The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Tax Effects in Term Structure Estimation
Published: 06/01/1984 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb02316.x
JAMES V. JORDAN
This study is a refinement and an extension of an earlier study by McCulloch of tax effects in the regression equation for term structure estimation. This study includes tests for tax effects and heteroskedasticity, a reconsideration of the need for an instrumental variable, and a search for the capital gains tax rate in addition to the ordinary‐income tax rate. There are two major findings: (1) statistically significant tax‐induced bias in the non‐tax‐adjusted equation and (2) evidence that the capital gains tax is misspecified in the tax‐adjusted equation.
Default Risk in Futures Markets: The Customer‐Broker Relationship
Published: 07/01/1990 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05112.x
JAMES V. JORDAN, GEORGE EMIR MORGAN
The traditional view of the futures clearinghouse as an insurer that eliminates the need for customers to evaluate default risk is inaccurate. A clearinghouse member default in 1985 confirms that the clearinghouse only guarantees payment from member to member, not from customer to customer or member to customer. Thus, non‐defaulting customers are subject to losses as a result of the action of individuals with whom thay have no contractual obligations. This study models the behavior of customers choosing a futures commission merchant (FCM) given the current legal position of the clearinghouse. In a single‐period model with symmetric information, customers can eliminate their exposure to defaults of other customers or of their FCM only by choosing to trade through “boutique” (undiversified) FCMs. In practice, monitoring and rebalancing costs may impede the attainment of zero default risk. However, FCM diversification remains an important factor in customer choice of an FCM. When setting capital requirements, clearinghouses and government regulators need to consider the implications of diversification for both customer and market protection.