The Journal of Finance

DISCUSSION

Published: 05/01/1983   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02254.x

ALLAN W. KLEIDON, PAUL PFLEIDERER

Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists

Published: 06/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x

ANAT R. ADMATI, PAUL PFLEIDERER

We derive a role for inside investors, such as venture capitalists, in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem. Absent an inside investor, the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information, and overinvestment may occur. An inside investor, however, always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed‐fraction contract, where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project's payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments. This contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds.

On Timing and Selectivity

Published: 07/01/1986   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04536.x

ANAT R. ADMATI, SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA, PAUL PFLEIDERER, STEPHEN A. ROSS

The dichotomy between timing ability and the ability to select individual assets has been widely used in discussing investment performance measurement. This paper discusses the conceptual and econometric problems associated with defining and measuring timing and selectivity. In defining these notions we attempt to capture their intuitive interpretation. We offer two basic modeling approaches, which we term the portfolio approach and the factor approach. We show how the quality of timing and selectivity information can be identified statistically in a number of simple models, and discuss some of the econometric issues associated with these models. In particular, a simple quadratic regression is shown to be valid in measuring timing information.

The Leverage Ratchet Effect

Published: 10/10/2017   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12588

ANAT R. ADMATI, PETER M. DEMARZO, MARTIN F. HELLWIG, PAUL PFLEIDERER

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.