliefs and investors anticipate the option to resell to those with even higher valuations. The bubble's size depends on float as investors anticipate an increase in float with lockup expirations and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Consistent with the internet experience, the bubble, turnover, and volatility decrease with float and prices drop on the lockup expiration date.

Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies

Published: 03/31/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00206

Harrison Hong, Terence Lim, Jeremy C. Stein

Various theories have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual‐information‐diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and establish three key results. First, once one moves past the very smallest stocks, the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with firm size. Second, holding size fixed, momentum strategies work better among stocks with low analyst coverage. Finally, the effect of analyst coverage is greater for stocks that are past losers than for past winners. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firm‐specific information, especially negative information, diffuses only gradually across the investing public.

Simple Forecasts and Paradigm Shifts

Published: 05/08/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01234.x

HARRISON HONG, JEREMY C. STEIN, JIALIN YU

We study the asset pricing implications of learning in an environment in which the true model of the world is a multivariate one, but agents update only over the class of simple univariate models. Thus, if a particular simple model does a poor job of forecasting over a period of time, it is discarded in favor of an alternative simple model. The theory yields a number of distinctive predictions for stock returns, generating forecastable variation in the magnitude of the value‐glamour return differential, in volatility, and in the skewness of returns. We validate several of these predictions empirically.

Social Interaction and Stock‐Market Participation

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00629.x

Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, Jeremy C. Stein

We propose that stock‐market participation is influenced by social interaction. In our model, any given “social” investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate. We test this theory using data from the Health and Retirement Study, and find that social households—those who interact with their neighbors, or attend church—are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non‐social households, controlling for wealth, race, education, and risk tolerance. Moreover, consistent with a peer‐effects story, the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock‐market participation rates are higher.

Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms

Published: 11/06/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12225

ING‐HAW CHENG, HARRISON HONG, JOSÉ A. SCHEINKMAN

Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders’ value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal‐agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier firms may offer higher total pay as compensation for the extra risk in equity stakes borne by risk‐averse managers. Using long lags of stock price risk to capture exogenous firm risk, we confirm our conjecture and show that riskier firms are also more productive and more likely to be held by institutional investors, who are most able to influence compensation.

Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word‐of‐Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers

Published: 11/10/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00817.x

HARRISON HONG, JEFFREY D. KUBIK, JEREMY C. STEIN

A mutual fund manager is more likely to buy (or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are buying (or selling) that same stock. This pattern shows up even when the fund manager and the stock in question are located far apart, so it is distinct from anything having to do with local preference. The evidence can be interpreted in terms of an epidemic model in which investors spread information about stocks to one another by word of mouth.

Outsourcing Mutual Fund Management: Firm Boundaries, Incentives, and Performance

Published: 11/26/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12006

JOSEPH CHEN, HARRISON HONG, WENXI JIANG, JEFFREY D. KUBIK

We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.

Robust Measures of Earnings Surprises

Published: 12/19/2018   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12746

CHIN‐HAN CHIANG, WEI DAI, JIANQING FAN, HARRISON HONG, JUN TU

Event studies of market efficiency measure earnings surprises using the consensus error (CE), given as actual earnings minus the average professional forecast. If a subset of forecasts can be biased, the ideal but difficult to estimate parameter‐dependent alternative to CE is a nonlinear filter of individual errors that adjusts for bias. We show that CE is a poor parameter‐free approximation of this ideal measure. The fraction of misses on the same side (FOM), which discards the magnitude of misses, offers a far better approximation. FOM performs particularly well against CE in predicting the returns of U.S. stocks, where bias is potentially large.