The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04607.x  |  Cited by: 2

JOSEPH WILLIAMS


DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04541.x  |  Cited by: 0

JOSEPH WILLIAMS


Efficient Signalling with Dividends, Investment, and Stock Repurchases

Published: 7/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04605.x  |  Cited by: 80

JOSEPH WILLIAMS

The efficient mix of dissipative dividends, investments in real and financial assets, and repurchases of stock is computed for a continuum of firms with inside information about the return on risky real assets. In the efficient signalling equilibrium, the representative firm optimally distributes dividends, invests in risky real assets to maximize net present value, holds no financial securities, and sells new stock in the market. This firm finances its value‐maximizing investment first from internal funds and second from stock sold to new investors.


Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure

Published: 3/1987,  Volume: 42,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02548.x  |  Cited by: 92

JOSEPH WILLIAMS

In a corporate agency problem, perquisites and risk interact to produce novel, complex comparative statics. For example, even if additional debt induces risk‐neutral insiders to increase risk, they never seek to increase the market value of their stock; instead, insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent, conditionally optimal perquisites. Also, the firm's optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults. However, the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds, stocks, options, and their hybrids.


Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium

Published: 9/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x  |  Cited by: 926

KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS

A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum‐dividend market values are derived explicitly.


Efficient Signalling with Dividends and Investments

Published: 6/1987,  Volume: 42,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02570.x  |  Cited by: 237

RAMASASTRY AMBARISH, KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS

An efficient signalling equilibrium with dividends and investments or, equivalently, dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed, and its properties are identified. Because corporate insiders can exploit multiple signals, the efficient mix must minimize dissipative costs. In equilibrium, many firms both distribute dividends and deviate from first‐best investment. Also, the impact of dividends on stock prices is positive. By contrast, the announcement effect of new stock is negative for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to invest.


The Portfolio‐Driven Disposition Effect

Published: 8/21/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13378  |  Cited by: 37

LI AN, JOSEPH ENGELBERG, MATTHEW HENRIKSSON, BAOLIAN WANG, JARED WILLIAMS

The disposition effect for a stock significantly weakens if the portfolio is at a gain, but is large when it is at a loss. We find this portfolio‐driven disposition effect (PDDE) in four independent settings: U.S. and Chinese archival data, as well as U.S. and Chinese experiments. The PDDE is robust to a variety of controls in regression specifications and is not explained by extreme returns, portfolio rebalancing, tax considerations, or investor heterogeneity. Our evidence suggests that investors form mental frames at both the stock and the portfolio levels and that these frames combine to generate the PDDE.


THE VALUE OF PENSION PROMISES AND CONSUMER WEALTH*

Published: 3/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00182.x  |  Cited by: 0

Walter Williams


NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND AGGREGATE DEMAND: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE POST‐WAR PERIOD*

Published: 12/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03043.x  |  Cited by: 0

Raburn Williams


MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES: AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPROVING FOREIGN‐TRADE BALANCE*

Published: 9/1954,  Volume: 9,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01236.x  |  Cited by: 0

C. Arthur Williams


EXPERIENCE AND RETROSPECTIVE RATING PLANS*

Published: 9/1954,  Volume: 9,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01235.x  |  Cited by: 0

C. Arthur Williams


RESTRICTIONS ON THE FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOLD‐EXCHANGE STANDARD*

Published: 12/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00335.x  |  Cited by: 0

Eric Campbell Williams


AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE AND RETROSPECTIVE RATING PLANS

Published: 12/1954,  Volume: 9,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01246.x  |  Cited by: 0

C. Arthur Williams


Model Secrecy and Stress Tests

Published: 3/7/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13207  |  Cited by: 35

YARON LEITNER, BASIL WILLIAMS

Should regulators reveal the models they use to stress‐test banks? In our setting, revealing leads to gaming, but secrecy can induce banks to underinvest in socially desirable assets for fear of failing the test. We show that although the regulator can solve this underinvestment problem by making the test easier, some disclosure may still be optimal (e.g., if banks have high appetite for risk or if capital shortfalls are not very costly). Cutoff rules are optimal within monotone disclosure rules, but more generally optimal disclosure is single‐peaked. We discuss policy implications and offer applications beyond stress tests.


REPLY

Published: 12/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00144.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph Aschheim


SUPPLEMENTARY SECURITY‐RESERVE REQUIREMENTS RECONSIDERED

Published: 12/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04216.x  |  Cited by: 1

Joseph Aschheim


ON MEASURING FISCAL POLICY

Published: 12/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02937.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph Scherer


DO HIGHER RESERVE REQUIREMENTS DISCOURAGE FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBERSHIP?

Published: 12/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb03225.x  |  Cited by: 5

Chris Joseph Prestopino


STABILIZATION ATTEMPTS IN AN “OPEN” ECONOMY—AUSTRALIA*

Published: 12/1956,  Volume: 11,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb04093.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph A. Hasson


INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964

Published: 5/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00208.x  |  Cited by: 1

Joseph A. Pechman


The Interrelation of Stock and Options Market Trading‐Volume Data

Published: 9/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02614.x  |  Cited by: 87

JOSEPH H. ANTHONY

This research empirically investigates the relation between common stock and call option trading volumes. The paper hyothesizes and tests a sequential flow of information between the stock and option markets. If information trading for CBOE‐listed firms is predominantly accomplished through option trading, then existing research methodologies may be biased against finding any significant economic consequences in those instances where option listing is an important variable. Results indicate that trading in call options leads trading in the underlying shares, with a one‐day lag.


