Search results: 50.
The Impact of Preferred‐for‐Common Exchange Offers on Firm Value
Published: 9/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04549.x | Cited by: 22
J. MICHAEL PINEGAR, RONALD C. LEASE
This paper examines the impact of capital structure changes which have no corporate tax consequences. Specifically, exchange offers involving preferred and common stock are analyzed. We find that systematic changes in firm value occur when companies announce preferred‐for‐common exchange offers. Consequently, we interpret our results to be consistent with a signalling hypothesis. We also find weaker evidence suggesting the existence of agency cost effects or wealth redistributions across security classes. Our findings imply that capital structure changes need not alter the tax status of the issuing firm to affect firm value.
An Investigation of Market Microstructure Impacts on Event Study Returns
Published: 9/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04629.x | Cited by: 108
RONALD C. LEASE, RONALD W. MASULIS, JOHN R. PAGE
We investigate the importance of bid‐ask spread‐induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. We document significant negative return biases on the offering day which explain a large portion of the negative event date return documented in the literature. Buy‐sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.
THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR: ATTRIBUTES AND ATTITUDES
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03055.x | Cited by: 110
Ronald C. Lease, Wilbur G. Lewellen, Gary G. Schlarbaum
THE COMMON‐STOCK‐PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE RECORD OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS: 1964–70
Published: 5/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb04859.x | Cited by: 39
Gary G. Schlarbaum, Wilbur G. Lewellen, Ronald C. Lease
INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR RISK AVERSION AND INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
Published: 5/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01834.x | Cited by: 272
Richard A. Cohn, Wilbur G. Lewellen, Ronald C. Lease, Gary G. Schlarbaum
SOME DIRECT EVIDENCE ON THE DIVIDEND CLIENTELE PHENOMENON
Published: 12/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03427.x | Cited by: 70
Wilbur G. Lewellen, Kenneth L. Stanley, Ronald C. Lease, Gary G. Schlarbaum
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01803.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald Forbes
A FACTOR ANALYTIC APPROACH TO AN EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF MONEY
Published: 9/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01023.x | Cited by: 2
Ronald S. Koot
INCOME VELOCITY AND COMMERCIAL BANK PORTFOLIOS
Published: 12/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03369.x | Cited by: 1
Ronald J. Sutherland
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK: COMMENT
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00596.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald W. Melicher
Endogenous Marginal Income Tax Rates, Investor Behavior and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
Published: 6/1979, Volume: 34, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02128.x | Cited by: 4
RONALD F. SINGER
A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY
Published: 5/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00768.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald L. Teigen
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM
Published: 12/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00270.x | Cited by: 26
Ronald F. Wippern
ON ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN CREDIT UNIONS
Published: 9/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02049.x | Cited by: 24
Ronald S. Koot
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03679.x | Cited by: 0
RONALD W. MASULIS
SUBSIDIES TO INDUSTRY AND ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO REDUCE REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT*
Published: 9/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00857.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald B. Gold
PROFIT PLANNING IN COMMERCIAL BANKS*
Published: 9/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00264.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald L. Olson
EARNINGS VARIABILITY, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM*
Published: 12/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02902.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald Frank Wippeen
A NOTE ON FINANCING MERGERS WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
Published: 6/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01721.x | Cited by: 1
C. Ronald Sprecher
The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some Estimates
Published: 3/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03629.x | Cited by: 184
RONALD W. MASULIS
This study develops a model based on current corporate finance theories which explains stock returns associated with the announcement of issuer exchange offers. The major independent variables are changes in leverage multiplied by senior security claims outstanding and changes in debt tax shields. Parameter estimates are statistically significant and consistent in sign and relative magnitude with model predictions. Overall, 55 percent of the variance in stock announcement period returns is explained. The evidence is consistent with tax‐based theories of optimal capital structure, a positive debt level information effect, and leverage‐induced wealth transfers across security classes.
