Search results: 50.
Johannes Stroebel: Winner of the 2023 Fischer Black Prize
Published: 9/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13269 | Cited by: 0
STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH
Information Immobility and the Home Bias Puzzle
Published: 5/20/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01462.x | Cited by: 725
STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, LAURA VELDKAMP
Many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can. But why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry? We model investors, endowed with a small home information advantage, who choose what information to learn before they invest. Surprisingly, even when home investors can learn what foreigners know, they choose not to: Investors profit more from knowing information others do not know. Learning amplifies information asymmetry. The model matches patterns of local and industry bias, foreign investments, portfolio outperformance, and asset prices. Finally, we propose new avenues for empirical research.
Out‐of‐Town Home Buyers and City Welfare
Published: 6/3/2021, Volume: 76, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13057 | Cited by: 72
JACK FAVILUKIS, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH
Many cities have attracted a flurry of out‐of‐town (OOT) home buyers. Such capital inflows affect house prices, rents, construction, labor income, wealth, and ultimately welfare. We develop an equilibrium model to quantify the welfare effects of OOT home buyers for the typical U.S. metropolitan area. When OOT investors buy 10% of the housing in the city center and 5% in the suburbs, welfare among residents falls by 0.61% in consumption‐equivalent units. House prices and rents rise substantially, resulting in welfare gains for owners and losses for renters. Policies that tax OOT buyers or mandate renting out vacant property mitigate welfare losses.
Valuing Private Equity Investments Strip by Strip
Published: 8/23/2021, Volume: 76, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13073 | Cited by: 98
ARPIT GUPTA, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH
We propose a new valuation method for private equity (PE) investments. It constructs a replicating portfolio using cash flows on listed equity and fixed‐income instruments (strips). It then values the strips using an asset pricing model that captures the risk in the cross‐section of bonds and equity factors. The method delivers a risk‐adjusted profit on each PE investment and a time series for the expected return on each fund category. We find negative risk‐adjusted profits for the average PE fund, with substantial heterogeneity and some persistence in the performance. Expected returns and risk‐adjusted profit decline in the later part of the sample.
Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance, and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perspective
Published: 5/3/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00759.x | Cited by: 427
HANNO N. LUSTIG, STIJN G. VAN NIEUWERBURGH
In a model with housing collateral, the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth shifts the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. A decrease in house prices reduces the collateral value of housing, increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and increases the conditional market price of risk. Using aggregate data for the United States, we find that a decrease in the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth predicts higher returns on stocks. Conditional on this ratio, the covariance of returns with aggregate risk factors explains 80% of the cross‐sectional variation in annual size and book‐to‐market portfolio returns.
Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill
Published: 7/18/2014, Volume: 69, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12084 | Cited by: 517
MARCIN KACPERCZYK, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, LAURA VELDKAMP
We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.
Health and Mortality Delta: Assessing the Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice
Published: 3/18/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12273 | Cited by: 112
RALPH S.J. KOIJEN, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, MOTOHIRO YOGO
We develop a pair of risk measures, health and mortality delta, for the universe of life and health insurance products. A life‐cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products. We estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance, annuities including private pensions, and long‐term care insurance in the Health and Retirement Study. For the median household aged 51 to 57, the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3.2% of total wealth.
Financial Fragility with SAM?
Published: 12/11/2020, Volume: 76, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12992 | Cited by: 36
DANIEL L. GREENWALD, TIM LANDVOIGT, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH
Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) feature mortgage payments that adjust with house prices. They are designed to stave off borrower default by providing payment relief when house prices fall. Some argue that SAMs may help prevent the next foreclosure crisis. However, home owners' gains from payment relief are mortgage lenders' losses. A general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries channel savings from saver to borrower households shows that indexation of mortgage payments to aggregate house prices increases financial fragility, reduces risk‐sharing, and leads to expensive financial sector bailouts. In contrast, indexation to local house prices reduces financial fragility and improves risk‐sharing.
The Joy of Giving or Assisted Living? Using Strategic Surveys to Separate Public Care Aversion from Bequest Motives
Published: 3/21/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01641.x | Cited by: 257
JOHN AMERIKS, ANDREW CAPLIN, STEVEN LAUFER, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH
The “annuity puzzle,” conveying the apparently low interest of retirees in longevity insurance, is central to household finance. Two possible explanations are “public care aversion” (PCA), retiree aversion to simultaneously running out of wealth and being in need of long‐term care, and an intentional bequest motive. To disentangle the relative importance of PCA and bequest motive, we estimate a structural model of the retirement phase using a novel survey instrument that includes hypothetical questions. We identify PCA as very significant and find bequest motives that spread deep into the middle class. Our results highlight potential interest in annuities that make allowance for long‐term care expenses.
