Search results: 50.
Assessing Goodness‐of‐Fit of Asset Pricing Models: The Distribution of the Maximal R2
Published: 6/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04814.x | Cited by: 66
F. DOUGLAS FOSTER, TOM SMITH, ROBERT E. WHALEY
The development of asset pricing models that rely on instrumental variables together with the increased availability of easily‐accessible economic time‐series have renewed interest in predicting security returns. Evaluating the significance of these new research findings, however, is no easy task. Because these asset pricing theory tests are not independent, classical methods of assessing goodness‐of‐fit are inappropriate. This study investigates the distribution of the maximal when k of m regressors are used to predict security returns. We provide a simple procedure that adjusts critical values to account for selecting variables by searching among potential regressors.
Ex Ante Bond Returns and the Liquidity Preference Hypothesis
Published: 6/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00140 | Cited by: 33
Jacob Boudoukh, Matthew Richardson, Tom Smith, Robert F. Whitelaw
We provide a formal test of the liquidity preference hypothesis (LPH), that is, the monotonicity of ex ante term premiums, using nonparametric estimates that do not require a structural model for conditional expected returns. Although the point estimates of the term premiums are consistent with previous conclusions in the literature regarding violations of the LPH, the test statistics are generally insignificant, even when powerful conditioning information is used. These results illustrate the importance of correctly accounting for correlations across maturities and of formally testing the inequality restrictions implied by the LPH.
Anonymous Trading in Equities
Published: 12/6/2020, Volume: 76, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12988 | Cited by: 22
TOM GRIMSTVEDT MELING
In this paper, I explore a reform at the Oslo Stock Exchange to assess the causal effect of posttrade trader anonymity on stock liquidity and trading volume. Using a regression discontinuity approach, I find that anonymity leads to a reduction in bid‐ask spreads of 40% and an increase in trading volume of more than 50%. The increase in trading volume is accounted for largely by increased trading activity by institutional investors, while retail investors do not adjust their trading behavior in response to anonymity. The results suggest that posttrade anonymity positively affects standard measures of market quality.
Market Serial Correlation on a Small Security Market: A Note
Published: 12/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03969.x | Cited by: 31
TOM BERGLUND, EVA LILJEBLOM
Further Evidence on the Value of a Priori Information
Published: 3/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03481.x | Cited by: 1
GARY SMITH
COST OF PROVIDING CONSUMER CREDIT: A STUDY OF FOUR MAJOR TYPES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS*
Published: 9/1962, Volume: 17, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04301.x | Cited by: 0
Paul Smith
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00667.x | Cited by: 1
Warren Smith
Public Information, IPO Price Formation, and Long‐Run Returns: Japanese Evidence
Published: 1/23/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01440.x | Cited by: 60
KENJI KUTSUNA, JANET KIHOLM SMITH, RICHARD L. SMITH
The price formation process of JASDAQ IPOs is more transparent than in the United States. The transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the IPO literature—why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information, and why adjustments are related to initial returns. The evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter's commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and/or disclosing information. Offer prices reflect pre‐IPO market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering. Underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket.
THE POSTWAR CANADIAN MORTGAGE MARKET AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT*
Published: 9/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00266.x | Cited by: 0
Lawrence B. Smith
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF INTERREGIONAL MORTGAGE INVESTMENT
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00811.x | Cited by: 3
Halbert C. Smith
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL AID TO SMALL BUSINESS: FISCAL POLICY
Published: 6/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04453.x | Cited by: 0
Dan Throop Smith
THE RESPONSE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO FEDERAL GRANT‐IN‐AID PAYMENTS*
Published: 6/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00839.x | Cited by: 0
David L. Smith
Structural Disequilibrium and the Banking Act of 1980
Published: 5/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03560.x | Cited by: 0
PAUL F. SMITH
Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Terms Used in Interfirm Trade
Published: 6/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00138 | Cited by: 621
Chee K. Ng, Janet Kiholm Smith, Richard L. Smith
AbstractTrade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE REMOVAL OF THE YIELD CEILING ON FEDERALLY INSURED MORTGAGES IN CANADA
Published: 3/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03254.x | Cited by: 0
Lawrence B. Smith
THE CONCEPTS OF MONEY AND COMMERCIAL BANKS
Published: 12/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00271.x | Cited by: 4
Paul F. Smith
THE OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL RESERVE AND TREASURY POLICY*
Published: 5/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01588.x | Cited by: 0
Warren L. Smith
A TRANSITION MODEL FOR PORTFOLIO REVISION*
Published: 9/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02978.x | Cited by: 4
Keith V. Smith
Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry
Published: 9/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03916.x | Cited by: 633
JANET KIHOLM SMITH
Commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held. By offering trade credit, a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short‐term financing. The information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments.
