The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management
Published: 05/11/2018 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12696
NICOLAE GÂRLEANU, LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN
We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.
Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management
Published: 05/11/2018 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12696
NICOLAE GÂRLEANU, LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN
We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.
Technological Growth and Asset Pricing
Published: 07/19/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01747.x
NICOLAE GÂRLEANU, STAVROS PANAGEAS, JIANFENG YU
We study the asset‐pricing implications of technological growth in a model with “small,” disembodied productivity shocks and “large,” infrequent technological innovations, which are embodied into new capital vintages. The technological‐adoption process leads to endogenous cycles in output and asset valuations. This process can help explain stylized asset‐valuation patterns around major technological innovations. More importantly, it can help provide a unified, investment‐based theory for numerous well‐documented facts related to excess‐return predictability. To illustrate the distinguishing features of our theory, we highlight novel implications pertaining to the joint time‐series properties of consumption and excess returns.