What Drives Variation in the U.S. Debt‐to‐Output Ratio? The Dogs that Did not Bark
Published: 6/11/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13363 | Cited by: 18
ZHENGYANG JIANG, HANNO LUSTIG, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, MINDY Z. XIAOLAN
A higher U.S. government debt‐to‐output (D‐O) ratio does not forecast higher surpluses or lower returns on Treasurys in the future. Neither future cash flows nor discount rates account for the variation in the current D‐O ratio. The market valuation of Treasurys is surprisingly insensitive to macro fundamentals. Instead, the future D‐O ratio accounts for most of the variation because the D‐O ratio is highly persistent. Systematic surplus forecast errors may help account for these findings. Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, surplus projections have anticipated a large fiscal correction that failed to materialize.
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics
Published: 9/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01124.x | Cited by: 55
STIJN CLAESSENS
The Czech and Slovak Republics' mass privatization scheme used voucher points distributed to the population and a competitive bidding process to change the governance of a large number of firms. Voucher prices and following secondary market prices are shown to depend upon the resulting ownership structures. The more concentrated ownership is, the higher prices are. High absolute ownership by a single domestic investor is associated with even higher voucher prices. I find some evidence that initially prices are relatively lower when a bank‐sponsored investment fund has a relatively large stake in a firm. This suggests conflicts of interest.
Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth
Published: 11/7/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00610.x | Cited by: 754
Stijn Claessens, Luc Laeven
AbstractIn countries with more secure property rights, firms might allocate resources better and consequentially grow faster as the returns on different types of assets are more protected against competitors' actions. Using data on sectoral value added for a large number of countries, we find evidence consistent with better property rights leading to higher growth through improved asset allocation. Quantitatively, the growth effect is as large as that of improved access to financing due to greater financial development. Our results are robust using various samples and specifications, including controlling for growth opportunities.
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
Published: 12/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00511 | Cited by: 2762
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang
This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash‐flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash‐flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE, INTEREST‐RATE RISK, AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02924.x | Cited by: 0
James Van Horne
Rumors
Published: 7/15/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00575 | Cited by: 188
Jos Van Bommel
A
Kyle (1985)
model with private information diffusion is used to examine the motivation to spread stock tips. An informed investor with limited investment capacity spreads imprecise rumors to an audience of followers. Followers trade on the advice and move the price. Due to the imprecision of the rumor, the price overshoots with positive probability. This gives the rumormonger the opportunity to trade twice: First when she receives information, then when she knows the price to be overshooting. In equilibrium, rumors are informative and both rumormongers and followers increase their profits at the expense of uninformed liquidity traders.
NEW LISTINGS AND THEIR PRICE BEHAVIOR
Published: 9/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00552.x | Cited by: 24
James C. Van Horne
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02154.x | Cited by: 1
JAMES C. VAN HORNE
THE EFFECT OF FHLB BOND OPERATIONS ON SAVINGS INFLOWS AT SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS: COMMENT
Published: 3/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01361.x | Cited by: 7
James C. Van Horne
Good‐Specific Habit Formation and the Cross‐Section of Expected Returns
Published: 7/13/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12397 | Cited by: 35
JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN
I study asset prices in a general equilibrium framework in which agents form habits over individual varieties of goods rather than over an aggregate consumption bundle. Goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms whose elasticities of demand depend on consumers' habit formation. Firms that produce goods with a high habit level relative to consumption have low demand elasticities, set high prices for their product, have low expected returns on their stock, and have low asset pricing betas and stock return volatilities. I find supportive evidence for these predictions in the data.
OPTIMAL INITIATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS BY DEBT HOLDERS
Published: 6/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01932.x | Cited by: 13
James C. Van Horne
Of Financial Innovations and Excesses
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04984.x | Cited by: 87
JAMES C. VAN HORNE
AN ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF SPECULATIVE ACTIVITY UNDER A SYSTEM OF FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES*
Published: 12/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03152.x | Cited by: 1
John J. Van Belle
Risk‐Free Rates and Convenience Yields around the World
Published: 5/11/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70045 | Cited by: 3
William Diamond, Peter Van Tassel
We infer risk‐free rates from index option prices to estimate safe asset convenience yields in 10 G11 currencies. Countries' convenience yields increase with the level of their interest rates, with U.S. convenience yields fifth largest. During financial crises, convenience yields grow, but the difference between United States and foreign convenience yields generally does not. Covered interest parity (CIP) deviations using our option‐implied rates are a similar size between the United States and each other country. A model in which convenience yields depend on domestic financial intermediaries, but CIP deviations reflect the funding costs of international arbitrageurs financed with dollar‐denominated debt, explains these results.
