The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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DISCUSSION

Published: 05/01/1979   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02118.x

STEPHEN A. BUSER


SEPARATION, DECOMPOSITION, AND DIVERSIFICATION IN THE SINGLE‐PERIOD PORTFOLIO PROBLEM*

Published: 12/01/1973   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01470.x

Stephen A. Buser


LaPlace Transforms as Present Value Rules: A Note

Published: 03/01/1986   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04502.x

STEPHEN A. BUSER

The present value equation in finance is shown to be equivalent to the Laplace transformation in mathematics. Based on this observation, the list of known analytic solutions for the present value problem is increased from a handful to more than one hundred. General properties of the Laplace transform are examined as well in light of the newly discovered significance for finance.


Portfolio Diversification at Commercial Banks

Published: 03/01/1979   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02068.x

EDWARD J. KANE, STEPHEN A. BUSER


Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital*

Published: 03/01/1981   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03534.x

STEPHEN A. BUSER, ANDREW H. CHEN, EDWARD J. KANE

This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk‐taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.