The Journal of Finance

Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00700.x

TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES

This paper uses evidence from a data set of 27 European IPOs to analyze how investors bid and the factors that influence their allocations. We also make use of a unique ranking of investor quality, associated with the likelihood of flipping the IPO. We find that investors perceived to be long‐term holders of the stock are consistently favored in allocation and in out‐turn profits. In contrast to Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), we find little evidence that more informative bids receive larger allocations or higher profits. Our results cast doubt upon the extent of information production during the bookbuilding period.

Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?

Published: 11/14/2011   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01699.x

MARK ABRAHAMSON, TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000), has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.

Quid Pro Quo? What Factors Influence IPO Allocations to Investors?

Published: 06/19/2018   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12703

TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES, FELIX SUNTHEIM

Using data from all of the leading international investment banks on 220 initial public offerings (IPOs) raising $160 billion between January 2010 and May 2015, we test the determinants of IPO allocations. We compare investors’ IPO allocations with proxies for their information production during bookbuilding and the broking (and other) revenues they generate for bookrunners. We find evidence consistent with information revelation theories. We also find strong support for the existence of a quid pro quo whereby broking revenues are a significant determinant of investors’ IPO allocations and profits. The quid pro quo remains when we control for unobserved investor characteristics and investor‐bank relationships.

Picking Winners? Investment Consultants’ Recommendations of Fund Managers

Published: 05/05/2015   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12289

TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES, JOSE VICENTE MARTINEZ

Investment consultants advise institutional investors on their choice of fund manager. Focusing on U.S. actively managed equity funds, we analyze the factors that drive consultants’ recommendations, what impact these recommendations have on flows, and how well the recommended funds perform. We find that investment consultants’ recommendations of funds are driven largely by soft factors, rather than the funds’ past performance, and that their recommendations have a significant effect on fund flows. However, we find no evidence that these recommendations add value, suggesting that the search for winners, encouraged and guided by investment consultants, is fruitless.