Search results: 50.
Efficient Funds in a Financial Market with Options: a New Irrelevance Proposition
Published: 6/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00653.x | Cited by: 13
KOSE JOHN
Under the same assumptions that Ross used to assert the existence of an efficient fund (on which a spanning set of options can be written) we prove that almost any portfolio is an efficient fund. From a constructive point of view, a randomly chosen vector of portfolio weights yields an efficient fund. When the Ross assumptions are relaxed, a limited notion of efficiency‐maximal efficiency‐is the best attainable. The maximally efficient funds are also everywhere dense in the portfolio space. Some implications are discussed and illustrative examples given.
Risk‐Shifting Incentives and Signalling Through Corporate Capital Structure
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04573.x | Cited by: 33
KOSE JOHN
This paper examines optimal corporate financing arrangements under asymmetric information for different patterns of temporal resolution of uncertainty in the underlying technology. An agency problem, a signalling problem and an agency‐signalling problem arise as special cases. The associated informational equilibria and the optimal financing arrangements are characterized and compared. In the agency‐signalling equilibrium the private information of corporate insiders at the time of financing is signalled through capital structure choices which deviate optimally from agency‐cost minimizing financing arrangements, which in turn induce risk‐shifting incentives in the investment policy. In the pure signalling case the equilibrium is characterized by direct contractual precommitments to implement investment policies which are riskier than pareto‐optimal levels. Empirical implications for debt covenants and the announcement effect of investment policies and leverage increasing transactions on existing stock and bond prices are explicitly derived.
Top‐Management Compensation and Capital Structure
Published: 7/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04026.x | Cited by: 407
TERESA A. JOHN, KOSE JOHN
The interrelationship between top‐management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied. The optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus. We analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are (1) equity and risky debt, and (2) equity and convertible debt. In addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests, managerial compensation in a
levered
firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt. The optimal management compensation derived has
low
pay‐performance sensitivity. With convertible debt, instead of straight debt, the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay‐to‐performance sensitivity. A
negative
relationship between pay‐performance sensitivity and leverage is derived. Our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of Jensen and Murphy (
1990
) with agency theory. Other testable implications include (1) a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top‐management compensation structures, and (2) the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices. The model yields implications for management compensation in banks and Federal Deposit Insurance reform. Our results explain the dynamics of top‐management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization.
Costly Contracting and Optimal Payout Constraints
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03567.x | Cited by: 54
KOSE JOHN, AVNER KALAY
Information Content of Insider Trading Around Corporate Announcements: The Case of Capital Expenditures
Published: 7/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05108.x | Cited by: 62
KOSE JOHN, BANIKANTA MISHRA
There is gathering evidence of insider trading around corporate announcements of dividends, capital expenditures, equity issues and repurchases, and other capital structure changes. Although signaling models have been used to explain the price reaction of these announcements, a usual assumption made in these models is that insiders cannot trade to gain from such announcements. An innovative feature of this paper is to model trading by corporate insiders (subject to disclosure regulation) as one of the signals. Detailed testable predictions are described for the interaction of corporate announcements and concurrent insider trading. In particular, such interaction is shown to depend crucially on whether the firm is a growth firm, a mature firm, or a declining firm. Empirical proxies for firm technology are developed based on measures of growth and Tobin's q ratio. In the underlying “efficient” signaling equilibrium, investment announcements and net insider trading convey private information of insiders to the market at least cost. The paper also addresses issues of deriving intertemporal announcement effects from the equilibrium (cross‐sectional) pricing functional. Other announcement effects relate the intensity of the market response to insider trading, variance of firm cash flows, risk aversion of the insiders, and characteristics of firm technology (growth, mature, or declining).
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
Published: 9/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x | Cited by: 935
KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS
A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum‐dividend market values are derived explicitly.
Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05012.x | Cited by: 92
KOSE JOHN, DAVID C. NACHMAN
The agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. The incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context. In a sequential equilibrium of the model, a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment. The incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market. This anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium. Some empirical implications of the model for bond rating, debt covenants, and bond price response to investment announcements are explored.
Efficient Signalling with Dividends and Investments
Published: 6/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02570.x | Cited by: 237
RAMASASTRY AMBARISH, KOSE JOHN, JOSEPH WILLIAMS
An efficient signalling equilibrium with dividends and investments or, equivalently, dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed, and its properties are identified. Because corporate insiders can exploit multiple signals, the efficient mix must minimize dissipative costs. In equilibrium, many firms both distribute dividends and deviate from first‐best investment. Also, the impact of dividends on stock prices is positive. By contrast, the announcement effect of new stock is negative for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to invest.
Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
Published: 7/19/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x | Cited by: 1564
KOSE JOHN, LUBOMIR LITOV, BERNARD YEUNG
Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value‐enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk‐avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk‐taking for their self‐interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk‐taking. Using a cross‐country panel and a U.S.‐only sample, we find that corporate risk‐taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
Insider Trading around Dividend Announcements: Theory and Evidence
Published: 9/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04621.x | Cited by: 251
KOSE JOHN, LARRY H. P. LANG
The informational role of strategic insider trading around corporate dividend announcements is studied based on the
efficient equilibrium
in a signalling model with endogenous insider trading. Insider trading immediately prior to the announcement of dividend initiations has significant explanatory power. For firms with insider selling prior to the dividend initiation announcement, the excess returns are negative and
significantly lower
than for the remaining firms (with no insider trading or just insider buying) as implied by our model. Another implication is that dividend increases may elicit a positive or
negative
stock price response depending on the firm's investment opportunities.
Asymmetry of Information, Regulatory Lags and Optimal Incentive Contracts: Theory and Evidence
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02245.x | Cited by: 0
RICHARD S. BOWER, KOSE JOHN, ANTHONY SAUNDERS
The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms In Response to Performance Decline
Published: 7/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03999.x | Cited by: 213
KOSE JOHN, LARRY H. P. LANG, JEFFRY NETTER
Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.
What Moves the Stock and Bond Markets? A Variance Decomposition for Long‐Term Asset Returns
Published: 3/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04700.x | Cited by: 373
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, JOHN AMMER
This paper uses a vector autoregressive model to decompose excess stock and 10‐year bond returns into changes in expectations of future stock dividends, inflation, short‐term real interest rates, and excess stock and bond returns. In monthly postwar U.S. data, stock and bond returns are driven largely by news about future excess stock returns and inflation, respectively. Real interest rates have little impact on returns, although they do affect the short‐term nominal interest rate and the slope of the term structure. These findings help to explain the low correlation between excess stock and bond returns.
Asset Writedowns: Managerial Incentives and Security Returns
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04574.x | Cited by: 240
JOHN S. STRONG, JOHN R. MEYER
Evaluating and Comparing Projects: Simple Detection of False Alarms
Published: 12/1979, Volume: 34, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb00068.x | Cited by: 11
JOHN W. PRATT, JOHN S. HAMMOND
Explaining the Poor Performance of Consumption‐based Asset Pricing Models
Published: 12/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00310 | Cited by: 203
John Y. Campbell, John H. Cochrane
We show that the external habit‐formation model economy of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) can explain why the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its extensions are betterapproximate asset pricing models than is the standard onsumption‐based model. The model economy produces time‐varying expected eturns, tracked by the dividend–price ratio. Portfolio‐based models capture some of this variation in state variables, which a state‐independent function of consumption cannot capture. Therefore, though the consumption‐based model and CAPM are both perfect conditional asset pricing models, the portfolio‐based models are better approximate unconditional asset pricing models.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00972.x | Cited by: 1
John Lintner
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00443.x | Cited by: 0
JOHN LINTNER
THE COUPON EFFECT ON YIELD TO MATURITY
Published: 3/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03245.x | Cited by: 23
John Caks
INFLATION AND SECURITY RETURNS*
Published: 5/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01809.x | Cited by: 64
John Lintner
WEALTH, WELFARE, AND THE PRICE OF RISK
Published: 5/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00970.x | Cited by: 12
John Long
Risk Adjusted Equity Performance Measurement
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03576.x | Cited by: 1
JOHN NAGORNIAK
The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay
Published: 5/21/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01736.x | Cited by: 116
JOHN THANASSOULIS
This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a negative externality, driving up market levels of banker remuneration and hence rival banks’ default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of the balance sheet used for bonuses. However, stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default risk enhancing, and suboptimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.
