The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Model Specification and Risk Premia: Evidence from Futures Options
Published: 05/08/2007 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01241.x
MARK BROADIE, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, MICHAEL JOHANNES
This paper examines model specification issues and estimates diffusive and jump risk premia using S&P futures option prices from 1987 to 2003. We first develop a time series test to detect the presence of jumps in volatility, and find strong evidence in support of their presence. Next, using the cross section of option prices, we find strong evidence for jumps in prices and modest evidence for jumps in volatility based on model fit. The evidence points toward economically and statistically significant jump risk premia, which are important for understanding option returns.
Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
Published: 05/08/2007 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01238.x
MARK BROADIE, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, SURESH SUNDARESAN
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.