The Journal of Finance

INTERRELATED MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR: A SUMMARY AND AN EXTENSION

Published: 5/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00977.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Wachtel

Market Response to the Weekly Money Supply Announcements in the 1970s

Published: 12/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb01076.x  |  Cited by: 117

THOMAS URICH, PAUL WACHTEL

The hypothesis that the weekly announcement of the money supply affects interest rates is examined. The announcement effect is interpreted as a policy anticipation effect. That is, an unanticipated increase in the money supply leads to an increase in interest rates in anticipation of future tightening by the Federal Reserve. Estimates of this effect with proxies for the unanticipated change constructed from a survey of money supply forecasts and an ARIMA model indicate that: (a) financial markets respond very quickly to the announcement; and (b) the response was largest when policymakers emphasized the importance of the monetary aggregates.

The Effects of Inflation and Money Supply Announcements on Interest Rates

Published: 9/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03901.x  |  Cited by: 71

THOMAS URICH, PAUL WACHTEL

This paper examines the impact of the money supply and inflation rate announcements on interest rates. Survey data on expectations of the money supply and consumer and producer price indexes are used to distinguish anticipated and unanticipated components of the announcements. This distinction is used to test for the efficiency of the financial market response to the announcements of new information. The results indicate that the unanticipated components of the announced changes in the Producers Price Index and in the money supply have an immediate positive effect on short‐term interest rates. The Consumer Price Index announcement has no apparent effect. There is no evidence of a delayed announcement effect. However, there is some indication of a liquidity effect of the money supply change on interest rates. This takes place when reserves are changing and several weeks prior to the information announcement.

CAPITAL SHORTAGES: MYTH OR REALITY?

Published: 5/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01886.x  |  Cited by: 1

Paul Wachtel, Arnold Sametz, Harry Shuford

Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending

Published: 3/18/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12368  |  Cited by: 207

MARKUS BEHN, RAINER HASELMANN, PAUL WACHTEL

We use a quasi‐experimental research design to examine the effect of model‐based capital regulation on the procyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model‐based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that microprudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects.

Trading Costs and Exchange Delisting: The Case of Firms that Voluntarily Move from the American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq

Published: 12/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02753.x  |  Cited by: 25

PAUL CLYDE, PAUL SCHULTZ, MIR ZAMAN

We examine 47 stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the Nasdaq. We find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the Nasdaq. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from The American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq. We are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.

Does the Stock Market Overreact to Corporate Earnings Information?

Published: 12/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02660.x  |  Cited by: 30

PAUL ZAROWIN

This paper tests whether the stock market overreacts to extreme earnings, by examining firms' stock returns over the 36 months subsequent to extreme earnings years. While the poorest earners do outperform the best earners, the poorest earners are also significantly smaller than the best earners. When poor earners are matched with good earners of equal size, there is little evidence of differential performance. This suggests that size, and not investor overreaction to earnings, is responsible for the “overreaction” phenomenon, the tendency for prior period losers to outperform prior period winners in the subsequent period.

Calls of Warrants: Timing and Market Reaction

Published: 6/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04733.x  |  Cited by: 16

PAUL SCHULTZ

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.

Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the UK Stock Market

Published: 9/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03439.x  |  Cited by: 116

PAUL MARSH

Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain

Published: 4/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00341  |  Cited by: 272

Paul Schultz

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over‐the‐counter bond market. I find average round‐trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower‐rated bonds.

A SUGGESTION FOR THE REVALUATION OF GOLD*

Published: 3/1963,  Volume: 18,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01621.x  |  Cited by: 1

Paul Wonnacott

THE CANADIAN DOLLAR, 1948–57*

Published: 3/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb04851.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Wonnacott

Convertible Bonds Are Not Called Late

Published: 9/1995,  Volume: 50,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04058.x  |  Cited by: 59

PAUL ASQUITH

Starting with Ingersoll (1977b), the academic literature has repeatedly sought to explain why convertible bonds are called late. The findings here demonstrate there is no call delay to explain. This paper finds that most convertible bonds, given their call protection, are called as soon as possible. For those that are not, there are significant cash flow advantages to delaying. The median call delay for all convertible bonds is less than four months. If a safety premium is desired to assure the conversion value will exceed the call price at the end of call notice period, the median call period is less than a month.