SIGNIFICANCE OF DUMMY VARIABLES: REPLY
Published: 6/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00825.x | Cited by: 0
Ronald F. Wippern
Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02159.x | Cited by: 142
RONALD W. MASULIS
ON THE ST. LOUIS EQUATION AND AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF THE MONEY SUPPLY
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01999.x | Cited by: 1
Ronald S. Koot
THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL: SOME QUESTIONS ON ITS DEFINITION, INTERPRETATION, AND USE: COMMENT
Published: 6/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01861.x | Cited by: 1
Ted Bloomfield, Ronald Ma
Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans
Published: 9/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04765.x | Cited by: 151
RONALD BEST, HANG ZHANG
This paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements. We differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts' percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions. The empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts. If these other indicators are reliable and signal‐improving prospects, banks do little further investigation. However, if the indicators are noisy and signal‐declining prospects, banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers, resulting in the production of valuable information.
Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
Published: 5/23/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x | Cited by: 316
RONALD W. MASULIS, SHAWN MOBBS
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.
The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and Acquisitions
Published: 5/3/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00764.x | Cited by: 551
MARA FACCIO, RONALD W. MASULIS
We study merger and acquisition (M&A) payment choices of European bidders for publicly and privately held targets in the 1997–2000 period. Europe is an ideal venue for studying the importance of corporate governance in making M&A payment choices, given the large number of closely held firms and the wide range of capital markets, institutional settings, laws, and regulations. The tradeoff between corporate governance concerns and debt financing constraints is found to have a large bearing on the bidder's payment choice. Consistent with earlier evidence, we find that several deal and target characteristics significantly affect the method of payment choice.
Leverage and Dividend Irrelevancy Under Corporate and Personal Taxation
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02176.x | Cited by: 77
HARRY DeANGELO, RONALD W. MASULIS
FLOW AND STOCK EQUILIBRIUM IN A DYNAMIC METZLER MODEL*
Published: 12/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb03216.x | Cited by: 1
William H. Branson, Ronald L. Teigen
A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behavior
Published: 6/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05049.x | Cited by: 44
RONALD M. GIAMMARINO, ROBERT L. HEINKEL
Several observed features of takeover contests appear to be inconsistent with value‐maximizing behavior on the part of the agents involved. For instance, managers occasionally resist takeover bids, presumably in order to facilitate competition among bidders. However, counterbids do not always materialize, suggesting that management resistance was not in the best interests of the firm's shareholders. On the other hand, a successful takeover is sometimes accompanied by a decrease in the value of the acquirer's shares. In addition, valuable combinations are occasionally not consummated.We present a simple illustration of sequential takeover bidding in which all managers act in the best interests of their respective shareholders. Within the context of this model, we provide an explanation of the type of behavior described above.
Mean Reversion across National Stock Markets and Parametric Contrarian Investment Strategies
Published: 4/2000, Volume: 55, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00225 | Cited by: 289
Ronald Balvers, Yangru Wu, Erik Gilliland
For U.S. stock prices, evidence of mean reversion over long horizons is mixed, possibly due to lack of a reliable long time series. Using additional cross‐sectional power gained from national stock index data of 18 countries during the period 1969 to 1996, we find strong evidence of mean reversion in relative stock index prices. Our findings imply a significantly positive speed of reversion with a half‐life of three to three and one‐half years. This result is robust to alternative specifications and data. Parametric contrarian investment strategies that fully exploit mean reversion across national indexes outperform buy‐and‐hold and standard contrarian strategies.
