The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Discussion
Published: 05/01/1979 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02095.x
REX THOMPSON
Empirical Estimates of Beta When Investors Face Estimation Risk
Published: 06/01/1990 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03697.x
PETER M. CLARKSON, REX THOMPSON
We examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. We find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.
Merger Negotiations with Stock Market Feedback
Published: 02/20/2014 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12151
SANDRA BETTON, B. ESPEN ECKBO, REX THOMPSON, KARIN S. THORBURN
Do preoffer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present model‐based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies. Rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target runups and markups (offer value minus runup) that is greater than minus one‐for‐one and inherently nonlinear. If merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup—a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies—markups become strictly increasing in runups. Large‐sample tests support rational deal anticipation in runups while rejecting the costly feedback loop.