The Journal of Finance

Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation

Published: 12/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00407  |  Cited by: 330

Francesca Cornelli, David Goldreich

In the bookbuilding procedure, an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue. The banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors. We examine the books for 39 international equity issues. We find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids. Regular investors receive favorable allocations, especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed. The investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors.

Bookbuilding: How Informative Is the Order Book?

Published: 7/15/2003,  Volume: 58,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00572  |  Cited by: 237

Francesca Cornelli, David Goldreich

We examine the institutional bids submitted under the bookbuilding procedure for a sample of international equity issues. We find that information in bids which include a limit price, especially those of large and frequent bidders, affects the issue price. Oversubscription has a smaller but significant effect for IPOs. Public information affects the issue price to the extent that it is reflected in the bids. Oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first‐day aftermarket return, and demand elasticity is negatively correlated with aftermarket volatility. Our results support the view that bookbuilding is designed to extract information from investors.

Investor Sentiment and Pre‐IPO Markets

Published: 5/16/2006,  Volume: 61,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00870.x  |  Cited by: 325

FRANCESCA CORNELLI, DAVID GOLDREICH, ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.

Political Connections and Allocative Distortions

Published: 1/7/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12751  |  Cited by: 295

DAVID SCHOENHERR

Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints members of his networks as CEOs of state‐owned firms that act as intermediaries in allocating government contracts to private firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. Contracts allocated to connected private firms are executed systematically worse and exhibit more frequent cost increases through renegotiations.

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium

Published: 1/10/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01310.x  |  Cited by: 211

ALEXANDER DAVID

Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.

STATE OF THE FINANCE FIELD: FURTHER COMMENT

Published: 12/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00322.x  |  Cited by: 10

David Durand

Testing the Efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. Exchange Market under the Assumption of no Risk Premium

Published: 3/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03533.x  |  Cited by: 45

DAVID LONGWORTH

The efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. exchange market for the current float is examined more extensively than previously. Semi‐strong‐form tests which admit the lagged spot rate as a predictor are considered in addition to the standard weak‐form test. These stronger tests reject the joint null hypothesis of an efficient exchange market and no risk premium for the period ending in October 1976, although not for the entire period. For almost every year the current spot rate provided a better forecast of the future spot rate than did the current forward rate.

The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Partially Observable Economy

Published: 7/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04391.x  |  Cited by: 29

DAVID FELDMAN

This paper investigates the term structure of interest rates in a multiperiod production and exchange economy with incomplete information. Unable to observe their stochastic investment opportunities, investors engage in dynamic Bayesian inference. This results in the endogenous identification of a more complex production function which generates a richer term structure, resembling the one that actual market prices imply. In addition, this paper introduces a characteristic function of the term structure and demonstrates that, in contrast with a fully observable economy, the widely investigated expectations hypothesis holds true only if interest rates are nonstochastic.

Transactions Costs and the Theory of Portfolio Selection

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01964.x  |  Cited by: 26

David Goldsmith

Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors

Published: 10/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x  |  Cited by: 624

DAVID YERMACK

I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross‐sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.

GROWTH STOCKS AND THE PETERSBURG PARADOX*

Published: 9/1957,  Volume: 12,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04143.x  |  Cited by: 13

David Durand

Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

Published: 6/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04809.x  |  Cited by: 622

DAVID YERMACK

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.

Individual Investors and Volatility

Published: 7/19/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01668.x  |  Cited by: 314

THIERRY FOUCAULT, DAVID SRAER, DAVID J. THESMAR

We show that retail trading activity has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns, which suggests that retail investors behave as noise traders. To identify this effect, we use a reform of the French stock market that raises the relative cost of speculative trading for retail investors. The daily return volatility of the stocks affected by the reform falls by 20 basis points (a quarter of the sample standard deviation of the return volatility) relative to other stocks. For affected stocks, we also find a significant decrease in the magnitude of return reversals and the price impact of trades.

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04539.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID FELDMAN

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03648.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID EMANUEL

A QUARTERLY SERIES OF CORPORATE BASIC YIELDS, 1952–57, AND SOME ATTENDANT RESERVATIONS*

Published: 9/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04200.x  |  Cited by: 3

David Durand

INCREASED TAXATION WITH INCREASED ACCEPTABILITY—A DISCUSSION OF NET WORTH TAXATION AS A FEDERAL REVENUE ALTERNATIVE

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01793.x  |  Cited by: 0

Martin David

Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance

Published: 5/27/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12906  |  Cited by: 270

DAVID HIRSHLEIFER

I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.

MERGERS, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE THEORIES OF THE FIRM

Published: 3/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01368.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Gilbert

A Theoretical Model for Valuing Preferred Stock

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02288.x  |  Cited by: 19

DAVID EMANUEL

This paper develops a model of preferred stock value which includes the possibility of dividends on the preferred stock being omitted. The analytical framework used is based on the option‐hedging methodology of Black and Scholes. Precise valuation formulae are obtained for cumulative and noncumulative preferred stock in a variety of contexts. The values obtained are quite different from those for either riskless or risky perpetual bonds, which have previously been proposed as being similar to preferred stock.

Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France

Published: 2/5/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12880  |  Cited by: 125

JOHAN HOMBERT, ANTOINETTE SCHOAR, DAVID SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self‐employment. We exploit a large‐scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one‐for‐one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.

