The Journal of Finance

Bustup Takeovers of Value‐Destroying Diversified Firms

Published: 9/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04066.x  |  Cited by: 147

PHILIP G. BERGER, ELI OFEK

We examine whether the value loss from diversification affects takeover and breakup probabilities. We estimate diversification's value effect by imputing stand‐alone values for individual business segments and find that firms with greater value losses are more likely to be taken over. Moreover, those acquired firms whose losses are greatest are most likely to be bought by LBO associations, which frequently break up their targets. For a subsample of large diversified targets: (1) higher value losses increase the extent of post‐takeover bustup; and (2) post‐takeover bustup generally results in divested divisions being operated as part of a focused, stand‐alone firm.

Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions

Published: 9/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01115.x  |  Cited by: 1170

PHILIP G. BERGER, ELI OFEK, DAVID L. YERMACK

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross‐sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment‐reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.

Portfolio Selection in a “Winner‐Take‐All” Environment

Published: 3/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02082.x  |  Cited by: 0

PAUL D. BERGER, ZVI BODIE

Half Banked: The Economic Impact of Cash Management in the Marijuana Industry

Published: 6/19/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13364  |  Cited by: 4

ELIZABETH A. BERGER, NATHAN SEEGERT

We investigate the economic value of cash management. In the legal marijuana industry, where only half of businesses have access to cash management services from a financial institution, we examine dispensary profitability using administrative and survey data. Our results show that businesses with cash management charge higher retail prices (8.3%), pay lower wholesale prices (7.3%), and have higher sales volume (19%). Together, these advantages create a 40% increase in profitability. These results support our model in which reputational capital and administrative costs drive profitability regardless of whether national banks, credit unions, or fintech provide the cash management functions.

Stimulating Housing Markets

Published: 11/12/2019,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12847  |  Cited by: 86

DAVID BERGER, NICHOLAS TURNER, ERIC ZWICK

We study temporary fiscal stimulus designed to support distressed housing markets by inducing demand from buyers in the private market. Using difference‐in‐differences and regression kink research designs, we find that the First‐Time Homebuyer Credit increased home sales by 490,000 (9.8%), median home prices by $2,400 (1.1%) per standard deviation increase in program exposure, and the transition rate into homeownership by 53%. The policy response did not reverse immediately. Instead, demand comes from several years in the future: induced buyers were three years younger in 2009 than typical first‐time buyers. The program's market‐stabilizing benefits likely exceeded its direct stimulus effects.

THE FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE OF BENEFICIARIES OF PERSONAL LIVING TRUSTS IN PHILADELPHIA, 1920–54*

Published: 9/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00131.x  |  Cited by: 0

Philip Elkin

EVALUATION OF SOME MONEY STOCK FORECASTING MODELS

Published: 12/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03359.x  |  Cited by: 1

Philip Pfaff

Bank and Nonbank Financial Intermediation

Published: 12/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00707.x  |  Cited by: 31

PHILIP BOND

Conglomerates, trade credit arrangements, and banks are all instances of financial intermediation. However, these institutions differ significantly in the extent to which the projects financed absorb aggregate intermediary risk, in whether or not intermediation is carried out by a financial specialist, in the type of projects they fund and in the type of claims they issue to investors. The paper develops a simple unified model that both accounts for the continued coexistence of these different forms of intermediation, and explains why they differ. Specific applications to conglomerate firms, trade credit, and banking are discussed.

THE DEMAND FUNCTION FOR SELECTED LIQUID ASSETS: A TEMPORAL CROSS‐SECTION ANALYSIS*

Published: 9/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02989.x  |  Cited by: 0

Philip B. Hartley

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PERCEPTION OF RISK*

Published: 3/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03242.x  |  Cited by: 11

Philip L. Cooley

THE EFFECTS OF STATE USURY CEILINGS ON SINGLE FAMILY HOMEBUILDING

Published: 3/1974,  Volume: 29,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00038.x  |  Cited by: 11

Philip K. Robins

The Time‐Variance Relationship of Security Returns: Implications for the Return‐Generating Stochastic Process

Published: 6/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb02228.x  |  Cited by: 22

PHILIP R. PERRY

Using a test statistic which specifically allows for parameter shifts over time, we investigate the time‐variance relationship of security returns. The null hypothesis of stationary and independent increments is rejected, and the existence of a complex short‐term reversal phenomenon is reported.

