The Journal of Finance

The International Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Published: 5/21/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01737.x  |  Cited by: 513

PHILIPP SCHNABL

I exploit the 1998 Russian default as a negative liquidity shock to international banks and analyze its transmission to Peru. I find that after the shock international banks reduce bank‐to‐bank lending to Peruvian banks and Peruvian banks reduce lending to Peruvian firms. The effect is strongest for domestically owned banks that borrow internationally, intermediate for foreign‐owned banks, and weakest for locally funded banks. I control for credit demand by examining firms that borrow from several banks. These results suggest that international banks transmit liquidity shocks across countries and that negative liquidity shocks reduce bank lending in affected countries.

Efficient Recapitalization

Published: 1/11/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01793.x  |  Cited by: 151

THOMAS PHILIPPON, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We analyze government interventions to recapitalize a banking sector that restricts lending to firms because of debt overhang. We find that the efficient recapitalization program injects capital against preferred stock plus warrants and conditions implementation on sufficient bank participation. Preferred stock plus warrants reduces opportunistic participation by banks that do not require recapitalization, although conditional implementation limits free riding by banks that benefit from lower credit risk because of other banks’ participation. Efficient recapitalization is profitable if the benefits of lower aggregate credit risk exceed the cost of implicit transfers to bank debt holders.

A Model of Monetary Policy and Risk Premia

Published: 7/26/2017,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12539  |  Cited by: 221

ITAMAR DRECHSLER, ALEXI SAVOV, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We develop a dynamic asset pricing model in which monetary policy affects the risk premium component of the cost of capital. Risk‐tolerant agents (banks) borrow from risk‐averse agents (i.e., take deposits) to fund levered investments. Leverage exposes banks to funding risk, which they insure by holding liquidity buffers. By changing the nominal rate the central bank influences the liquidity premium, and hence the cost of taking leverage. Lower nominal rates make liquidity cheaper and raise leverage, resulting in lower risk premia and higher asset prices, volatility, investment, and growth. We analyze forward guidance, a “Greenspan put,” and the yield curve.

Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence from Exporting Firms

Published: 6/20/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13254  |  Cited by: 165

DANIEL PARAVISINI, VERONICA RAPPOPORT, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We develop a novel approach for measuring bank specialization using granular data on borrower activities and apply it to Peruvian exporters and their banks. We find that borrowers seek credit from banks that specialize in their export destinations, both when expanding exports and when exporting to new countries. Firms experiencing country‐specific export demand shocks adjust borrowing disproportionately from specialized banks. Specialized bank credit supply shocks affect exports disproportionately to countries of specialization. Our results demonstrate that firm credit demand is bank‐ and activity‐specific, which reduces banking competition and affects the transmission and amplification of shocks through the banking sector.

Banking on Deposits: Maturity Transformation without Interest Rate Risk

Published: 4/6/2021,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13013  |  Cited by: 347

ITAMAR DRECHSLER, ALEXI SAVOV, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We show that maturity transformation does not expose banks to interest rate risk—it hedges it. The reason is the deposit franchise, which allows banks to pay deposit rates that are low and insensitive to market interest rates. Hedging the deposit franchise requires banks to earn income that is also insensitive, that is, to lend long term at fixed rates. As predicted by this theory, we show that banks closely match the interest rate sensitivities of their interest income and expense, and that this insulates their equity from interest rate shocks. Our results explain why banks supply long‐term credit.

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

Published: 11/10/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12206  |  Cited by: 757

VIRAL ACHARYA, ITAMAR DRECHSLER, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.