Housing Collateral and Entrepreneurship

Published: 1/12/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12468  |  Cited by: 344

MARTIN C. SCHMALZ, DAVID A. SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We show that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and postentry growth, using French administrative data and cross‐sectional variation in local house‐price appreciation as shocks to collateral values. We control for local demand shocks by comparing treated homeowners to controls in the same region that do not experience collateral shocks: renters and homeowners with an outstanding mortgage, who (in France) cannot take out a second mortgage. In both comparisons, an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, treated entrepreneurs use more debt, start larger firms, and remain larger in the long run.

Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer

Published: 8/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00380-i1  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03668.x  |  Cited by: 1

DAVID S. KIDWELL

The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating

Published: 11/25/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01513.x  |  Cited by: 70

DAVID C. CICERO

I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.

Investment Decisions Depend on Portfolio Disclosures

Published: 6/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00132  |  Cited by: 146

David K. Musto

Abstract A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross‐sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers.

Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting, January 7, 2012

Published: 7/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01756.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID H. PYLE

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CREDIT UNIONS IN MICHIGAN*

Published: 12/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00285.x  |  Cited by: 1

David L. McKee

MONEY SUPPLY CONTROL: RESERVES AS THE INSTRUMENT UNDER LAGGED ACCOUNTING

Published: 6/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01927.x  |  Cited by: 0

David A. Pierce

THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE CEILING RATE ON DEPOSITS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS*

Published: 9/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02985.x  |  Cited by: 0

David E. Bond

PREMIUMS ON CONVERTIBLE BONDS: COMMENT

Published: 9/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00567.x  |  Cited by: 2

David Tell Duvel

The Equilibrium Valuation of Risky Discrete Cash Flows in Continuous Time

Published: 12/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02659.x  |  Cited by: 9

DAVID C. SHIMKO

This paper values a contingent claim to discrete stochastic cash flows generated by a Poisson arrival process with a randomly varying intensity parameter. In the most general case, both the size and the arrival intensity of cash flows may correlate wih state variables in a continuous time economy. Assuming the conditions of an intertemporal capital aset pricing model, solutions for the value of the contingent claim can be found using various techniques. The paper suggests immediate applications to the valuation of insurance contracts, the decision to build a firm with unknown future investment opportunities, and the pricing of mortgage‐backed securities.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF UTILITY RATE‐BASE TYPE, PERMITTED RATE OF RETURN, AND UTILITY EARNINGS*

Published: 3/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04247.x  |  Cited by: 2

David K. Eiteman

THE S.E.C. SPECIAL STUDY AND THE EXCHANGE MARKETS

Published: 5/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00230.x  |  Cited by: 2

David K. Eiteman

THE RESPONSE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO FEDERAL GRANT‐IN‐AID PAYMENTS*

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00839.x  |  Cited by: 0

David L. Smith

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04595.x  |  Cited by: 2

DAVID K. WHITCOMB

THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIMARY COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS: A CANADIAN COMPARISON

Published: 12/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01751.x  |  Cited by: 17

David C. Shaw

Fed Policy, Financial Market Efficiency, and Capital Flows

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00153  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Jones

GOVERNMENT DEBT, INTERGENERATION WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY*

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00836.x  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Kopf

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01795.x  |  Cited by: 0

David J. Ott

REPLY

Published: 12/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00143.x  |  Cited by: 0

David E. Novack

THE FINANCING OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLORADO*

Published: 12/1954,  Volume: 9,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01247.x  |  Cited by: 0

David L. Mosconi

The Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life Insurance

Published: 3/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04946.x  |  Cited by: 46

DAVID F. BABBEL

In this study a real price index is created for whole life insurance sold in the United States from 1953 to 1979. New purchases of whole life insurance are shown to be negatively related to changes in this cost index, contrary to what has been widely accepted in the insurance literature, but consistent with economic theory. The existence of strong price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance does not ensure, however, that the insurance industry manifests a high degree of price competition.

A BEHAVIORAL MODEL FOR COMMERCIAL BANKING*

Published: 9/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00941.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Neil Hyman

LEGAL ASPECTS OF REVENUE BOND FINANCING*

Published: 5/1955,  Volume: 10,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01266.x  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Wood

Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining

Published: 5/7/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x  |  Cited by: 516

DAVID A. MATSA

I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm‐level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.

Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00155  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle

Liquidity and Liquidation: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Published: 2/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00213  |  Cited by: 38

David T. Brown

This study provides evidence that highly leveraged owner‐managed properties liquidated assets during the commercial real estate decline of the late 1980s, and that this provided buying opportunities for better capitalized buyers. The analysis documents significant financial distress costs for highly leveraged firms during an industry‐wide downturn and shows that these costs are particularly large for owner‐managed firms.

A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues

Published: 9/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x  |  Cited by: 637

DAVID P. BARON

This paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer, and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker. The optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better‐informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized. The model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues.

Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

Published: 12/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03722.x  |  Cited by: 99

DAVID J. DENIS

This paper examines defensive payouts announced in response to hostile corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. Regardless of payout type, those firms remaining independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest experience an abnormal share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are substantial post‐contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and abnormally high rates of top management turnover.