Short Sales Restrictions and Kinks on the Mean Variance Frontier

Published: 3/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03871.x  |  Cited by: 23

PHILIP H. DYBVIG

With a short sales restriction, there may be switching points along the mean variance frontier corresponding to changes in the set of assets held. Traditional wisdom holds that each switching point corresponds to a kink, while Ross has claimed that kinks never occur. This paper shows that the truth lies between the two views, since the efficient frontier may or may not be kinked at a switching point. There is some indication that kinks are rare, since a kink corresponds to a portfolio in which all assets have the same expected return.

Acknowledgement: Kinks on the Mean‐Variance Frontier

Published: 3/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04955.x  |  Cited by: 1

PHILIP H. DYBVIG

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INVESTMENT GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE

Published: 5/1952,  Volume: 7,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01541.x  |  Cited by: 0

Philip D. Bradley

FACTORS DETERMINING ADEQUACY OF CAPITAL IN COMMERCIAL BANKS*

Published: 3/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02969.x  |  Cited by: 0

Philip J. Hahn

EASTERN FINANCE ASSOCIATION CALL FOR PAPERS

Published: 9/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04904.x  |  Cited by: 0

Philip L. Cooley

Wall Street Occupations

Published: 9/3/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12244  |  Cited by: 95

ULF AXELSON, PHILIP BOND

Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”

Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices

Published: 11/12/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12303  |  Cited by: 198

PHILIP BOND, ITAY GOLDSTEIN

Governments intervene in firms' lives in a variety of ways. To enhance the efficiency of government intervention, many researchers and policy makers call for governments to make use of information contained in stock market prices. However, price informativeness is endogenous to government policy. We analyze government policy in light of this endogeneity. In some cases, it is optimal for a government to commit to limit its reliance on market prices to avoid harming the aggregation of information into market prices. For similar reasons, it is optimal for a government to limit transparency in some dimensions.

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Published: 3/9/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00857.x  |  Cited by: 465

EVAN GATEV, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Banks have a unique ability to hedge against market‐wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, banks can insure firms against systematic declines in liquidity at lower cost than other institutions. We provide evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from commercial paper backup lines without running down their holdings of liquid assets. We also provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains these funding flows.

Does Credit Competition Affect Small‐Firm Finance?

Published: 5/7/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01555.x  |  Cited by: 610

TARA RICE, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

While relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion permitted banking organizations to expand across state lines, it allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion. These differences in states' branching restrictions affect credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Firms in open states also are more likely to borrow from banks. Despite this evidence that interstate branch openness expands credit supply, we find  no effect  of variation in state restrictions on branching on the amount that small firms borrow.

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations

Published: 3/13/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01451.x  |  Cited by: 380

ELENA LOUTSKINA, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Low‐cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.

How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans

Published: 11/28/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01293.x  |  Cited by: 942

JUN QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Legal and institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. We show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and tangibility of assets. Foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic banks as creditor protection falls. Our multidimensional empirical model paints a more complete picture of how financial contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment than existing studies.

Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets

Published: 1/20/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00841.x  |  Cited by: 644

NICOLA CETORELLI, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of nonfinancial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. The empirical evidence, however, strongly supports the idea that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets in which banking is more competitive.

Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual‐to‐Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress

Published: 9/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04070.x  |  Cited by: 48

RANDALL S. KROSZNER, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual‐to‐stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital‐impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.

Tax Clienteles and Asset Pricing

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04540.x  |  Cited by: 28

PHILIP H. DYBVIG, STEPHEN A. ROSS

Taxation of asset returns can create various clientele effects. If every agent is marginal on all assets, no clientele effects arise. If some (but not every) agent is marginal on all assets, there arises a clientele effect in quantities but none in prices. If no agent is marginal on all assets, there arise clientele effects in both quantities and prices. In the first two cases, standard asset pricing and martingale results extend to analogous aftertax results. In the third case, linear asset pricing works only on subsets of assets, and the standard martingale results become after‐tax supermartingale results.