VALUATION CONSEQUENCES OF CASH TENDER OFFERS
Published: 5/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb04864.x | Cited by: 63
Donald R. Kummer, J. Ronald Hoffmeister
THE PERFORMANCE OF CONGLOMERATE FIRMS: RECENT RISK AND RETURN EXPERIENCE
Published: 5/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01781.x | Cited by: 49
Ronald W. Melicher, David F. Rush
Changes in Federal Reserve Membership: A Risk‐Return Profitability Analysis
Published: 9/1979, Volume: 34, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03451.x | Cited by: 0
LOUIS J. D'ANTONIO, RONALD W. MELICHER
EVIDENCE ON THE ACQUISITION‐RELATED PERFORMANCE OF CONGLOMERATE FIRMS
Published: 3/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00030.x | Cited by: 25
Ronald W. Melicher, David F. Rush
Defensive Mechanisms and Managerial Discretion
Published: 9/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01117.x | Cited by: 8
RONALD GIAMMARINO, ROBERT HEINKEL, BURTON HOLLIFIELD
We study a model where firms may possess free cash flow and takeovers may be disruptive. We show that the possibility of a takeover, combined with defensive mechanisms and the ability to pay greenmail, can solve the free cash flow problem in an efficient way. The payment of greenmail reveals information that generates a stock price decline that exceeds the value of the greenmail payment, even though the payment of greenmail is value maximizing. Optimal defensive measures limit takeover attempts if the target stock price is too low. We also provide cross‐sectional implications of the analysis.
Hedging and Joint Production: Theory and Illustrations
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02180.x | Cited by: 115
RONALD W. ANDERSON, JEAN‐PIERRE DANTHINE
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
Published: 5/6/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00567 | Cited by: 3997
Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb
AbstractWe investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.
SYSTEMATIC RISK, FINANCIAL DATA, AND BOND RATING RELATIONSHIPS IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03067.x | Cited by: 9
Ronald W. Melicher, David F. Rush
DETERMINING AN OPTIMAL CAPITAL STANDARD FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY
Published: 9/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03325.x | Cited by: 39
Anthony M. Santomero, Ronald D. Watson
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE WARRANT PRICES
Published: 12/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03127.x | Cited by: 1
David F. Rush, Ronald W. Melicher
Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies
Published: 7/16/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01477.x | Cited by: 515
RONALD W. MASULIS, CONG WANG, FEI XIE
Using a sample of U.S. dual‐class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value‐destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
Published: 8/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x | Cited by: 1459
RONALD W. MASULIS, CONG WANG, FEI XIE
We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.
Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order Market
Published: 9/16/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00795.x | Cited by: 316
RONALD L. GOETTLER, CHRISTINE A. PARLOUR, UDAY RAJAN
We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov‐perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform comparative dynamics. Conditional on a transaction, the midpoint of the quoted prices is not a good proxy for the true value. Further, transaction costs paid by market order submitters are negative on average, and negatively correlated with the effective spread. Reducing the tick size is not Pareto improving but increases total investor surplus.
Family‐Controlled Firms and Informed Trading: Evidence from Short Sales
Published: 1/17/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01714.x | Cited by: 192
RONALD C. ANDERSON, DAVID M. REEB, WANLI ZHAO
We investigate the relation between organization structure and the information content of short sales, focusing on founder‐ and heir‐controlled firms. Our analysis indicates that family‐controlled firms experience substantially higher abnormal short sales prior to negative earnings shocks than nonfamily firms. Supplementary testing indicates that family control characteristics intensify informed short selling. Further analysis suggests that daily short‐sale interest in family firms contains useful information in forecasting stock returns; however, we find no discernable effect for nonfamily firms. This analysis provides compelling evidence that informed trading via short sales occurs more readily in family firms than in nonfamily firms.
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
Published: 12/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x | Cited by: 2025
MARA FACCIO, RONALD W. MASULIS, JOHN J. McCONNELL
We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed‐out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.
Predicting Stock Returns in an Efficient Market
Published: 9/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02429.x | Cited by: 227
RONALD J. BALVERS, THOMAS F. COSIMANO, BILL MCDONALD
An intertemporal general equilibrium model relates financial asset returns to movements in aggregate output. The model is a standard neoclassical growth model with serial correlation in aggregate output. Changes in aggregate output lead to attempts by agents to smooth consumption, which affects the required rate of return on financial assets. Since aggregate output is serially correlated and hence predictable, the theory suggests that stock returns can be predicted based on rational forecasts of output. The empirical results confirm that stock returns are a predictable function of aggregate output and also support the accompanying implications of the model.
The Information Content of Municipal Bond Rating Changes: A Note
Published: 6/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02514.x | Cited by: 75
ROBERT W. INGRAM, LEROY D. BROOKS, RONALD M. COPELAND*