GROWTH AND COMMON STOCK VALUES
Published: 12/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01245.x | Cited by: 5
John C. Clendenin, Maurice Van Cleave
High‐Frequency Trading around Large Institutional Orders
Published: 3/21/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12759 | Cited by: 207
VINCENT VAN KERVEL, ALBERT J. MENKVELD
Liquidity suppliers lean against the wind. We analyze whether high‐frequency traders (HFTs) lean against large institutional orders that execute through a series of child orders. The alternative is HFTs trading with the wind, that is, in the same direction. We find that HFTs initially lean against these orders but eventually change direction and take positions in the same direction for the most informed institutional orders. Our empirical findings are consistent with investors trading strategically on their information. When deciding trade intensity, they seem to trade off higher speculative profits against higher risk of being detected and preyed on by HFTs.
Session Topic: Corporate Finance and Capital Budgeting
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03071.x | Cited by: 1
James Van Horn, William L. White
SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURE
Published: 12/1950, Volume: 5, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1950.tb03804.x | Cited by: 4
Eli Schwartz, Roger C. Van Tassel
THE IMPACT OF UNANTICIPATED CHANGES IN INFLATION ON THE VALUE OF COMMON STOCKS
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03025.x | Cited by: 11
James C. Van Horne, William F. Glassmire
DIVIDEND POLICY AND NEW EQUITY FINANCING
Published: 5/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00911.x | Cited by: 14
James C. Van Horne, John G. McDonald
EXPECTED INFLATION IMPLIED BY CAPITAL MARKET RATES
Published: 5/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01773.x | Cited by: 14
Patric H. Hendershott, James C. Van Horne
ABANDONMENT VALUE AND CAPITAL BUDGETING*
Published: 12/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00293.x | Cited by: 22
Alexander A. Robichek, James C. Van Horne
Real Anomalies
Published: 4/2/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12771 | Cited by: 94
JULES H. van BINSBERGEN, CHRISTIAN C. OPP
We examine the importance of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies (alphas) for the real economy. To this end, we develop a novel quantitative model of the cross‐section of firms that features lumpy investment and informational inefficiencies, while yielding distributions in closed form. Our findings indicate that anomalies can cause material real inefficiencies, which raises the possibility that agents who help eliminate them add significant value to the economy. The model shows that the magnitude of alphas alone is a poor indicator of real outcomes, and highlights the importance of the alpha persistence, the amount of mispriced capital, and the Tobin's q of firms affected.
Government Security Dealers' Positions, Information and Interest‐Rate Expectations: A Note
Published: 12/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03847.x | Cited by: 1
JAMES C. VAN HORNE, HAL B. HEATON
THE IMPACT OF OUTSTANDING CONVERTIBLE BONDS ON CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY
Published: 5/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01902.x | Cited by: 1
James C. Van Horne, Dileep R. Mehta
ABANDONMENT VALUE AND CAPITAL BUDGETING: REPLY
Published: 3/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00346.x | Cited by: 16
Alexander A. Robichek, James C. Van Horne
Regulation of Charlatans in High‐Skill Professions
Published: 2/26/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13112 | Cited by: 26
JONATHAN B. BERK, JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN
We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03276.x | Cited by: 1
Bernell K. Stone, James C. Van Horne
ELIMINATION OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION OF DIVIDENDS AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY
Published: 6/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02015.x | Cited by: 21
Robert H. Litzenberger, James C. Van Horne
The Exchange Rate in the Presence of Transaction Costs: Implications for Tests of Purchasing Power Parity
Published: 9/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04060.x | Cited by: 287
PIET SERCU, RAMAN UPPAL, CYNTHIA VAN HULLE
With transaction costs for trading goods, the nominal exchange rate moves within a band around the nominal purchasing power parity (PPP) value. We model the behavior of the band and of the exchange rate within the band. The model explains why there are below‐unity slope coefficients in regression tests of PPP, and why these increase toward unity under hyperinflation or with low‐frequency data. Our results are independent of the presence of nontraded goods in the economy.
Predictive Regressions: A Present‐Value Approach
Published: 7/15/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01575.x | Cited by: 395
JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, RALPH S. J. KOIJEN
We propose a latent variables approach within a present‐value model to estimate the expected returns and expected dividend growth rates of the aggregate stock market. This approach aggregates information contained in the history of price‐dividend ratios and dividend growth rates to predict future returns and dividend growth rates. We find that returns and dividend growth rates are predictable with values ranging from 8.2% to 8.9% for returns and 13.9% to 31.6% for dividend growth rates. Both expected returns and expected dividend growth rates have a persistent component, but expected returns are more persistent than expected dividend growth rates.