MONETARY POLICY AND EXTERNAL SURPLUSES: THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE, 1955–61*
Published: 9/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb02855.x | Cited by: 0
John Hein
BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AND HOW THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MONETARY CONTROL MAY BE ENHANCED*
Published: 3/1956, Volume: 11, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb00690.x | Cited by: 0
John Livingston
A NOTE ON THE GIRO TRANSFER SYSTEM
Published: 12/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00145.x | Cited by: 6
John Hein
Competition and Misconduct
Published: 4/12/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13227 | Cited by: 18
JOHN THANASSOULIS
Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.
Nontransferable Interest‐Bearing National Debt
Published: 9/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03518.x | Cited by: 2
JOHN BRYANT
A NOTE ON THE USE OF INDEX CLAUSES ABROAD
Published: 12/1960, Volume: 15, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb02768.x | Cited by: 0
John Hein
SECURITY PRICES, RISK, AND MAXIMAL GAINS FROM DIVERSIFICATION*
Published: 12/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02930.x | Cited by: 444
John Lintner
THE COST OF CAPITAL AND OPTIMAL FINANCING OF CORPORATE GROWTH
Published: 5/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb00725.x | Cited by: 36
John Lintner
CORPORATE DEBT DECISIONS: A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Published: 12/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03421.x | Cited by: 4
John Caks
TOWARD A THEORY OF WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Published: 5/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01259.x | Cited by: 23
John Sagan
The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging
Published: 4/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00442 | Cited by: 340
John D. Knopf, Jouahn Nam, John H. Thornton
We use estimates of the Black—Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less.
MONETARY POLICY AND THE FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET
Published: 12/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb04236.x | Cited by: 1
John H. Auten
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE IN CORPORATE SECURITIES: A NEW TECHNIQUE FOR MEASUREMENT*
Published: 3/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00744.x | Cited by: 0
John P. Herzog
Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchases: Dutch Auctions versus Fixed Price Tender Offers
Published: 9/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb02458.x | Cited by: 34
JOHN C. PERSONS
This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross‐sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.
ON BERNOULLI, SHARPE, FINANCIAL RISK AND THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
Published: 6/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01938.x | Cited by: 4
John T. Sennetti
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00508.x | Cited by: 0
John P. Shelton
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION OF MEXICO, 1900 TO 1949*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02490.x | Cited by: 0
John William Simpson
WELLESLEY, A CASE HISTORY IN NEW ENGLAND TOWN FINANCE*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02492.x | Cited by: 0
Alice John Vandermeulen
DEVALUATION: ITS INTERSPATIAL AND INTERTEMPORAL PRICE EFFECTS ON FUTURES MARKETS*
Published: 9/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01434.x | Cited by: 0
John R. Dominguez
THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT*
Published: 6/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00541.x | Cited by: 0
John H. Hand
CONSUMER CREDIT INSURANCE IN NEBRASKA*
Published: 3/1960, Volume: 15, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb04846.x | Cited by: 1
John B. Minick
Resolving the Puzzling Intertemporal Relation between the Market Risk Premium and Conditional Market Variance: A Two‐Factor Approach
Published: 4/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.235793 | Cited by: 330
John T. Scruggs
The existing empirical literature fails to agree on the nature of the intertemporal relation between risk and return. This paper attempts to resolve the issue by estimating a conditional two‐factor model motivated by Merton's intertemporal capital asset pricing model. When long‐term government bond returns are included as a second factor, thepartialrelation between the market risk premium and conditional market variance is found to be positive and significant. The paper also helps explain the convoluted empirical relation between the market risk premium, conditional market variance, and the nominal risk‐free rate previously reported in the literature.
THE STRUCTURE AND ADEQUACY OF WISCONSIN COMMERCIAL BANKING
Published: 12/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01645.x | Cited by: 0
John Robert Pike
Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence
Published: 2/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00103 | Cited by: 541
John R. Graham
A model is developed which implies that if an analyst has high reputation or low ability, or if there is strong public information that is inconsistent with the analyst's private information, she is likely to herd. Herding is also common when informative private signals are positively correlated across analysts. The model is tested using data from analysts who publish investment newsletters. Consistent with the model's implications, the empirical results indicate that a newsletter analyst is likely to herd on
Value Line's
recommendation if her reputation is high, if her ability is low, or if signal correlation is high.
DISCRIMINATION AMONG ECONOMIC MODELS: A BAYESIAN ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATION TO AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR MONEY*
Published: 3/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00640.x | Cited by: 0
John C. Wiginton
MONETARY POLICY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT*
Published: 12/1958, Volume: 13, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04228.x | Cited by: 0
John H. Kareken