The Journal of Finance

The Foreign Exchange Exposure of Japanese Multinational Corporations

Published: 4/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.295575  |  Cited by: 442

Jia He, Lilian K. Ng

We find that about 25 percent of our sample of 171 Japanese multinationals' stock returns experienced economically significant positive exposure effects for the period January 1979 to December 1993. The extent to which a firm is exposed to exchange‐rate fluctuations can be explained by the level of its export ratio and by variables that are proxies for its hedging needs. Highly leveraged firms, or firms with low liquidity, tend to have smaller exposures. Foreign exposure is found to increase with firm size. We also find that keiretsu multinationals are more exposed to exchange‐rate risk than nonkeiretsu firms.

A Variance‐Ratio Test of Random Walks in Foreign Exchange Rates

Published: 6/1991,  Volume: 46,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02686.x  |  Cited by: 107

CHRISTINA Y. LIU, JIA HE

The separate variance‐ratio tests under homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity both provide evidence rejecting the random walk hypothesis, using five pairs of weekly nominal exchange rate series over the period from August 7, 1974 to March 29, 1989. The rejections cast doubt on the random walk hypothesis in exchange rates, which has received support in the existing literature. Furthermore, since the rejections are robust to heteroscedasticity, they suggest autocorelations of weekly increments in the nominal exchange rate series, which may be consistent with the exchange rate overshooting or undershooting phenomenon.

One‐Time Cash Flow Announcements and Free Cash‐Flow Theory: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

Published: 12/1992,  Volume: 47,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04691.x  |  Cited by: 85

KEITH M. HOWE, JIA HE, G. WENCHI KAO

The leading explanation for the positive price response surrounding tender offer share repurchase and specially designated dividend (SDD) announcements is the information signaling hypothesis. This paper reexamines these announcements to determine if Jensen's free cash‐flow theory also has explanatory power. Lang and Litzenberger's (1989) findings suggest an important role for the free cash‐flow theory in explaining the market's reaction to dividend changes. In contrast, we find the market's reaction to share repurchases and SDDs is approximately the same for both high‐Q and low‐Q firms. We thus have an empirical puzzle: If Jensen's free cash‐flow theory applies to dividend changes, it is difficult to see why it does not also apply to the analogous events examined here.

Tests of the Relations Among Marketwide Factors, Firm‐Specific Variables, and Stock Returns Using a Conditional Asset Pricing Model

Published: 12/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05230.x  |  Cited by: 22

JIA HE, RAYMOND KAN, LILIAN NG, CHU ZHANG

In this article we generalize Harvey's (1989) empirical specification of conditional asset pricing models to allow for both time‐varying covariances between stock returns and marketwide factors and time‐varying reward‐to‐covariabilities. The model is then applied to examine the effects of firm size and book‐to‐market equity ratios. We find that the traditional asset pricing model with commonly used factors can only explain a small portion of the stock returns predicted by firm size and book‐to‐market equity ratios. The results indicate that allowing time‐varying covariances and time‐varying reward‐to‐covariabilities does little to salvage the traditional asset pricing models.

Information Acquisition in Rumor‐Based Bank Runs

Published: 5/11/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12202  |  Cited by: 96

ZHIGUO HE, ASAF MANELA

We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent‐but‐illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding‐out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.

Rollover Risk and Credit Risk

Published: 3/27/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01721.x  |  Cited by: 542

ZHIGUO HE, WEI XIONG

Our model shows that deterioration in debt market liquidity leads to an increase in not only the liquidity premium of corporate bonds but also credit risk. The latter effect originates from firms' debt rollover. When liquidity deterioration causes a firm to suffer losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the losses while maturing debt holders are paid in full. This conflict leads the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold. Our model demonstrates an intricate interaction between the liquidity premium and default premium and highlights the role of short‐term debt in exacerbating rollover risk.

Market Making Contracts, Firm Value, and the IPO Decision

Published: 9/3/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12285  |  Cited by: 63

HENDRIK BESSEMBINDER, JIA HAO, KUNCHENG ZHENG

We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.

Leverage Dynamics without Commitment

Published: 1/13/2021,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13001  |  Cited by: 143

PETER M. DEMARZO, ZHIGUO HE

We characterize equilibrium leverage dynamics in a trade‐off model in which the firm can continuously adjust leverage and cannot commit to a policy ex ante. While the leverage ratchet effect leads shareholders to issue debt gradually over time, asset growth and debt maturity cause leverage to mean‐revert slowly toward a target. Investors anticipate future debt issuance and raise credit spreads, fully offsetting the tax benefits of new debt. Shareholders are therefore indifferent toward the debt maturity structure, even though their choice significantly affects credit spreads, leverage levels, the speed of adjustment, future investment, and growth.

