The Journal of Finance

Rollover Risk and Credit Risk

Published: 03/27/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01721.x

ZHIGUO HE, WEI XIONG

Our model shows that deterioration in debt market liquidity leads to an increase in not only the liquidity premium of corporate bonds but also credit risk. The latter effect originates from firms' debt rollover. When liquidity deterioration causes a firm to suffer losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the losses while maturing debt holders are paid in full. This conflict leads the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold. Our model demonstrates an intricate interaction between the liquidity premium and default premium and highlights the role of short‐term debt in exacerbating rollover risk.

Information Acquisition in Rumor‐Based Bank Runs

Published: 11/11/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12202

ZHIGUO HE, ASAF MANELA

We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent‐but‐illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding‐out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.

A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Published: 11/04/2013   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12118

DOUGLAS W. DIAMOND, ZHIGUO HE

Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.

Leverage Dynamics without Commitment

Published: 12/22/2020   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13001

PETER M. DEMARZO, ZHIGUO HE

We characterize equilibrium leverage dynamics in a trade‐off model in which the firm can continuously adjust leverage and cannot commit to a policy ex ante. While the leverage ratchet effect leads shareholders to issue debt gradually over time, asset growth and debt maturity cause leverage to mean‐revert slowly toward a target. Investors anticipate future debt issuance and raise credit spreads, fully offsetting the tax benefits of new debt. Shareholders are therefore indifferent toward the debt maturity structure, even though their choice significantly affects credit spreads, leverage levels, the speed of adjustment, future investment, and growth.

Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

Published: 11/19/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01787.x

PETER M. DEMARZO, MICHAEL J. FISHMAN, ZHIGUO HE, NENG WANG

We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.

Pledgeability and Asset Prices: Evidence from the Chinese Corporate Bond Markets

Published: 07/18/2023   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13266

HUI CHEN, ZHUO CHEN, ZHIGUO HE, JINYU LIU, RENGMING XIE

We provide causal evidence on the value of asset pledgeability by exploiting a unique feature of Chinese corporate bond markets: bonds with identical fundamentals are traded on two segmented markets with different rules for repo transactions. Using a policy shock that rendered AA+ and AA bonds ineligible for repo on one market only, we compare how bond prices changed across markets and rating classes around this event. When the haircut increases from 0% to 100%, bond yields increase by 39 bps to 85 bps. These estimates help us infer the magnitude of the shadow cost of capital in China.