The Journal of Finance

Collateral Spread and Financial Development

Published: 1/13/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01526.x  |  Cited by: 82

JOSÉ M. LIBERTI, ATIF R. MIAN

We show that institutions that promote financial development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm‐specific assets. Collateral spread is defined as the difference in collateralization rates between high‐ and low‐risk borrowers. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with improvements in financial development driven by stronger institutions. We also show that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non‐specific assets (e.g., land) with borrower risk. However, the shift is considerably smaller in developed financial markets, enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral.

Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion

Published: 3/21/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01637.x  |  Cited by: 156

ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSÉ MARÍA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

Published: 5/7/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x  |  Cited by: 240

ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

Shorting in Speculative Markets

Published: 1/27/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12871  |  Cited by: 19

MARCEL NUTZ, JOSÉ A. SCHEINKMAN

In models of trading with heterogeneous beliefs following Harrison‐Kreps, short selling is prohibited and agents face constant marginal costs‐of‐carry. The resale option guarantees that prices exceed buy‐and‐hold prices and the difference is identified as a bubble. We propose a model where risk‐neutral agents face asymmetric increasing marginal costs on long and short positions. Here, agents also value an option to delay, and a Hamilton‐Jacobi‐Bellman equation quantifies the influence of costs on prices. An unexpected decrease in shorting costs may deflate a bubble, linking financial innovations that facilitated shorting of mortgage‐backed securities to the collapse of prices.

Pension Plan Funding and Stock Market Efficiency

Published: 3/9/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00859.x  |  Cited by: 192

FRANCESCO FRANZONI, JOSÉ M. MARÍN

The paper argues that the market significantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least 5 years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.

Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles

Published: 5/16/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00867.x  |  Cited by: 368

HARRISON HONG, JOSÉ SCHEINKMAN, WEI XIONG

We model the relationship between asset float (tradeable shares) and speculative bubbles. Investors with heterogeneous beliefs and short‐sales constraints trade a stock with limited float because of insider lockups. A bubble arises as price overweighs optimists' beliefs and investors anticipate the option to resell to those with even higher valuations. The bubble's size depends on float as investors anticipate an increase in float with lockup expirations and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Consistent with the internet experience, the bubble, turnover, and volatility decrease with float and prices drop on the lockup expiration date.

Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities in Foreign Exchange Options

Published: 6/1995,  Volume: 50,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04794.x  |  Cited by: 61

JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA, P. H. KEVIN CHANG

This article tests the expectations hypothesis in the term structure of volatilities in foreign exchange options. In particular, it addresses whether long‐dated volatility quotes are consistent with expected future short‐dated volatility quotes, assuming rational expectations. For options observed daily from December 1, 1989 to August 31, 1992 on dollar exchange rates against the pound, mark, yen, and Swiss franc, we are unable to reject the expectations hypothesis in the great majority of cases. The current spread between long‐ and short‐dated volatility rates proves to be a significant predictor of the direction of future short‐dated rates.

Explorations Into Factors Explaining Money Market Returns

Published: 12/1994,  Volume: 49,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04784.x  |  Cited by: 192

PETER J. KNEZ, ROBERT LITTERMAN, JOSÉ SCHEINKMAN

In this article, we measure and interpret the common “factors” that describe money market returns. Results are presented for both three‐and four‐factor models. We find that the three‐factor model explains, on average, 86 percent of the total variation in most money market returns while the four‐factor model explains, on average, 90 percent of this variation. Using mimicking portfolios, we provide an interpretation of the systematic risks represented by these factors.

Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

Published: 8/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12698  |  Cited by: 856

JOSÉ AZAR, MARTIN C. SCHMALZ, ISABEL TECU

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. Within‐route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route‐level changes in ticket prices, even when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large asset managers. We conclude that a hidden social cost—reduced product market competition—accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.

Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization

Published: 1/20/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00830.x  |  Cited by: 459

JOSÉ‐MIGUEL GASPAR, MASSIMO MASSA, PEDRO MATOS

We investigate whether mutual fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits. We find that “high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) overperform at the expense of “low value” funds. Such a performance gap is above the one existing between similar funds not affiliated with the same family. Better allocations of underpriced initial public offering deals and opposite trades across member funds partly explain why high value funds overperform. Our findings highlight how the family organization prevalent in the mutual fund industry generates distortions in delegated asset management.

