The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Non‐Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Published: 11/21/2021, Volume: 77, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13089 | Cited by: 70
DANIEL BRADLEY, RUSSELL JAME, JARED WILLIAMS
Non‐deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell‐side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, together with more “beatable” earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts who organize them.
The Portfolio‐Driven Disposition Effect
Published: 8/21/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13378 | Cited by: 39
LI AN, JOSEPH ENGELBERG, MATTHEW HENRIKSSON, BAOLIAN WANG, JARED WILLIAMS
The disposition effect for a stock significantly weakens if the portfolio is at a gain, but is large when it is at a loss. We find this portfolio‐driven disposition effect (PDDE) in four independent settings: U.S. and Chinese archival data, as well as U.S. and Chinese experiments. The PDDE is robust to a variety of controls in regression specifications and is not explained by extreme returns, portfolio rebalancing, tax considerations, or investor heterogeneity. Our evidence suggests that investors form mental frames at both the stock and the portfolio levels and that these frames combine to generate the PDDE.
NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND AGGREGATE DEMAND: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE POST‐WAR PERIOD*
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03043.x | Cited by: 0
Raburn Williams
THE VALUE OF PENSION PROMISES AND CONSUMER WEALTH*
Published: 3/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00182.x | Cited by: 0
Walter Williams
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04607.x | Cited by: 2
JOSEPH WILLIAMS
Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure
Published: 3/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02548.x | Cited by: 94
JOSEPH WILLIAMS
In a corporate agency problem, perquisites and risk interact to produce novel, complex comparative statics. For example, even if additional debt induces risk‐neutral insiders to increase risk, they never seek to increase the market value of their stock; instead, insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent, conditionally optimal perquisites. Also, the firm's optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults. However, the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds, stocks, options, and their hybrids.
Efficient Signalling with Dividends, Investment, and Stock Repurchases
Published: 7/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04605.x | Cited by: 80
JOSEPH WILLIAMS
The efficient mix of dissipative dividends, investments in real and financial assets, and repurchases of stock is computed for a continuum of firms with inside information about the return on risky real assets. In the efficient signalling equilibrium, the representative firm optimally distributes dividends, invests in risky real assets to maximize net present value, holds no financial securities, and sells new stock in the market. This firm finances its value‐maximizing investment first from internal funds and second from stock sold to new investors.
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04541.x | Cited by: 0
JOSEPH WILLIAMS
EXPERIENCE AND RETROSPECTIVE RATING PLANS*
Published: 9/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01235.x | Cited by: 0
C. Arthur Williams
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE AND RETROSPECTIVE RATING PLANS
Published: 12/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01246.x | Cited by: 0
C. Arthur Williams
MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES: AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPROVING FOREIGN‐TRADE BALANCE*
Published: 9/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01236.x | Cited by: 0
C. Arthur Williams
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOLD‐EXCHANGE STANDARD*
Published: 12/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00335.x | Cited by: 0
Eric Campbell Williams
Model Secrecy and Stress Tests
Published: 3/7/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13207 | Cited by: 35
YARON LEITNER, BASIL WILLIAMS
Should regulators reveal the models they use to stress‐test banks? In our setting, revealing leads to gaming, but secrecy can induce banks to underinvest in socially desirable assets for fear of failing the test. We show that although the regulator can solve this underinvestment problem by making the test easier, some disclosure may still be optimal (e.g., if banks have high appetite for risk or if capital shortfalls are not very costly). Cutoff rules are optimal within monotone disclosure rules, but more generally optimal disclosure is single‐peaked. We discuss policy implications and offer applications beyond stress tests.
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
Published: 9/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x | Cited by: 929
KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS
A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum‐dividend market values are derived explicitly.
Estimating Security Price Risk Using Duration and Price Elasticity
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03562.x | Cited by: 6
ALEX O. WILLIAMS, PHILLIP E. PFEIFER
Efficient Signalling with Dividends and Investments
Published: 6/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02570.x | Cited by: 237
RAMASASTRY AMBARISH, KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS
An efficient signalling equilibrium with dividends and investments or, equivalently, dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed, and its properties are identified. Because corporate insiders can exploit multiple signals, the efficient mix must minimize dissipative costs. In equilibrium, many firms both distribute dividends and deviate from first‐best investment. Also, the impact of dividends on stock prices is positive. By contrast, the announcement effect of new stock is negative for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to invest.
In the Red: Overdrafts, Payday Lending, and the Underbanked
Published: 3/31/2025, Volume: 80, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13447 | Cited by: 2
MARCO DI MAGGIO, ANGELA MA, EMILY WILLIAMS
The reordering of transactions from “high‐to‐low” is a controversial bank practice thought to maximize fees paid by low‐income customers on overdrawn accounts. We exploit a series of class‐action lawsuits that mandated that some banks cease the practice. Using alternative credit bureau data, we find that after banks cease high‐to‐low reordering, low‐income individuals reduce payday borrowing, increase consumption, realize long‐term improvements in financial health, and gain access to lower‐cost loans in the traditional financial system. These findings suggest that aggressive bank practices can create demand for alternative financial services and highlight an important link between the traditional and alternative financial systems.
INVARIANCE AND SCALING IN THE PER SHARE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DATA: REPLY
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb02004.x | Cited by: 0
E. G. Davis, D. M. Dunn, W. H. Williams
AMBIGUITIES IN THE CROSS‐SECTION ANALYSIS OF PER SHARE FINANCIAL DATA
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01453.x | Cited by: 2
E. G. Davis, D. M. Dunn, W. H. Williams
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01261.x | Cited by: 0
Paul M. Van Arsdell, Bion B. Howard, Charles M. Williams