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1974: A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Published: 5/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03298.x | Cited by: 9
James F. Smith
ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY RETURN ON INVESTMENT*
Published: 12/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03149.x | Cited by: 0
Rodney F. Smith
The Choice of Issuance Procedure and the Cost of Competitive and Negotiated Underwriting: an Examination of the Impact of Rule 50
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04580.x | Cited by: 23
RICHARD L. SMITH
Previous research suggests that firms choose negotiated issuance over competitive despite its apparently higher net interest cost. This result is shown to arise partly from failure to correct for a selectivity bias in the choice of issuance procedures. Two stage analysis is used in a model that includes qualitative and limited dependent variables to re‐estimate the net interest cost difference between competitive and negotiated issues. Results support the hypothesis that the choice of issuance procedure is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Examination of debt issues subject to Rule 50 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act indicates that the regulation, as applied, is not effective.
THE EFFECT OF THE CORPORATE FINANCIAL PLAN ON THE CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Published: 5/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00772.x | Cited by: 1
W. B. Smith
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF RATES OF RETURN: COMMENT
Published: 12/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03433.x | Cited by: 1
W. James Smith
PRICING POLICIES ON CONSUMER LOANS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS
Published: 5/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00677.x | Cited by: 7
Paul F. Smith
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS
Published: 3/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.x | Cited by: 832
MICHAEL P. SMITH
This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the 51 firms targeted by CalPERS over the 1987–93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.
OPTIMUM RATE ON TIME DEPOSITS*
Published: 12/1962, Volume: 17, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04336.x | Cited by: 0
Paul F. Smith
A Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Credit Union Decision Making
Published: 9/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03899.x | Cited by: 91
DONALD J. SMITH
This paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits. The unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union, in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative, are used to develop the objective function. This is based on a comparison of the credit union's rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower‐saver conflict. The principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02277.x | Cited by: 1
CLIFFORD W. SMITH
ESTIMATING A GENERAL DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR*
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01475.x | Cited by: 0
Gary N. Smith
DEMAND FOR SHORT TERM GOVERNMENT DEBT*
Published: 3/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00638.x | Cited by: 0
Charles I. Smith
THE VALUE OF A PRIORI INFORMATION IN ESTIMATING A FINANCIAL MODEL*
Published: 12/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb03215.x | Cited by: 9
Gary Smith, William Brainard
Market Created Risk
Published: 7/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04378.x | Cited by: 28
ALAN KRAUS, MAXWELL SMITH
We develop a multiperiod rational expectations model of securities market equilibrium in which equilibrium prices may move between periods even though it is common knowledge that no new information has arrived about ultimate security payoffs. This happens because investors know they have imperfect information about the endowments of other investors and this knowledge affects their probability beliefs about the prices that will prevail at the intermediate trading date. These beliefs are reflected in the equilibrium at the initial trading date when investors focus on the probabilities of intermediate capital gains and losses, rather than ultimate payoffs.
A Disequilibrium Model of Savings and Loan Associations
Published: 12/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03618.x | Cited by: 1
GARY SMITH, WILLIAM BRAINARD
This paper discusses the consistent specification and estimation of asset demand equations in a disequilibrium model of financial markets. We estimate the effective asset demands of savings and loan associations, allowing for rationing in the mortgage market. These disequilibrium estimates are not very different from the estimates of notional demands with no rationing assumed. Savings and loans seem to be least affected by excess demand situations in that they are apparently not reluctant to raise mortgage rates and/or to ration borrowers.
UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00589.x | Cited by: 6
R. G. E. Smith
Looking for Someone to Blame: Delegation, Cognitive Dissonance, and the Disposition Effect
Published: 1/14/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12311 | Cited by: 258
TOM Y. CHANG, DAVID H. SOLOMON, MARK M. WESTERFIELD
We analyze brokerage data and an experiment to test a cognitive dissonance based theory of trading: investors avoid realizing losses because they dislike admitting that past purchases were mistakes, but delegation reverses this effect by allowing the investor to blame the manager instead. Using individual trading data, we show that the disposition effect—the propensity to realize past gains more than past losses—applies only to nondelegated assets like individual stocks; delegated assets, like mutual funds, exhibit a robust reverse‐disposition effect. In an experiment, we show that increasing investors' cognitive dissonance results in both a larger disposition effect in stocks and a larger reverse‐disposition effect in funds. Additionally, increasing the salience of delegation increases the reverse‐disposition effect in funds. Cognitive dissonance provides a unified explanation for apparently contradictory investor behavior across asset classes and has implications for personal investment decisions, mutual fund management, and intermediation.