Misspecified Recovery

Published: 11/10/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12404  |  Cited by: 131

JAROSLAV BOROVIČKA, LARS PETER HANSEN, JOSÉ A. SCHEINKMAN

Asset prices contain information about the probability distribution of future states and the stochastic discounting of those states as used by investors. To better understand the challenge in distinguishing investors' beliefs from risk‐adjusted discounting, we use Perron–Frobenius Theory to isolate a positive martingale component of the stochastic discount factor process. This component recovers a probability measure that absorbs long‐term risk adjustments. When the martingale is not degenerate, surmising that this recovered probability captures investors' beliefs distorts inference about risk‐return tradeoffs. Stochastic discount factors in many structural models of asset prices have empirically relevant martingale components.

Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms

Published: 3/12/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12225  |  Cited by: 235

ING‐HAW CHENG, HARRISON HONG, JOSÉ A. SCHEINKMAN

Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders’ value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal‐agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier firms may offer higher total pay as compensation for the extra risk in equity stakes borne by risk‐averse managers. Using long lags of stock price risk to capture exogenous firm risk, we confirm our conjecture and show that riskier firms are also more productive and more likely to be held by institutional investors, who are most able to influence compensation.

Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization, and the Synchronization of Economic Activity

Published: 5/20/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12025  |  Cited by: 258

SEBNEM KALEMLI‐OZCAN, ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time‐varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country‐pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de‐jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.

Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Crises: Evidence from History and Administrative Data

Published: 1/27/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70023  |  Cited by: 5

GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, DMITRY KUVSHINOV, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, BJÖRN RICHTER

We show that a U‐shaped monetary rate path increases banking crisis risk, via credit and asset price cycles, analyzing 17 countries over 150 years. Rate hikes (raw or instrumented) increase crisis risk, but only if preceded by prolonged cuts. These patterns are unique to banking crises, unlike noncrisis recessions. Regarding the mechanism, prolonged cuts raise the likelihood of large credit and asset price booms, consistent with higher credit supply and risk‐taking. Subsequent hikes strongly reduce credit and asset prices, and increase banks' realized credit risk, rather than interest rate risk. We find consistent results in administrative loan‐level data for Spain.

Monetary Policy and Inequality

Published: 7/27/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13262  |  Cited by: 76

ASGER LAU ANDERSEN, NIELS JOHANNESEN, MIA JØRGENSEN, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ

We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household‐level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long‐standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality.

Financial Crises and Political Radicalization: How Failing Banks Paved Hitler's Path to Power

Published: 7/8/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13166  |  Cited by: 39

SEBASTIAN DOERR, STEFAN GISSLER, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, HANS‐JOACHIM VOTH

Do financial crises radicalize voters? We study Germany's 1931 banking crisis, collecting new data on bank branches and firm‐bank connections. Exploiting cross‐sectional variation in precrisis exposure to the bank at the center of the crisis, we show that Nazi votes surged in locations more affected by its failure. Radicalization in response to the shock was exacerbated in cities with a history of anti‐Semitism. After the Nazis seized power, both pogroms and deportations were more frequent in places affected by the banking crisis. Our results suggest an important synergy between financial distress and cultural predispositions, with far‐reaching consequences.

Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazilian FX Interventions, Local Credit, and Global Financial Cycles

Published: 5/22/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70054  |  Cited by: 0

RODRIGO BARBONE GONZALEZ, DMITRY KHAMETSHIN, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, ANDREA POLO

We show that FX interventions can be effective, particularly in attenuating global financial spillovers. We exploit global financial shocks and Brazilian central bank interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: bank credit (to firms), foreign credit to banks, and employer‐employees. After the U.S. Taper Tantrum (followed by emerging markets' FX turbulence), Brazilian banks with more foreign debt cut credit supply, reducing firm‐level employment. A subsequent large policy intervention supplying derivatives against FX risks — hedger of last resort — halved the negative effects. A 2008 to 2015 panel exploiting global FX shocks and local FX interventions confirms the results and the hedging channel. However, the FX policy entails fiscal and moral hazard costs.

The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach‐for‐Yield, and Real Effects

Published: 1/25/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12735  |  Cited by: 213

BERNARDO MORAIS, JOSÉ‐LUIS PEYDRÓ, JESSICA ROLDÁN‐PEÑA, CLAUDIA RUIZ‐ORTEGA

We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 112

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.