The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives
Published: 04/18/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01112.x
CHRISTOPHER GÉCZY, BERNADETTE A. MINTON, CATHERINE SCHRAND
We examine the use of currency derivatives in order to differentiate among existing theories of hedging behavior. Firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result suggests that firms might use derivatives to reduce cash flow variation that might otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities. Firms with extensive foreign exchange‐rate exposure and economies of scale in hedging activities are also more likely to use currency derivatives. Finally, the source of foreign exchange‐rate exposure is an important factor in the choice among types of currency derivatives.
Taking a View: Corporate Speculation, Governance, and Compensation
Published: 09/04/2007 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01279.x
CHRISTOPHER C. GÉCZY, BERNADETTE A. MINTON, CATHERINE M. SCHRAND
Using responses to a well‐known confidential survey, we study corporations' use of derivatives to “take a view” on interest rate and currency movements. Characteristics of speculators suggest that perceived information and cost advantages lead them to take positions actively; that is, they do not speculate to increase risk by “betting the ranch.” Speculating firms encourage managers to speculate through incentive‐aligning compensation arrangements and bonding contracts, and they use derivatives‐specific internal controls to manage potential abuse. Finally, we examine whether investors reading public corporate disclosures are able to identify firms that indicate speculating in the confidential survey; they are not.