The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

AFA members can log in to view full-text articles below.

View past issues


Search the Journal of Finance:






Search results: 9.

Are CEOs Different?

Published: 4/2021,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13019  |  Cited by: 74

STEVEN N. KAPLAN, MORTEN SORENSEN

Using 2,603 executive assessments, we study how CEO candidates differ from candidates for other top management positions, particularly CFOs. More than half of the variation in the 30 assessed characteristics is explained by four factors that we interpret as general ability, execution (vs. interpersonal), charisma (vs. analytical), and strategic (vs. managerial). CEO candidates have more extreme factor scores that differ significantly from those of CFO candidates. Conditional on being considered, candidates with greater general ability and interpersonal skills are more likely to be hired. These and our previous results on CEO success suggest that boards overweight interpersonal skills in hiring CEOs.


Private Equity and Long‐Run Investment: The Case of Innovation

Published: 3/21/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01639.x  |  Cited by: 526

JOSH LERNER, MORTEN SORENSEN, PER STRÖMBERG

A long‐standing controversy is whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) relieve managers from short‐term pressures from public shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves sacrifice long‐term growth to boost short‐term performance. We examine one form of long‐run activity, namely, investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. Based on 472 LBO transactions, we find no evidence that LBOs sacrifice long‐term investments. LBO firm patents are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and become more concentrated in important areas of companies' innovative portfolios.


Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities Matter?

Published: 5/21/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01739.x  |  Cited by: 630

STEVEN N. KAPLAN, MARK M. KLEBANOV, MORTEN SORENSEN

We exploit a unique data set to study individual characteristics of CEO candidates for companies involved in buyout and venture capital transactions and relate these characteristics to subsequent corporate performance. CEO candidates vary along two primary dimensions: one that captures general ability and another that contrasts communication and interpersonal skills with execution skills. We find that subsequent performance is positively related to general ability and execution skills. The findings expand our view of CEO characteristics and types relative to previous studies.


DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05001.x  |  Cited by: 0

ERIC H. SORENSEN


The Impact of Underwriting Method and Bidder Competition Upon Corporate Bond Interest Cost

Published: 9/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03440.x  |  Cited by: 41

ERIC H. SORENSEN


How Smart Is Smart Money? A Two‐Sided Matching Model of Venture Capital

Published: 11/28/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01291.x  |  Cited by: 912

MORTEN SØRENSEN

I find that companies funded by more experienced VCs are more likely to go public. This follows both from the direct influence of more experienced VCs and from sorting in the market, which leads experienced VCs to invest in better companies. Sorting creates an endogeneity problem, but a structural model based on a two‐sided matching model is able to exploit the characteristics of the other agents in the market to separately identify and estimate influence and sorting. Both effects are found to be significant, with sorting almost twice as important as influence for the difference in IPO rates.


The Demand for Preferred Stock with Sinking Funds and Without: A Note

Published: 3/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01107.x  |  Cited by: 2

ERIC H. SORENSEN, CLARK A. HAWKINS


Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Published: 3/18/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12897  |  Cited by: 222

MORTEN BENNEDSEN, FRANCISCO PÉREZ‐GONZÁLEZ, DANIEL WOLFENZON

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm‐CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family‐controlled firms, and in human‐capital‐intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.


Do Firms Respond to Gender Pay Gap Transparency?

Published: 6/3/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13136  |  Cited by: 179

MORTEN BENNEDSEN, ELENA SIMINTZI, MARGARITA TSOUTSOURA, DANIEL WOLFENZON

We examine the effect of pay transparency on the gender pay gap and firm outcomes. Using a 2006 legislation change in Denmark that requires firms to provide gender‐disaggregated wage statistics, detailed employee‐employer administrative data, and difference‐in‐differences and difference‐in‐discontinuities designs, we find that the law reduces the gender pay gap, primarily by slowing wage growth for male employees. The gender pay gap declines by 2 percentage points, or 13% relative to the prelegislation mean. Despite the reduction of the overall wage bill, the wage transparency mandate does not affect firm profitability, likely because of the offsetting effect of reduced firm productivity.