The Cost of Debt
Published: 11/9/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01611.x | Cited by: 265
JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, JOHN R. GRAHAM, JIE YANG
We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.
Is the United States a Lucky Survivor? A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach
Published: 4/16/2025, Volume: 80, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13452 | Cited by: 4
JULES VAN BINSBERGEN, SOPHIA HUA, JONAS PEETERS, JESSICA WACHTER
Using international data, we quantify the magnitude of survivorship bias in U.S. equity market performance, finding that it explains about one‐third of the equity risk premium in the past century. We model the subjective crash belief of an investor who infers the crash risk in the United States by cross‐learning from other countries. The U.S. crash probability shows a persistent and widening divergence from the implied global average. We attribute the upward bias in the measured equity premium to crashes that did not occur in‐sample and to shocks to valuations resulting from learning about the probability.
The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock
Published: 6/1991, Volume: 46, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02677.x | Cited by: 73
CLAUDIO LODERER, JOHN W. COONEY, LEONARD D. VAN DRUNEN
We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.
Firm‐Level Climate Change Exposure
Published: 3/31/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13219 | Cited by: 1321
ZACHARIAS SAUTNER, LAURENCE VAN LENT, GRIGORY VILKOV, RUISHEN ZHANG
We develop a method that identifies the attention paid by earnings call participants to firms' climate change exposures. The method adapts a machine learning keyword discovery algorithm and captures exposures related to opportunity, physical, and regulatory shocks associated with climate change. The measures are available for more than 10,000 firms from 34 countries between 2002 and 2020. We show that the measures are useful in predicting important real outcomes related to the net‐zero transition, in particular, job creation in disruptive green technologies and green patenting, and that they contain information that is priced in options and equity markets.
Real Estate Shocks and Financial Advisor Misconduct
Published: 7/26/2021, Volume: 76, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13067 | Cited by: 70
STEPHEN G. DIMMOCK, WILLIAM C. GERKEN, TYSON VAN ALFEN
We test whether personal real estate shocks affect professional misconduct by financial advisors. We use a panel of advisors' home addresses and examine within‐advisor variation relative to other advisors who work at the same firm and live in the same ZIP code. We find a negative relation between housing returns and misconduct. We show that advisors' housing returns explain misconduct against out‐of‐state customers, breaking the link between customer and advisor housing shocks. Furthermore, the results are stronger for advisors with lower career risk from committing misconduct, and for advisors with greater borrowing constraints.
From Wall Street to Main Street: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Consumer Credit Supply
Published: 5/11/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12209 | Cited by: 67
RODNEY RAMCHARAN, STÉPHANE VERANI, SKANDER J. VAN DEN HEUVEL
How did the collapse of the asset‐backed securities (ABS) market during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis affect the supply of credit to the broader economy? Using new data on the U.S. credit union industry, we find that ABS‐related losses are associated with a large contraction in the supply of credit to consumers, especially among those credit unions that began the crisis with weaker capitalization. We also find that this credit supply shock restricted the availability of mortgage and automobile credit. These results show how movements in the prices of financial assets can affect the real economy.
A Horizon‐Based Decomposition of Mutual Fund Value Added Using Transactions
Published: 4/4/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13331 | Cited by: 15
JULES VAN BINSBERGEN, JUNGSUK HAN, HONGXUN RUAN, RAN XING
We decompose mutual fund value added by the length of funds' holdings using transaction‐level data. We motivate our decomposition with a model featuring horizon‐specific investment ideas, where short‐term ideas are less scalable because the associated trades cannot be spread over time. Fund turnover correlates negatively with the horizon over which value is added and positively with price impact costs. As predicted, holdings of high‐turnover funds add a substantial amount of value in the first two weeks, of which more than 80% is earned on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and earnings announcement days. Holdings of low‐turnover funds add value only over longer horizons.
THE ASSET STRUCTURE OF INDIVIDUAL PORTFOLIOS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Published: 5/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01833.x | Cited by: 32
James C. Van Horne, Marshall E. Blume, Irwin Friend
On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring
Published: 7/18/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13374 | Cited by: 2
SHAUN WILLIAM DAVIES, EDWARD D. VAN WESEP, BRIAN WATERS
We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.
The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis
Published: 6/1994, Volume: 49, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05147.x | Cited by: 1063
WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, ROBERT C. NASH, MATTHIAS VAN RANDENBORGH
This study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. Our results document strong performance improvements, achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security. Specifically, after being privatized, firms increase real sales, become more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, improve their operating efficiency, and increase their work forces. Furthermore, these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout. Finally, we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization.