The Journal of Finance

Visibility Bias in the Transmission of Consumption Beliefs and Undersaving

Published: 03/21/2023   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13223

BING HAN, DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, JOHAN WALDEN

We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than nonconsumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth‐signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure, and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions.

Financial Flexibility, Bank Capital Flows, and Asset Prices

Published: 09/12/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01770.x

CHRISTINE A. PARLOUR, RICHARD STANTON, JOHAN WALDEN

In our parsimonious general‐equilibrium model of banking and asset pricing, intermediaries have the expertise to monitor and reallocate capital. We study financial development, intraeconomy capital flows, the size of the banking sector, the value of intermediation, expected market returns, and the risk of bank crashes. Asset pricing implications include: a market's dividend yield is related to its financial flexibility, and capital flows should be important in explaining expected returns and the risk of bank crashes. Our predictions are broadly consistent with the aggregate behavior of U.S. capital markets since 1950.

Payment System Externalities

Published: 02/03/2022   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13110

CHRISTINE A. PARLOUR, UDAY RAJAN, JOHAN WALDEN

We examine how the payment processing role of banks affects their lending activity. In our model, banks operate in separate zones, and issue claims to entrepreneurs who purchase some inputs outside their own zone. Settling bank claims across zones incurs a cost. In equilibrium, a liquidity externality arises when zones are sufficiently different in their outsourcing propensities—a bank may restrict its own lending because it needs to hold liquidity against claims issued by another bank. Our work highlights that the disparate motives for interbank borrowing (investing in productive projects and managing liquidity) can have different effects on efficiency.