Deposit Franchise Runs

Published: 4/7/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70034  |  Cited by: 12

ITAMAR DRECHSLER, ALEXI SAVOV, PHILIPP SCHNABL, OLIVIER WANG

The deposit franchise is valuable because banks pay below‐market deposit rates. However, if depositors leave, its value vanishes. This can trigger runs by uninsured depositors, even if banks hold fully liquid assets. Because the franchise value increases with interest rates, runs are more harmful, and hence likelier, when rates are high. Banks can deter runs by shortening asset duration, but this risks insolvency if rates fall. Avoiding both runs and insolvency requires capital covering the potential loss of the uninsured deposit franchise. We estimate deposit franchise values and use them to identify vulnerable banks during the 2023 regional bank crisis.

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

Published: 9/14/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12421  |  Cited by: 213

ITAMAR DRECHSLER, THOMAS DRECHSEL, DAVID MARQUES‐IBANEZ, PHILIPP SCHNABL

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.

Ambiguous Information, Portfolio Inertia, and Excess Volatility

Published: 11/14/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01693.x  |  Cited by: 156

PHILIPP KARL ILLEDITSCH

I study the effects of risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) on optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive information that is difficult to link to fundamentals. I show that the desire of investors to hedge ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia and excess volatility. Specifically, when news is surprising, investors may not react to price changes even if there are no transaction costs or other market frictions. Moreover, I show that small shocks to cash flow news, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in the stock price and hence to excess volatility.

The WACC Fallacy: The Real Effects of Using a Unique Discount Rate

Published: 5/11/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12250  |  Cited by: 134

PHILIPP KRÜGER, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, DAVID THESMAR

In this paper, we test whether firms properly adjust for risk in their capital budgeting decisions. If managers use a single discount rate within firms, we expect that conglomerates underinvest (overinvest) in relatively safe (risky) divisions. We measure division relative risk as the difference between the division's asset beta and a firm‐wide beta. We establish a robust and significant positive relationship between division‐level investment and division relative risk. Next, we measure the value loss due to this behavior in the context of acquisitions. When the bidder's beta is lower than that of the target, announcement returns are significantly lower.

Information Inertia

Published: 10/21/2020,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12979  |  Cited by: 41

PHILIPP K. ILLEDITSCH, JAYANT V. GANGULI, SCOTT CONDIE

We show that aversion to risk and ambiguity leads to information inertia when investors process public news about assets. Optimal portfolios do not always depend on news that is worse than expected; hence, the equilibrium stock price does not reflect this bad news. This informational inefficiency is more severe when there is more risk and ambiguity but disappears when investors are risk‐neutral or the news is about idiosyncratic risk. Information inertia leads to news momentum (e.g., after earnings announcements) and is consistent with low household trading activity. An ambiguity premium helps explain the macro and earnings announcement premium.

ESG News, Future Cash Flows, and Firm Value

Published: 9/30/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13498  |  Cited by: 64

FRANÇOIS DERRIEN, PHILIPP KRÜGER, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, TIANHAO YAO

We investigate the expected consequences of negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news on firms' future profits. After learning about negative ESG news, analysts significantly downgrade their forecasts at short and longer horizons. Negative ESG news affects forecasts more strongly at longer horizons than other types of negative corporate news. The negative revisions of earnings forecasts following negative ESG news largely reflect expectations of lower future sales, rather than higher future costs. Quantitatively, forecast revisions can explain most of the negative impacts of ESG news on firm value. Analysts are correct to revise forecasts downward following negative ESG news.

Sticky Expectations and the Profitability Anomaly

Published: 10/31/2018,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12734  |  Cited by: 262

JEAN‐PHILIPPE BOUCHAUD, PHILIPP KRÜGER, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, DAVID THESMAR

We propose a theory of the “profitability” anomaly. In our model, investors forecast future profits using a signal and sticky belief dynamics. In this model, past profits forecast future returns (the profitability anomaly). Using analyst forecast data, we measure expectation stickiness at the firm level and find strong support for three additional model predictions: (1) analysts are on average too pessimistic regarding the future profits of high‐profit firms, (2) the profitability anomaly is stronger for stocks that are followed by stickier analysts, and (3) the profitability anomaly is stronger for stocks with more persistent profits.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 111

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.