The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Search results: 5.
Expectations and the Cross‐Section of Stock Returns
Published: 12/01/1996 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05223.x
RAFAEL LA PORTA
Previous research has shown that stocks with low prices relative to book value, cash flow, earnings, or dividends (that is, value stocks) earn high returns. Value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky. Alternatively, systematic errors in expectations may explain the high returns earned by value stocks. I test for the existence of systematic errors using survey data on forecasts by stock market analysts. I show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme.
Government Ownership of Banks
Published: 12/17/2002 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00422
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports “political” theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Good News for Value Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency
Published: 04/18/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04825.x
RAFAEL LA PORTA, JOSEF LAKONISHOK, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT VISHNY
This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so‐called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a 5‐year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk‐based explanation for the return differential.
Diagnostic Expectations and Stock Returns
Published: 07/06/2019 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12833
PEDRO BORDALO, NICOLA GENNAIOLI, RAFAEL LA PORTA, ANDREI SHLEIFER
We revisit La Porta's finding that returns on stocks with the most optimistic analyst long‐term earnings growth forecasts are lower than those on stocks with the most pessimistic forecasts. We document the joint dynamics of fundamentals, expectations, and returns of these portfolios, and explain the facts using a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic. Analysts forecast fundamentals from observed earnings growth, but overreact to news by exaggerating the probability of states that have become more likely. We find support for the model's predictions. A quantitative estimation of the model accounts for the key patterns in the data.
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
Published: 03/31/2007 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00199
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome model,” dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the “substitute model,” insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.