The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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The Structure of Asset Prices and Socially Useless/Useful Information
Published: 12/01/1984 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb04915.x
JAMES A. OHLSON
This paper relates the value of additional information to asset prices in a pure exchange setting. The price structure of interest revolves around a “pricing‐hypothesis”: the prices in an economy with less information are unbiased estimators of the prices that would obtain in a more informative economy. Two basic results are developed. First, if the incremental information is useless then the pricing‐hypothesis applies. Second, if the pricing hypothesis is assumed valid, then the information is valuable in a weak sense. The results are also considered in the context of empirical research. The case is made for viewing statistical tests of association between prices and signals as tests of the social value of information.
Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to have Social Value in Pure Exchange
Published: 12/01/1982 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03610.x
NILS H. HAKANSSON, J. GREGORY KUNKEL, JAMES A. OHLSON
This paper extends, corrects, and unifies earlier statements concerning the social value of public information as well as the no‐trading conditions in pure exchange. Sufficient and necessary conditions are provided for both the single‐period and two‐period cases in a postsignal trading model. The social value of information is shown to be closely linked to the allocational efficiency of the market, the degree of homogeneity of prior beliefs, and of information structures, the time‐additivity of preferences, and the efficiency of endowments. We conclude that the case in favor of public information is much stronger than previously suggested.