The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Collateral Spread and Financial Development
Published: 01/13/2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01526.x
JOSÉ M. LIBERTI, ATIF R. MIAN
We show that institutions that promote financial development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm‐specific assets. Collateral spread is defined as the difference in collateralization rates between high‐ and low‐risk borrowers. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with improvements in financial development driven by stronger institutions. We also show that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non‐specific assets (e.g., land) with borrower risk. However, the shift is considerably smaller in developed financial markets, enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral.
Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion
Published: 03/21/2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01637.x
ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSÉ MARÍA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI
This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.