The Journal of Finance

Share Issuance and Factor Timing

Published: 03/27/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01730.x

ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL G. HANSON

We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML), size (i.e., SMB), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.

Catering through Nominal Share Prices

Published: 11/25/2009   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01511.x

MALCOLM BAKER, ROBIN GREENWOOD, JEFFREY WURGLER

We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuations on low‐price firms, managers respond by supplying shares at lower price levels, and vice versa. We confirm these predictions in time‐series and firm‐level data using several measures of time‐varying catering incentives. More generally, the results provide unusually clean evidence that catering influences corporate decisions, because the process of targeting nominal share prices is not well explained by alternative theories.

A Gap‐Filling Theory of Corporate Debt Maturity Choice

Published: 05/07/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01559.x

ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL HANSON, JEREMY C. STEIN

We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short‐term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long‐term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher and (2) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory sheds new light on market timing phenomena in corporate finance more generally.

A Comparative‐Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity

Published: 02/06/2015   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12253

ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL G. HANSON, JEREMY C. STEIN

We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short‐term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short‐term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short‐term money‐like claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of short‐term debt.

Predictable Financial Crises

Published: 01/27/2022   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13105

ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL G. HANSON, ANDREI SHLEIFER, JAKOB AHM SØRENSEN

Using historical data on postwar financial crises around the world, we show that the combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth is elevated. Our evidence challenges the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and supports the Kindleberger‐Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom‐bust credit cycles. This predictability favors policies that lean against incipient credit‐market booms.