The Journal of Finance

Picking Winners? Investment Consultants’ Recommendations of Fund Managers

Published: 9/14/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12289  |  Cited by: 100

TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES, JOSE VICENTE MARTINEZ

Investment consultants advise institutional investors on their choice of fund manager. Focusing on U.S. actively managed equity funds, we analyze the factors that drive consultants’ recommendations, what impact these recommendations have on flows, and how well the recommended funds perform. We find that investment consultants’ recommendations of funds are driven largely by soft factors, rather than the funds’ past performance, and that their recommendations have a significant effect on fund flows. However, we find no evidence that these recommendations add value, suggesting that the search for winners, encouraged and guided by investment consultants, is fruitless.

Non‐Fundamental Speculation

Published: 6/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02694.x  |  Cited by: 47

VICENTE MADRIGAL

We study an intertemporal asset market where insiders coexist with “non‐fundamental” speculators. Non‐fundamental speculators possess no private information on fundamental values of assets, but have superior knowledge about some aspect of the market environment. We show that the entry of these (rational) speculators can lead to reductions in market liquidity and in the information content of prices, even in an efficient market. Also, equilibrium trades display patterns of empirical interest. For example, speculators appear to chase trends and lose money after market “overreactions,” while insiders trade as contrarians and profit after such overreactions.

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

Published: 9/12/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01776.x  |  Cited by: 382

VICENTE CUÑAT, MIREIA GINE, MARIA GUADALUPE

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.

Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions

Published: 5/12/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12908  |  Cited by: 28

VICENTE CUÑAT, MIREIA GINÉ, MARIA GUADALUPE

We study the effects of anti‐takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability, the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of a trade‐off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less protected firms is driven by better bidder‐target matching and merger synergies.

The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues

Published: 12/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05227.x  |  Cited by: 399

JOSE GUEDES, TIM OPLER

We document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7,369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993. Our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum, while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum. This pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short‐term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation, but are screened out of the long‐term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution.

Explaining the Diversification Discount

Published: 8/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00476  |  Cited by: 1055

Jose Manuel Campa, Simi Kedia

This paper argues that the documented discount on diversified firms is not per se evidence that diversification destroys value. Firms choose to diversify. We use three alternative econometric techniques to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision, and find evidence supporting the selfselection of diversifying firms. We find a strong negative correlation between a firms choice to diversify and firm value. The diversification discount always drops, and sometimes turns into a premium. There also exists evidence of selfselection by refocusing firms. These results point to the importance of explicitly modeling the endogeneity of the diversification status in analyzing its effect on firm value.

Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises

Published: 6/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00354  |  Cited by: 549

Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Sergio L. Schmukler

This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.

The Dog That Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes

Published: 9/10/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01401.x  |  Cited by: 174

JOSE M. MARIN, JACQUES P. OLIVIER

This paper documents that at the individual stock level, insiders' sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders' purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. A key feature of our theory is that rational uninformed investors may react more strongly to the absence of insider sales than to their presence (the “dog that did not bark” effect). We test our hypothesis against competing stories, such as insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution.

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

Published: 5/7/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x  |  Cited by: 240

ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed‐End Funds

Published: 6/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00251  |  Cited by: 66

Jeffrey L. Coles, Jose Suay, Denise Woodbury

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed‐end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.

Cream‐Skimming in Financial Markets

Published: 3/18/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12385  |  Cited by: 143

PATRICK BOLTON, TANO SANTOS, JOSE A. SCHEINKMAN

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.