A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Published: 3/17/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12118  |  Cited by: 288

DOUGLAS W. DIAMOND, ZHIGUO HE

Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.

Household Liquidity Constraints and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Danish Mortgage Reform

Published: 9/23/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13277  |  Cited by: 15

ALEX XI HE, DANIEL LE MAIRE

We study the causal effect of liquidity constraints on individual labor market outcomes by exploiting the 1992 mortgage reform in Denmark, which for the first time allowed homeowners to borrow against housing equity for nonhousing purposes. Following the reform, liquidity‐constrained homeowners increased debt levels and had higher earnings growth and lower employment rates. The option to borrow against housing equity enabled liquidity‐constrained individuals to move to high‐wage jobs and invest in valuable human and physical capital. The results imply that relaxing household liquidity constraints during recessions can create better job matches, potentially increasing earnings and output in the longer run.

Are Liquidity and Information Risks Priced in the Treasury Bond Market?

Published: 1/23/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01439.x  |  Cited by: 94

HAITAO LI, JUNBO WANG, CHUNCHI WU, YAN HE

We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity and information risks on expected returns of Treasury bonds. We focus on the systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh as opposed to the traditional microstructure‐based measures of liquidity. Information risk is measured by the probability of information‐based trading (PIN). We document a strong positive relation between expected Treasury returns and liquidity and information risks, controlling for the effects of other systematic risk factors and bond characteristics. This relation is robust to many empirical specifications and a wide variety of traditional liquidity and informed trading proxies.

The Rising Tide Lifts Some Interest Rates: Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Loan Pricing

Published: 7/28/2026,  Volume: ,  Issue:   |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70066  |  Cited by: 1

RICARDO CORREA, AI HE, CHRISTOPH HERPFER, UGUR LEL

Banks adjust loan spreads after observing natural disasters linked to climate change. We isolate this updating process by identifying loans to borrowers at risk of, but not directly affected by, such disasters. Loan spreads for these borrowers spike in both primary and secondary markets, while no such updating occurs for non–climate‐related disasters. Evidence suggests a heightened perceived credit risk, which nonetheless cannot fully explain the increase in rates. Taken altogether, increased spreads are explained primarily by salience bias, as they are short‐lived and amplified by media attention. This salience impacts financial decisions at bank‐dependent firms.

Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage‐Backed Securities

Published: 11/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01782.x  |  Cited by: 194

JIE (JACK) HE, JUN (QJ) QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Initial yields on both AAA‐rated and non‐AAA rated mortgage‐backed security (MBS) tranches sold by large issuers are higher than yields on similar tranches sold by small issuers during the market boom years of 2004 to 2006. Moreover, the prices of MBS sold by large issuers drop more than those sold by small issuers, and the differences are concentrated among tranches issued during 2004 to 2006. These results suggest that investors price the risk that large issuers received more inflated ratings than small issuers, especially during boom periods.

Pledgeability and Asset Prices: Evidence from the Chinese Corporate Bond Markets

Published: 7/29/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13266  |  Cited by: 71

HUI CHEN, ZHUO CHEN, ZHIGUO HE, JINYU LIU, RENGMING XIE

We provide causal evidence on the value of asset pledgeability by exploiting a unique feature of Chinese corporate bond markets: bonds with identical fundamentals are traded on two segmented markets with different rules for repo transactions. Using a policy shock that rendered AA+ and AA bonds ineligible for repo on one market only, we compare how bond prices changed across markets and rating classes around this event. When the haircut increases from 0% to 100%, bond yields increase by 39 bps to 85 bps. These estimates help us infer the magnitude of the shadow cost of capital in China.

Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

Published: 11/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01787.x  |  Cited by: 283

PETER M. DEMARZO, MICHAEL J. FISHMAN, ZHIGUO HE, NENG WANG

We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.

The Drivers and Implications of Retail Margin Trading

Published: 5/15/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70049  |  Cited by: 1

JIANGZE BIAN, ZHI DA, ZHIGUO HE, DONG LOU, KELLY SHUE, HAO ZHOU

Using granular data covering both regulated (brokerage‐financed) and unregulated (shadow‐financed) margin accounts in China, we provide novel evidence on retail investors' margin trading behavior and its price implications. We first show that retail investors' decisions to lever up in stock trading despite the hefty borrowing cost is related to their lottery preferences. We then show that margin borrowing affects investors' trading behavior—investors are more likely to liquidate their holdings as they approach margin calls. Finally, we show that margin‐induced trading aggregates to affect asset prices and contributes to shock spillovers across stocks (e.g., from lottery stocks to nonlottery stocks).

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 106

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.