Yes, The APT Is Testable

Published: 9/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02370.x  |  Cited by: 73

PHILIP H. DYBVIG, STEPHEN A. ROSS

The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) has been proposed as an alternative to the mean‐variance Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This paper considers the testability of the APT and points out the irrelevance for testing of the approximation error. We refute Shanken's objections, including his assertion that Roll's critique of the CAPM is applicable to the APT. We also explain the testability of the APT on subsets, and we explore the relationship between the APT and the CAPM.

The Empirical Implications of the Cox, Ingersoll, Ross Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04523.x  |  Cited by: 213

STEPHEN J. BROWN, PHILIP H. DYBVIG

The one‐factor version of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model of the term structure is estimated using monthly quotes on U.S. Treasury issues trading from 1952 through 1983. Using data from a single yield curve, it is possible to estimate implied short and long term zero coupon rates and the implied variance of changes in short rates. Analysis of residuals points to a probable neglected tax effect.

On The Direction of Preference for Moments of Higher Order Than The Variance

Published: 9/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03509.x  |  Cited by: 548

ROBERT C. SCOTT, PHILIP A. HORVATH

Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability

Published: 12/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00513  |  Cited by: 816

Sandra E. Black, Philip E. Strahan

The literature is divided on the expected effects of increased competition and consolidation in the financial sector on the supply of credit to relationship borrowers. This paper tests whether policy changes fostering competition and consolidation in U.S. banking helped or harmed entrepreneurs. We find that the rate of new incorporations increases following deregulation of branching restrictions, and that deregulation reduces the negative effect of concentration on new incorporations. We also find the formation of new incorporations increases as the share of small banks decreases, suggesting that diversification benefits of size outweigh the possible comparative advantage small banks may have in forging relationships.

The Analytics of Performance Measurement Using a Security Market Line

Published: 6/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04964.x  |  Cited by: 66

PHILIP H. DYBVIG, STEPHEN A. ROSS

Security market line (SML) analysis, while an important tool, has never been fully justified from a theoretical standpoint. Assuming symmetric information and an inefficient index, we show that SML analysis can be grossly misleading, since, in general, efficient and inefficient portfolios can plot above and below the SML. On a more positive note, if SML analysis uses the return on a marketed riskless asset for the zero‐beta rate, efficient portfolios must plot above the SML. Nonetheless, arbitrarily inefficient portfolios also plot above the SML.

Differential Information and Performance Measurement Using a Security Market Line

Published: 6/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04963.x  |  Cited by: 194

PHILIP H. DYBVIG, STEPHEN A. ROSS

An uninformed observer using the tools of mean variance and security market line analysis to measure the performance of a portfolio manager who has superior information is unlikely to be able to make any reliable inferences. While some positive results of a very limited nature are possible, e.g., when there is a riskless asset or when information is restricted to be “security specific,” in general anything is possible. In particular, a manager with superior information can appear to the observer to be below or above the security market line and inside or outside of the mean‐variance efficient frontier, and any combination of these is possible.

Testing Market Efficiency: Evidence From The NFL Sports Betting Market

Published: 9/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01129.x  |  Cited by: 144

PHILIP K. GRAY, STEPHEN F. GRAY

This article examines the efficiency of the National Football League (NFL) betting market. The standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression methodology is replaced by a probit model. This circumvents potential econometric problems, and allows us to implement more sophisticated betting strategies where bets are placed only when there is a relatively high probability of success. In‐sample tests indicate that probit‐based betting strategies generate statistically significant profits. Whereas the profitability of a number of these betting strategies is confirmed by out‐of‐sample testing, there is some inconsistency among the remaining out‐of‐sample predictions. Our results also suggest that widely documented inefficiencies in this market tend to dissipate over time.

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

Published: 11/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01781.x  |  Cited by: 94

GIOVANNI FAVARA, ENRIQUE SCHROTH, PHILIP VALTA

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.

Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy

Published: 4/14/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12896  |  Cited by: 80

FABIO SCHIANTARELLI, MASSIMILIANO STACCHINI, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Italian firms delay payment to banks weakened by past loan losses. Exploiting Credit Register data, we fully absorb borrower fundamentals with firm‐quarter effects. Identification therefore reflects firm choices to delay payment to some banks, depending on their health. This selective delay occurs more where legal enforcement of collateral recovery is slow. Poor enforcement encourages borrowers not to pay when the value of their bank relationship comes into doubt. Selective delays occur even by firms able to pay all lenders. Credit losses in Italy have thus been worsened by the combination of weak banks and weak legal enforcement.