CUSHIONING THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS ON THE REST OF THE WORLD*

Published: 5/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01589.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph D. Coppock


SHORT INTEREST: BEARISH OR BULLISH?*

Published: 3/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb01655.x  |  Cited by: 22

Joseph J. Seneca


Pareto Optimality and Competition

Published: 5/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00437.x  |  Cited by: 83

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ


INSIDERS AND MARKET EFFICIENCY

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01965.x  |  Cited by: 332

Joseph E. Finnerty


THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES: THEORY, MODELS OF INTEREST‐RATE FORECASTING, AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

Published: 12/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01766.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph F. Sinkey


SHORT INTEREST: BULLISH OR BEARISH? REPLY

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00827.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph J. Seneca


A METHOD FOR CONSUMER VALUATION OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES BY TYPE: COMMENT

Published: 12/1963,  Volume: 18,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01640.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph M. Belth


DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00511.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph P. McKenna


POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND INVESTMENT. I*

Published: 12/1951,  Volume: 6,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04478.x  |  Cited by: 1

Joseph J. Spengler


A STUDY OF CASH PLANNING IN SMALL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES*

Published: 9/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb01610.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph C. Schabacker


ADAM SMITH ON USURY LAWS

Published: 9/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03319.x  |  Cited by: 16

Joseph M. Jadlow


Turn‐of‐Month Evaluations of Liquid Profits and Stock Returns: A Common Explanation for the Monthly and January Effects

Published: 9/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02435.x  |  Cited by: 125

JOSEPH P. OGDEN

This paper presents and tests a hypothesis that the standardization of payments in the United States at the turn of each calendar month generally induces a surge in stock returns at the turn of each calendar month. The hypothesis also asserts that returns generally will be greater following the month of December and will vary inversely with the stringency of monetary policy. Empirical results using stock index returns for 1969–1986 support the hypothesis. This analysis provides an explanation for the previously documented monthly effect in stock returns and a partial explanation for the January effect.


An Analysis of Yield Curve Notes

Published: 3/1987,  Volume: 42,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02552.x  |  Cited by: 10

JOSEPH P. OGDEN

This paper analyzes a new type of security, the yield curve note, which pays interest at a rate that varies inversely with short‐term interest rates. A valuation model for yield curve notes is presented, the parameters of the model are estimated empirically, and the estimated model is used to explore, in simulation, the price behavior and risk characteristics of yield curve notes in comparison with fixed‐rate notes. The risk of a yield curve note is approximately twice as great as a fixed‐rate note with the same maturity. The unique risk characteristics of yield curve notes make them useful (as liabilities) in immunization strategies for financial institutions. Their usefulness in this regard may be the chief rationale for their development.


Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent Crises

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00154  |  Cited by: 105

Joseph E. Stiglitz


DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES BY INCOME CLASSES*

Published: 5/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00953.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph A. Pechman


VOTING RIGHTS OF PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS IN INDUSTRIALS1

Published: 10/1948,  Volume: 3,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1948.tb01519.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph F. Bradley


THE SAVING‐INVESTMENT PROCESS IN A THEORY OF FINANCE*

Published: 3/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb03009.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph M. Burns


THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON THE CYCLICAL MOVEMENT OF THE MONEY SUPPLY*

Published: 3/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00192.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph L. Craycraft


AN APPRAISAL OF THE OHIO AXLE‐MILE TRUCK TAX*

Published: 3/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04183.x  |  Cited by: 0

William Joseph Weiskopf


COMPARATIVE USAGE OF BOND‐WARRANT AND CONVERTIBLE BOND ISSUES*

Published: 6/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01738.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph Alan Lavely


THE INTER‐FIRM CORPORATE CASH TENDER OFFER: OPERATING, MARKET, AND BID CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET FIRMS*

Published: 9/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01035.x  |  Cited by: 0

Fred Joseph Ebeid


ALTERNATIVE OPTIMAL OPEN MARKET STRATEGIES: A SIMULATION APPROACH*

Published: 6/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01400.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph M. Crews


POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND INVESTMENT (II)*

Published: 3/1952,  Volume: 7,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01521.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph J. Spengler


NONCAPITAL PROGRAMMING: A THEORY OF FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE*

Published: 9/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00940.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph A. Hess


A STUDY OF REFINEMENTS IN THE INCIDENTS OF BUSINESS OWNERSHIP FROM THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*

Published: 3/1953,  Volume: 8,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1953.tb01137.x  |  Cited by: 0

Joseph S. Begando


A MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROBLEM BANKS

Published: 3/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb03158.x  |  Cited by: 271

Joseph F. Sinkey


Estimating Security Price Risk Using Duration and Price Elasticity

Published: 5/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03562.x  |  Cited by: 6

ALEX O. WILLIAMS, PHILLIP E. PFEIFER


Non‐Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest

Published: 11/21/2021,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13089  |  Cited by: 67

DANIEL BRADLEY, RUSSELL JAME, JARED WILLIAMS

Non‐deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell‐side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, together with more “beatable” earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts who organize them.


Effects of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act: Evidence from Capital Markets

Published: 9/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04887.x  |  Cited by: 20

JOSEPH AHARONY, ITZHAK SWARY

This study measures the effects of the 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act on the profitability and risk of BHCs using capital market data. Differences in abnormal returns and risk among three portfolios of bank shares which differ in their regulatory status are examined in various periods preceding and following the enactment. No significant differences in performance and no change in the relative risk of any pair of portfolios were observed. Thus, the null hypothesis that the nonbank expansion provisions of the 1970 amendment had no effect on BHCs' risk and profitability cannot be rejected.