COST OF PROVIDING CONSUMER CREDIT: A STUDY OF FOUR MAJOR TYPES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS*

Published: 9/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04301.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Smith

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT DECISION MAKING

Published: 9/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01311.x  |  Cited by: 292

Paul Slovic

The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study

Published: 3/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01099.x  |  Cited by: 519

PAUL MARSH

This empirical study of security issues by UK companies between 1959 and 1974 focuses on how companies select between financing instruments at a given point in time. It throws light on a number of interesting questions. First, it demonstrates that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions and the past history of security prices in choosing between debt and equity. Second, it provides evidence that companies appear to make their choice of financing instrument as if they have target levels of debt in mind. Finally, the results are consistent with the notion that these target debt levels are themselves a function of company size, bankruptcy risk, and asset composition.

The Making of an Investment Banker: Stock Market Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income

Published: 11/11/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01409.x  |  Cited by: 221

PAUL OYER

I show that stock market shocks have important and lasting effects on the careers of MBAs. Stock market conditions while MBA students are in school have a large effect on whether they go directly to Wall Street upon graduation. Further, starting on Wall Street immediately upon graduation causes a person to be more likely to work there later and to earn, on average, substantially more money. The empirical results suggest that investment bankers are largely “made” by circumstance rather than “born” to work on Wall Street.

Valuation of Underwriting Agreements for UK Rights Issues

Published: 6/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03493.x  |  Cited by: 16

PAUL MARSH

THE UPWARD SLOPING IS CURVE AND THE CONTROL OF INCOME AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Published: 6/1974,  Volume: 29,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb01493.x  |  Cited by: 5

Paul Burrows

Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?

Published: 8/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.x  |  Cited by: 507

Paul Oyer

This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees' outside opportunities are correlated with their firms' performance. The model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad‐based stock option plans, as well as other financial instruments, even when these pay plans have no effect on employees' on‐the‐job behavior. The model suggests that agency theory's often‐overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes, particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks.

MONEY, GROWTH, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS*

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00833.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Graeser

Stock Splits, Tick Size, and Sponsorship

Published: 2/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00211  |  Cited by: 191

Paul Schultz

A traditional explanation for stock splits is that they increase the number of small shareholders who own the stock. A possible reason for the increase is that the minimum bid‐ask spread is wider after a split and brokers have more incentive to promote a stock. I document a large number of small buy orders following Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX splits during 1993 to 1994. I also find strong evidence that trading costs increase, and weak evidence that costs of market making decline following splits. This is consistent with splits acting as an incentive to brokers to promote stocks.

Pseudo Market Timing and the Long‐Run Underperformance of IPOs

Published: 3/21/2003,  Volume: 58,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00535  |  Cited by: 322

Paul Schultz

Numerous studies document long‐run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex‐post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex‐post, issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex‐ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex‐post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event‐time. Using calendar‐time returns solves the problem.

Discussion

Published: 5/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02249.x  |  Cited by: 0

PAUL HALPERN

SOME RECENT CHANGES IN THE EURO‐DOLLAR SYST

Published: 9/1964,  Volume: 19,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02866.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Einzig

Personal Income Taxes and the January Effect: Small Firm Stock Returns Before the War Revenue Act of 1917: A Note

Published: 3/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04954.x  |  Cited by: 45

PAUL SCHULTZ

This paper tests the tax explanation of the January effect by examining small firm stock returns before the War Revenue Act of 1917. No evidence of a turn‐of‐the‐year effect is found. This paper also extends previous authors' work on the subject to 1918–29. A January effect is found during that period.

Downward‐Sloping Demand Curves, the Supply of Shares, and the Collapse of Internet Stock Prices

Published: 1/10/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01318.x  |  Cited by: 24

PAUL SCHULTZ

Over March and April 2000, Internet stocks lost 56%, or $700 billion. This sudden collapse has been attributed to an increasing supply of shares from lockup expirations and equity offerings. I show that Internet stocks collapsed in this period regardless of whether their lockups expired. Furthermore, daily Internet stock portfolio returns were almost unaffected by the number or dollar amount of lockup expirations that day, or by the amount of stock offered in IPOs or SEOs. Most of the Internet stock decline is explained by poor marketwide returns, particularly for growth stocks.