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

Published: 11/10/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00820.x  |  Cited by: 277

ALLEN N. BERGER, MARCO A. ESPINOSA‐VEGA, W. SCOTT FRAME, NATHAN H. MILLER

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

Exporting Liquidity: Branch Banking and Financial Integration

Published: 5/11/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12387  |  Cited by: 383

ERIK P. GILJE, ELENA LOUTSKINA, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Using exogenous liquidity windfalls from oil and natural gas shale discoveries, we demonstrate that bank branch networks help integrate U.S. lending markets. Banks exposed to shale booms enjoy liquidity inflows, which increase their capacity to originate and hold new loans. Exposed banks increase mortgage lending in nonboom counties, but only where they have branches and only for hard‐to‐securitize mortgages. Our findings suggest that contracting frictions limit the ability of arm's length finance to integrate credit markets fully. Branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration, despite the development of securitization markets.

Funding Liquidity without Banks: Evidence from a Shock to the Cost of Very Short‐Term Debt

Published: 7/29/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12832  |  Cited by: 31

FELIPE RESTREPO, LINA CARDONA‐SOSA, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.

The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending

Published: 7/23/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12251  |  Cited by: 177

JUN (QJ) QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN, ZHISHU YANG

In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.

Contingent Claims Analysis of Corporate Capital Structures: an Empirical Investigation

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03649.x  |  Cited by: 502

E. PHILIP JONES, SCOTT P. MASON, ERIC ROSENFELD

Evidence of Financial Leverage Clienteles

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02287.x  |  Cited by: 13

JOHN M. HARRIS, RODNEY L. ROENFELDT, PHILIP L. COOLEY

Merging Markets

Published: 6/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00137  |  Cited by: 87

Tom Arnold, Philip Hersch, J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry Netter

AbstractWe study the causes and effects of the competition for order flow by U.S. regional stock exchanges. We trace the origins of competition for order flow to a change in the role of regional exchanges from being venues for listing local securities to being more direct competitors for the order flow of NYSE listings. We study the way regionals competed for order flow, concentrating on a series of stock‐exchange mergers that occurred in the midst of this transition of the regional exchanges. The merging exchanges attracted market share and experienced narrower bid‐ask spreads.

Contributing Authors and Institutions to the Journal of Finance: 1946–1985

Published: 12/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb02535.x  |  Cited by: 46

J. LOUIS HECK, PHILIP L. COOLEY, CARL M. HUBBARD

Publication of the December 1985 issue of the Journal of Finance completed the Journal's first 40 years of contributions to the profession. This study identifies and summarizes the contributing authors, where they earned their doctoral degrees, and their employers at the time of publication. The authors, degree‐granting institutions, and employers appearing most frequently in the Journal are ordered for the entire 40‐year period and for various subperiods. Where possible, the present findings are compared with those of previously published studies.

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1963,  Volume: 18,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb00717.x  |  Cited by: 0

Hal B. Lary, Philip W. Bell, Roy L. Reierson

Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs

Published: 7/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05103.x  |  Cited by: 57

JAMES R. BARTH, PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, MICHAEL G. BRADLEY

This paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980–1988. A simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution. This model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies. The empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s. This evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator's closure rule. Our econometric evidence, moreover, is consistent with the hypothesis that, for troubled institutions, tangible net worth systematically understates market‐value net worth. In addition, the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed.

Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage‐Backed Securities

Published: 11/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01782.x  |  Cited by: 194

JIE (JACK) HE, JUN (QJ) QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN

Initial yields on both AAA‐rated and non‐AAA rated mortgage‐backed security (MBS) tranches sold by large issuers are higher than yields on similar tranches sold by small issuers during the market boom years of 2004 to 2006. Moreover, the prices of MBS sold by large issuers drop more than those sold by small issuers, and the differences are concentrated among tranches issued during 2004 to 2006. These results suggest that investors price the risk that large issuers received more inflated ratings than small issuers, especially during boom periods.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 111

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.