Merging Markets
Published: 6/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00137 | Cited by: 87
Tom Arnold, Philip Hersch, J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry Netter
AbstractWe study the causes and effects of the competition for order flow by U.S. regional stock exchanges. We trace the origins of competition for order flow to a change in the role of regional exchanges from being venues for listing local securities to being more direct competitors for the order flow of NYSE listings. We study the way regionals competed for order flow, concentrating on a series of stock‐exchange mergers that occurred in the midst of this transition of the regional exchanges. The merging exchanges attracted market share and experienced narrower bid‐ask spreads.
Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately
Published: 6/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04723.x | Cited by: 391
MICHAEL HERTZEL, RICHARD L. SMITH
Despite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. We find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. We also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise our sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00766.x | Cited by: 0
Tynan Smith, Robert W. Johnson
Direct Equity Financing; A Resolution of a Paradox: A Comment
Published: 12/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb04928.x | Cited by: 7
RICHARD L. SMITH, MANJEET DHATT
Death and Taxes: The Market for Flower Bonds
Published: 7/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04578.x | Cited by: 7
DAVID MAYERS, CLIFFORD W. SMITH
Certain U.S. Government securities, known as flower bonds, can be redeemed at par plus accrued interest for the purpose of paying estate taxes, if held at the time of death. Thus, a flower bond, selling at a discount, is like a straight bond plus a life insurance policy. An equilibrium derived from a rational flower bond pricing model implies the existence of clienteles: individuals with the highest death probabilities hold the deepest discount flower bonds. The empirical implication, that bonds with the deepest discount should be redeemed at the fastest rate, is tested and the results support the proposition.
The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt
Published: 6/1995, Volume: 50, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04797.x | Cited by: 1306
MICHAEL J. BARCLAY, CLIFFORD W. SMITH
We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting‐cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long‐term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short‐term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.
Maturity Intermediation and Intertemporal Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries
Published: 9/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03925.x | Cited by: 10
GEORGE EMIR MORGAN, STEPHEN D. SMITH
This paper considers the maturity intermediation and intertemporal lending decisions of risk‐averse financial intermediaries. In particular, the maturity mismatch problem and the fixed‐versus‐variable‐rate lending decision are modeled when the major source of risk involves uncertain future interest rates. The results imply that the strategy of matching the maturity of assets and liabilities is not generally optimal or even minimum risk. This is due primarily to the “built‐in” hedge that the intermediary has as a result of rolling over short‐term loans while continuing to finance long‐term loans. Intertemporal dependencies between loan demand and costs (or both) also have an effect on the optimal degree of maturity mismatching and provide one rationale for making loans at rates below current marginal cost.
Disclosing to Informed Traders
Published: 12/17/2023, Volume: 79, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13296 | Cited by: 15
SNEHAL BANERJEE, IVÁN MARINOVIC, KEVIN SMITH
We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.
Accounts Receivable Management Policy: Theory and Evidence
Published: 3/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03982.x | Cited by: 422
SHEHZAD L. MIAN, CLIFFORD W. SMITH
This paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies. The tests focus on both cross‐sectional explanations of policy‐choice determinants, as well as incentives to establish captives. We find size, concentration, and credit standing of the firm's traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring, accounts receivable secured debt, captive finance subsidiaries, and general corporate credit. We also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting. However, we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth.
A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF POST‐ACCORD INTEREST RATES
Published: 6/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00986.x | Cited by: 6
V. Kerry Smith, Richard G. Marcis
THE VALUE OF PERFECT MARKET FORECASTS IN PORTFOLIO SELECTION
Published: 5/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00965.x | Cited by: 0
Nancy L. Jacob, Keith V. Smith
The Conditional Performance of Insider Trades
Published: 4/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.205263 | Cited by: 140
B. Espen Eckbo, David C. Smith
This paper estimates the performance of insider trades on the closely held Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during a period of lax enforcement of insider trading regulations. Our data permit construction of a portfolio that tracks all movements of insiders in and out of the OSE firms. Using three alternative performance estimators in a time‐varying expected return setting, we document zero or negative abnormal performance by insiders. The results are robust to a variety of trade characteristics. Applying the performance measures to mutual funds on the OSE, we also document some evidence that the average mutual fund outperforms the insider portfolio.
A PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS OF CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION
Published: 6/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00363.x | Cited by: 25
Keith V. Smith, John C. Schreiner
Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings, Broadtape Disclosure, and the Timing of Price Reactions
Published: 6/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00047 | Cited by: 8
Mark C. Dawkins, Linda Smith Bamber
Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This “Broadtape announcement effect” persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11–day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.