A SURROGATIVE MEASURE OF BUSINESS CONFIDENCE AND ITS RELATION TO STOCK PRICES

Published: 12/1955,  Volume: 10,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01297.x  |  Cited by: 11

Paul G. Darling

COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE SIXTIES

Published: 5/1961,  Volume: 16,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02819.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul S. Nadler

STIMULATING BANK COMPETITION THROUGH REGULATORY ACTION

Published: 3/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00180.x  |  Cited by: 4

Paul M. Horvitz

Crowding Out and the Informativeness of Security Prices

Published: 9/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04763.x  |  Cited by: 22

JONATHAN M. PAUL

Individual investors trade less agressively on any particular piece of information as more investors observe it. The trades of the new investors observing a piece of information “crowd out” some of the trades of the old investors who observe that same piece of information. This paper shows that when traders are risk averse, these crowding out effects lead the proportions of traders who choose to observe one signal versus another to differ from the proportions that maximize the informativeness of prices.

THE AVAILABILITY OF CAPITAL TO SMALL BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA IN 1945–1946

Published: 10/1947,  Volume: 2,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1947.tb00796.x  |  Cited by: 3

Paul F. Wendt

A GENERAL GRANT FOR THE STATES: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS OBJECTIVES, JUSTIFICATION, AND EFFECTS*

Published: 9/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00946.x  |  Cited by: 0

George Paul Roniger

Structural Disequilibrium and the Banking Act of 1980

Published: 5/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03560.x  |  Cited by: 0

PAUL F. SMITH

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NONPAR BANKING*

Published: 12/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00333.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul F. Jessup

PREMIUMS ON CONVERTIBLE BONDS: COMMENT

Published: 9/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00566.x  |  Cited by: 3

Paul D. Cretien

DOMESTIC EXPANSION AND EXTERNAT., RESPONSIBILITIES

Published: 5/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00894.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul A. Volcker

VALUATION, LEVERAGE AND THE COST OF CAPITAL IN THE CASE OF DEPRECIABLE ASSETS: COMMENT

Published: 3/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb03173.x  |  Cited by: 0

Ronda S. Paul

INFLATION: AN EQUILIBRATING PROCESS*

Published: 12/1956,  Volume: 11,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb04095.x  |  Cited by: 0

Elmer Paul Lotshaw

WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH IN AN INVESTMENTS COURSE?

Published: 5/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00242.x  |  Cited by: 3

Paul F. Wendt

THE PRESENT STATUS OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY

Published: 3/1950,  Volume: 5,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1950.tb02468.x  |  Cited by: 1

Paul W. McCracken

TERM LOANS TO SMALL BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA, 1945–46

Published: 6/1948,  Volume: 3,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1948.tb01512.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul F. Wendt

OPTIMUM RATE ON TIME DEPOSITS*

Published: 12/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04336.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul F. Smith

COMPETITIVE INFORMATION IN THE STOCK MARKET: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EARNINGS, DIVIDENDS AND ANALYSTS' FORECASTS*

Published: 5/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01911.x  |  Cited by: 24

Paul A. Griffin

LARGE‐SCALE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Published: 5/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00008.x  |  Cited by: 1

Paul F. Wendt

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01682.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul S. Nadler

PRICING POLICIES ON CONSUMER LOANS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS

Published: 5/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00677.x  |  Cited by: 7

Paul F. Smith

THE FEDERAL BUDGET*

Published: 6/1950,  Volume: 5,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1950.tb02475.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul H. Douglas

A RE‐EXAMINATION OF PENSION FUND INVESTMENT POLICIES*

Published: 5/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04193.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul L. Howell

MONETARY POLICY AND FLUCTUATIONS IN THE EXTENSION OF TRADE CREDIT*

Published: 12/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04349.x  |  Cited by: 0

Paul Edwin Junk